Che cosa si muove nella MST?

Antonino Fazio


Riassunto: Nel suo scritto intitolato What is moving right now? Elton Marques cerca di rispondere alla domanda su cosa sia la spotlight cui si riferisce la teoria temporale detta Moving Spotlight Theory ed espone l’idea che si tratti del flusso di coscienza relativo ai nostri stati mentali. Dopo aver presentato la sua tesi, introduco un’ipotesi aggiuntiva allo scopo di risolvere una difficoltà presente nella sua interpretazione. Benché Marques non tenti di sostenere il modello della MST rispetto ad altri modelli temporali, egli cerca di rendere la sua ipotesi convincente. Per questo motivo, io stesso metto qui a confronto il modello della MST (in particolare nella versione offerta da Marques) con altri modelli temporali, per valutarne la plausibilità all’interno del dibattito complessivo riguardante le principali teorie sul tempo, che pertanto vengono esposte nelle loro linee essenziali.

Parole chiave: A-theory; B-theory; Growing Block Theory; Moving Spotlight Theory; Tempo


What is moving in MST?

Abstract: In his paper entitled What is moving right now? Elton Marques queries the nature of the spotlight is in the Moving Spotlight Theory of time, suggesting it is the flow of consciousness regarding our own mental states. After presenting his thesis, I introduce an additional hypothesis which helps resolve a problem with his proposal. Also, although Marques presents a convincing argument for his interpretation, he does not attempt to compare the MST model with other temporal models. I take up this challenge, comparing the MST model (specifically, the version offered by Marques) with other temporal models, pointing out essential characteristics and differences. In this way, I am able to locate and evaluate MST within the overall debate and main theories of time.

Keywords: A-theory; B-theory; Growing Block Theory; Moving Spotlight Theory; Time

Parole chiave

Keywords: A-theory; B-theory; GBT; MST; Time - Parole chiave: A-theory; B-theory; GBT; MST; Tempo

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