Il sé minimale e la tecnologia ibrida bio-macchinale: un contributo alla fenomenologia dell'incorporazione tecnologica
Abstract
Riassunto: Questo articolo contribuisce alla ricerca in corso sul sé minimale, la configurazione più semplice dell’identità individuale che affonda le sue radici nelle strutture e negli schemi corporei di base. Il tema del sé minimale sarà trattato da una prospettiva fenomenologica, concentrando l’attenzione sulle problematiche relative all’incorporazione tecnologica. Alcuni tipi di tecnologia come le protesi sono vissute dall’individuo come parte del proprio corpo. Esiste una relazione rilevante, da un punto di vista fenomenologico, tra l’incorporazione di una macchina e l’esperienza minimale del sé? La domanda è cruciale per una nuova generazione di macchine incorporabili, nota come tecnologia ibrida bio-macchinale, che beneficia di significativi progressi nella modellazione digitale dei segnali corporei e nella ricerca sui materiali biointegrati. L’articolo approfondisce la relazione tra la tecnologia ibrida bio-macchinale e il sé minimale discutendo un caso di studio altamente informativo nel campo della tecnologia della visione (protesi visive biomimetiche).
Parole chiave: Sé minimale; Incorporazione della tecnologia; Fenomenologia; Tecnologia ibrida bio-macchinale; Protesi biomimetiche
Minimal self and bio-machine hybrid technology: A contribution to the phenomenology of technology incorporation
Abstract: This article contributes to ongoing research on the minimal self, i.e., the simplest configuration of individual identity, which is rooted in basic body structures and schemes. The topic of minimal selfhood will be treated from a phenomenological perspective, focusing on issues of technology incorporation. Some types of technology, such as prosthetics, are experienced by the user as part of her or his own body. Is there a phenomenologically relevant relationship between the incorporation of a machine and minimal self-experience? The question is crucial for a new generation of incorporable machines, known as bio-machine hybrid technology, which benefits from significant advances in digital modeling of bodily signals as well as research on bio-integrated materials. The article delves into the relationship between bio-machine hybrid technology and the minimal self by discussing a highly informative case study in the field of vision technology (biomimetic visual prostheses).
Keywords: Minimal Self; Technology Incorporation; Phenomenology; Bio-Machine Hybrid Technology; Biomimetic Prostheses
Parole chiave
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.4453/rifp.2024.0020
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