Mechanistic explanations and the ethics of nudging
Abstract
Abstract: Nudges have proven to be effective tools for steering citizens toward desirable behaviors and make valuable additions to any policy-maker’s toolbox. Disappointingly, however, there are no mechanistic explanations for how nudges work, leaving policy-makers unable to explain what happens when they are implemented. This paper identifies some neglected ethical implications of the resulting citizens lack of awareness of such mechanisms. We first examine mechanistic explanations in relation to citizens’ understanding on how they work. Then, we look at mechanistic explanations in light of the suggestion advanced by some ethicists that nudges be considered ethically acceptable in modern liberal democracies provided the explicit transparency of the nudges employed.
Keywords: Nudge; Ethics of Nudging; Mechanistic Evidence; In-principle Transparency; Explicit Transparency
Spiegazioni meccanicistiche e l’etica dei nudges
Riassunto: I nudge si sono rivelati strumenti di policy efficaci nello "spingere gentilmente" i cittadini verso comportamenti considerati desiderabili. Per questa ragione i nudge sono considerati validi strumenti della cassetta degli attrezzi di un policymaker. Tuttavia, è in qualche modo deludente la mancanza di spiegazioni meccanicistiche dei nudge, dalla quale risulta l'incapacità dei policymaker di spiegare quello che succede quando i nudge vengono effettivamente implementati. Questo articolo identifica alcune implicazioni etiche finora trascurate connesse alla inconsapevolezza da parte dei cittadini circa i meccanismi che governano i nudge. Da una parte, le nostre considerazioni metteranno in relazione le spiegazioni meccanicistiche con la comprensione dei nudge da parte dei cittadini. Dall'altra parte, metteremo in relazione le spiegazioni meccanicistiche con il concetto di trasparenza esplicita, ossia la richiesta avanzata da alcuni eticisti al fine di considerare i nudge eticamente accettabili nelle moderne democrazie liberali.
Parole chiave: Nudge; Etica dei nudge; Spiegazioni meccanicistiche; Trasparenza implicita; Trasparenza esplicita
Parole chiave
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.4453/rifp.2022.0017
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