Time and Consciousness in Cognitive Naturalism
Abstract
Abstract: Eliminative materialists argue that we can overcome the phenomenological gap between two different ways of referring to our subjective experiences – either as introspectively grasped in terms of folk psychology or as explained in neurological terms – by abandoning the pre-scientific concepts of folk psychology. However, unless these theorists can offer a plausible explanation for why the scientific view of the human mind proposed by cognitive neuroscience is so deeply counter-intuitive, this argument will remain unconvincing. In order to address the difficulties involved in making the paradigm shift from folk psychology to cognitive neuroscience I (a) briefly review the theoretical revolution that marked the transition from classical mechanics to the theory of relativity at the beginning of 20th century; (b) identify some similarities between this paradigm shift in physics and the birth of a new scientific view of the mind; (c) explain by means of (a) and (b) why neurological theories that reduce consciousness and the Self to aspects of brain dynamics appear implausible from a common sense perspective despite being sound from a scientific point of view.
Keywords: Time; Consciousness; Relativity Theory; Neuroscience; Eliminative Materialism.
Tempo e coscienza nel naturalismo cognitivo
Riassunto: I materialisti eliminativi sostengono che il divario fenomenologico tra due modi diversi di riferirsi alle esperienze soggettive, ora colte introspettivamente nei termini della psicologia del senso comune e ora spiegate in termini neurologici, può essere superato abbandonando i concetti pre-scientifici della psicologia del senso comune. Tuttavia essi continueranno a essere poco convincenti fino a quando non riusciranno a formulare una spiegazione plausibile del perché l’immagine scientifica della mente umana offerta dalla neuroscienza cognitiva sia così profondamente contro-intuitiva. Per superare le difficoltà legate al cambiamento di paradigma dalla psicologia del senso comune alla neuroscienza cognitiva si presenta qui un argomento articolato in tre passaggi: (a) viene brevemente esaminata la rivoluzione teorica che ha segnato il passaggio dalla meccanica classica alla teoria della relatività all’inizio del XX secolo; (b) vengono messe in luce alcune somiglianze tra, da un lato, il summenzionato cambiamento di paradigma in fisica e, dall’altro, la nascita odierna di una nuova visione scientifica della mente; (c) viene spiegato per mezzo di (a) e (b) il motivo per cui le teorie neurologiche che riducono la coscienza e l’io ad aspetti della dinamica del cervello appaiono implausibili al senso comune, sebbene siano pienamente convincenti da un punto di vista scientifico.
Parole chiave: Tempo; Coscienza; Teoria della Relatività; Neuroscienze; Materialismo Eliminativo.
Parole chiave
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.4453/rifp.2015.0044
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