Phenomenology and interoception: Comment on Leder
Abstract
Abstract: Interoception is an important contributor to our everyday phenomenology. Two thought experiments can tell us something about the role it plays in our experience. The first is Avicenna’s “flying man” thought experiment which involves the idea of sensory deprivation, but shows how difficult it is to eliminate interoception. The central question is whether one would still have self-awareness if, along with all of the external senses one could eliminate interoception. I argue that this type of thought experiment necessarily leads to an abstraction that fails to take into account the rich context of bodily and environmental factors. A second, more recent thought experiment, the brain-in-the-vat argument, on one interpretation, fails to take into consideration the constraints imposed by the biological body with respect to hormonal, neurotransmitter chemistry, as well as anatomically based pre-neural processing of sensory input and post-neural processing of motor output, as well as interoceptive and affective/emotional processes. As Leder points out, most interoceptive processes happen without our awareness, although they shape our experience and if they were altered or missing our experience would be different, which is what he calls the “projective” feature of interoception. I conclude by suggesting that, as part of the rich context of everyday phenomenology, the projective feature can involve intersubjective processes
Keywords: Interoception; Sensory Deprivation; The Flying Man; The Brain in the Vat; Avicenna
Fenomenologia e interocezione: commento a Leder
Riassunto: L’interocezione è una componente importante della nostra fenomenologia quotidiana. Due esperimenti mentali possono dirci qualcosa sul ruolo che essa svolge nella nostra esperienza. Il primo è quello dell’uomo volante di Avicenna, che implica l’idea della privazione sensoriale, ma mostra quanto sia difficile eliminare l’interocezione. La questione nodale qui è la possibilità di avere ancora autocoscienza se, assieme a tutti i sensi esterni, venisse eliminata anche l’interocezione. Mostrerò che questo tipo di esperimento mentale porta necessariamente a un’astrazione che non tiene conto di un ampio contesto di fattori corporei e ambientali. Un secondo e più recente esperimento mentale è l’argomento del cervello nella vasca, che, in una delle sue interpretazioni, manca di considerare i vincoli imposti dal corpo biologico alla chimica degli ormoni e dei neurotrasmettitori; quelli imposti dall’anatomia al processamento pre-neurale dell’input sesoriale e a quello post-neurale dell’output motorio; quelli imposti dai processi interocettivi e affettivo/emotivi. Come sottolinea Leder, la maggior parte dei processi interocettivi ha luogo senza la nostra consapevolezza, anche se modellano la nostra esperienza e, se fossero alterati o mancassero, la nostra esperienza sarebbe diversa, che è ciò che lui definisce caratteristica “proiettiva” dell’interocezione. Concluderò suggerendo che, come parte del ricco contesto della fenomenologia quotidiana, la caratteristica proiettiva può coinvolgere i processi intersoggettivi.
Parole chiave: Interocezione; Deprivazione sensoriale; L’uomo volante; Il cervello nella vasca; Avicenna
Parole chiave
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