The mind-body problem between philosophy and the cognitive sciences
Abstract
Abstract: Here, I examine the main philosophical solutions to the mind-body problem distinguishing between “historicist” solutions that (more or less clearly) separate philosophy from science and solutions that instead result from a double “cognitive turn”, and see “continuity” between philosophy of mind and the cognitive sciences. The “historicist” solutions include ontological dualism (together with “skepticism” and “new mysterianism”), epistemological dualism, subjective idealism, and absolute idealism. In this group, transcendental idealism, phenomenology, and neutral monism are the solutions most open to a dialogue between philosophy and science. The “naturalistic” solutions can be divided into four groups: (1) behaviorism (psychological, logical, philosophical-analytical behaviorism); (2) materialism (identity theory, physicalism); (3) “weak naturalism” (functionalism, anomalous monism, “biological naturalism”, liberal naturalism, emergentism); (4) “strong naturalism” (“cognitive neo-evolutionism”, eliminativism). These offer a physicalist-eliminative solution to the mind-body problem (here called “soft physicalistic eliminativism”) that allows for more continuity between philosophy of mind and the cognitive sciences.
Keywords: Mind/Body-Problem; Cognitive Science; Cognitive Turn; Naturalism; Eliminativism
Il problema mente-corpo in filosofia e le scienze cognitive
Riassunto: Vengono esaminate le principali soluzioni filosofiche al problema mente-corpo al fine di distinguere le soluzioni di origine storicistica che separano (più o meno chiaramente) filosofia e scienza da quelle che invece, nate da una duplice “svolta cognitiva”, favoriscono la “continuità” tra filosofia della mente e scienze cognitive. Le soluzioni del primo gruppo sono anzitutto il dualismo ontologico (insieme allo “scetticismo” e al “neo-misterianismo”), il dualismo epistemologico, l’idealismo soggettivo e l’idealismo assoluto. L’idealismo trascendentale, la fenomenologia e il monismo neutrale sono invece soluzioni più aperte al dialogo tra filosofia e scienza. Le soluzioni del secondo gruppo, quelle “naturalistiche”, vengono suddivise in quattro grandi gruppi: (1) il comportamentismo (psicologico, logico e filosofico-analitico); (2) il materialismo (teoria dell’identità e fisicalismo); (3) il “naturalismo debole” (funzionalismo, monismo anomalo, “naturalismo biologico”, naturalismo liberalizzato e emergentismo); (4) il “naturalismo forte” (“neo-evoluzionismo cognitivo” ed eliminativismo). In conclusion, una soluzione di tipo fisicalistico-eliminativo (qui chiamata “eliminativismo fisicalistico moderato”) al problema mente-corpo è quella che più di altre favorisce la continuità tra filosofia della mente e scienze cognitive.
Parole chiave: Problema mente/corpo; Scienza cognitiva; Svolta cognitiva; Naturalismo; Eliminativismo
Parole chiave
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.4453/rifp.2023.0009
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