Searle's New Mystery, or, How not to Solve the Problem of Consciousness

Saulo de Freitas Araujo

Abstract


Il nuovo mistero di Searle, ovvero: come non risolvere il problema della coscienza

Riassunto: John Searle ha più volte affermato di aver risolto il problema mente-corpo, in particolar modo per quel che riguarda il mistero della coscienza. Obiettivo di questo lavoro è presentare e analizzare la sua teoria del naturalismo biologico, dalla sua prima formulazione, alla metà degli anni ’80, sino alle sue ultime manifestazioni. La nostra analisi mostrerà che il naturalismo biologico di Searle presenta molti problemi teorici e incongruenze logiche, che non depongono a suo favore come buona spiegazione sia per il problema della coscienza sia per il problema mente/cervello. In definitiva, lungi dall’offrire una soluzione al problema della coscienza, Searle finisce col fare della coscienza un nuovo mistero.

Parole chiave: John Searle; Coscienza; Naturalismo biologico; Problema mente-corpo; Filosofia della mente.

 

Abstract: John Searle repeatedly claims to have offered a solution to the mind-brain problem, especially as regards the mystery of consciousness. The aim of this paper is to present and analyse Searle’s theory of biological naturalism, from its earliest expression in the 1980s to his most recent works. Our analysis shows that Searle’s biological naturalism suffers from many theoretical difficulties and logical inconsistencies, which disqualify it as a sound explanation for consciousness and the mind-brain problem. We conclude that, far from offering a solution to the problem of consciousness, Searle ended up creating a new mystery of consciousness.

Keywords: John Searle; Consciousness; Biological Naturalism; Mind-Body Problem; Philosophy of Mind.


Parole chiave


John Searle; Consciousness; Biological Naturalism; Mind-Body Problem; Philosophy of Mind

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Riferimenti bibliografici


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DOI: https://doi.org/10.4453/rifp.2013.0001

Copyright (c) 2013 Saulo de Freitas Araujo

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