The boundaries and location of consciousness as identity theories deem fit

Riccardo Manzotti


Abstract: In this paper I approach the problem of the boundaries and location of consciousness in a strictly physicalist way. I start with the debate on extended cognition, pointing to two unresolved issues: the ontological status of cognition and the fallacy of the center. I then propose using identity to single out the physical basis of consciousness. As a tentative solution, I consider Mind-Object Identity (MOI) and compare it with other identity theories of mind.

Keywords: Extended Mind; Spread Mind; Enactivism; Cognition; Consciousness; Mind-Object Identity; Identity


I confini e la localizzazione della coscienza secondo le teorie dell’identità

Riassunto: In questo lavoro tratterò il problema dei confini e della localizzazione della coscienza in termini strettamente fisicalisti. Prenderò le mosse dal dibattito sulla cognizione estesa, portando l’attenzione su due questioni irrisolte: lo status ontologico della cognizione e la fallacia del centro. Proporrò quindi di usare l’identità per individuare la base fisica della coscienza. Come possibile soluzione, prenderò in considerazione la Mind-Object Identity (moi), confrontandola con oltre teorie dell’identità della mente.

Parole chiave: Mente estesa; Mente diffusa; Enattivimo; Cognizione; Coscienza; Mind-Object Identity; Identità

Parole chiave

Extended Mind; Spread Mind; Enactivism; Cognition; Consciousness; Mind-Object Identity; Identity

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