Dobbiamo abbandonare l'intuizionismo morale? Effetti incorniciamento e problemi di salvataggio

Chiara Corona

Abstract


Riassunto: Gli sviluppi recenti nell’ambito della ricerca sui processi decisionali relativi ai cosiddetti effetti di incorniciamento (framing effects) hanno ricevuto particolare attenzione da parte di quell’ambito della filosofia morale che si occupa di spiegare i dilemmi morali classici legati al famoso problema del carrello (trolley problem). Alcuni filosofi sostengono che illusioni cognitive come l’effetto di incorniciamento mettano seriamente in discussione alcuni punti di vista classici della filosofia morale come, per esempio, l’etica normativa e l’intuizionismo morale. L’obiettivo di questo articolo è cercare di mostrare se, alla luce della ricerca empirica sugli effetti di incorniciamento, possiamo mantenere un punto di vista intuizionista o meno e, più in generale, che cosa implichino questo genere di dati per la filosofia morale.

Parole chiave: Filosofia morale; Intuizionismo; Effetti di inconiciamento; Dilemmi morali; Teoria del prospetto

 

Should we Abandon Moral Intuitionism? Framing Effects and Moral Dilemmas

Abstract: Recent developments in experimental research on decision-making have received attention from moral philosophers trying to explain classical moral dilemmas. The class of cognitive illusions known as framing effects have received particular attention because they appear to play a role in explaining the famous trolley-problem. Some philosophers maintain that cognitive illusions such as framing effects seriously undermine classical point of views in moral philosophy such as normative ethics and moral intuitionism. This essay investigates whether, in light of empirical research on framing effects, we can still maintain an intuitionist point of view, and what the available data imply in general for moral philosophy.

Keywords: Moral Philosophy; Intuitionism; Framing Effects; Moral Dilemmas; Prospect Theory


Parole chiave


Filosofia morale; Intuizionismo; Effetti di inconiciamento; Dilemmi morali; Teoria del prospetto

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DOI: https://doi.org/10.4453/rifp.2019.0005

Copyright (c) 2019 Chiara Corona

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