Operationalizing and Measuring (a Kind of) Free Will (and Responsibility). Towards a New Framework for Psychology, Ethics, and Law
Abstract
Abstract: Free will is usually defined by three conditions: (1) the ability to do otherwise; (2) control of one’s own choices; (3) responsiveness to reasons. The compatibility of free will with determinism lies at the heart of the philosophical debate at the metaphysical level. This debate, while being increasingly refined, has not yet reached a conclusion. Recently, neuroscience and empirical psychology have tried to settle the problem of free will with a series of experiments that go in the direction of so-called illusionism: free will as the conscious control of our behavior cannot exist, being a mere illusion. But even in this case, the experimental results are challenged at various levels. Considering that in most moral and legal systems, the subject’s liability derives from their freedom, the usefulness of preserving the concept of freedom – which incidentally responds to a very strong commonsensical intuition – suggests the need for an operational solution. This could be done by resorting to the concepts of capacity and cognitive control, which are measured by a set of well-established neuropsychological tests. Our preliminary proposal is to create an index, the first step towards a specific quantification and measurement of free will, to be used especially in ethical and legal contexts. Theoretical premises, practical difficulties and objections to this approach are also discussed and addressed.
Keywords: Free Will; Responsibility; Self-control; Cognitive Functions; Determinism/Compatibilism.
Operazionalizzare e misurare (un tipo di) libero arbitrio (e di responsabilità). Un nuovo quadro di riferimento per la psicologia, l'etica e il diritto
Riassunto: Il libero arbitrio è solitamente definito da tre condizioni: (1) la possibilità di fare altrimenti; (2) il controllo delle proprie scelte; (3) la sensibilità alle ragioni. L’esistenza del libero arbitrio rispetto alla verità del determinismo è il cuore del dibattito filosofico a livello metafisico. E tale dibattito, pur sempre più raffinato, non ha ancora raggiunto un punto di approdo. Recentemente, le neuroscienze e la psicologia empirica hanno cercato di dirimere il problema del libero arbitrio con una serie di esperimenti che vanno nella direzione del cosiddetto illusionismo. In altre parole, il libero arbitrio come controllo cosciente del nostro comportamento non esisterebbe. Ma anche in questo caso i risultati sperimentali sono sfidati a vari livelli. Considerato che dalla libertà discende, in gran parte dei sistemi morali e legali, la responsabilità degli individui, l’utilità di conservare il concetto di libertà, verso la cui esistenza c’è anche una forte intuizione tra i non esperti, suggerisce di circoscrivere e operazionalizzare il libero arbitrio. Ciò potrebbe essere fatto ricorrendo alle nozioni di capacità e controllo cognitivo, che sono misurati da una serie di test neuropsicologici ben consolidati. La proposta preliminare è quella di creare un indice sintetico, primo passo verso una specifica quantificazione e misurazione del libero arbitrio di cui siamo dotati, da utilizzare soprattutto in ambito etico e giuridico. Premesse teoriche, difficoltà pratiche e obiezioni a questo approccio sono discusse e affrontate.
Parole chiave: Libero arbitrio; Responsabilità; Autocontrollo; Funzioni cognitive; Determinismo/Compatibilismo.
Parole chiave
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PDFRiferimenti bibliografici
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.4453/rifp.2015.0004
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