The future of cognitive science is pluralistic, but what does that mean?
Abstract
Abstract: We imagine the future of cognitive science by first considering its past, which shows remarkable transformation from a field that, although interdisciplinary, was initially marked by a narrow set of assumptions concerning its subject matter. In the last decades, multiple alternative frameworks with radically different ontological and epistemic commitments (e.g., situated cognition, embodied cognition, extended mind) found broad support. We address the question of how to understand these changes, noting as logical alternatives that (1) newer approaches are not properly cognitive; (2) that newer approaches are cognitive but not science; and (3) that cognitive science has become pluralistic. We endorse the third position and venture to guess that the future of cognitive science is also pluralistic. We are left, however, with the question of what this means. After noting the polysemous nature of the term “pluralism”, we attempt to add clarity by distinguishing three forms: ontological, epistemic, and ethical. We then consider what each form might imply for the future of cognitive science.
Keywords: Cognitive Science; Pluralism; Relativism; History of Science; Philosophy of Science
Il futuro della scienza cognitiva è pluralista, ma che vuol dire?
Riassunto: Pensiamo al futuro della scienza cognitiva in primo luogo considerando il suo passato, il quale è notevolmente cambiato rispetto al presente. Per quanto si proponesse come un campo di studi interdisciplinari, la scienza cognitiva delle origini era caratterizzata da un insieme ristretto di assunzioni riguardanti il proprio oggetto. Negli ultimi decenni hanno trovato supporto diverse cornici teoriche in reciproca competizione e con impegni ontologici ed epistemologici radicalmente differenti (si pensi, per esempio, alla cognizione situata, alla cognizione incarnata, alla mente estesa). Proveremo a dare risposta alla domanda su come intendere questi cambiamenti, prendendo atto che ci troviamo di fronte a una serie di posizioni che sono logicamente alternative fra loro: (1) gli approcci più recenti non sono propriamente cognitivi; (2) oppure che gli approcci più recenti sono cognitivi, ma non scientifici; (3) la scienza cognitiva è diventata pluralista. Noi crediamo che la terza posizione sia corretta e scommettiamo su un futuro della scienza cognitiva che sia anche pluralista. Resta aperto, tuttavia, il problema di cosa questo significhi. Dopo aver preso atto della natura polisemica del termine “pluralismo”, cercheremo di far chiarezza distinguendo tre forme di pluralismo: ontologico, epistemico, ed etico. Considereremo quindi ciò che ciascuna può comportare per il futuro della scienza cognitiva.
Parole chiave: Scienza cognitiva; Pluralismo; Relativismo; Storia della scienza; Filosofia della scienza
Parole chiave
Full Text
PDFRiferimenti bibliografici
ABRAHAMSEN, A., BECHTEL, W. (2012). History and core themes. In: K. FRANKISH, W. RAMSEY (eds), The Cambridge handbook of cognitive science, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 9-28.
ADAMS, F., AIZAWA, K. (2008). The bounds of cognition, Blackwell, London/New York.
ADAMS, F., AIZAWA, K. (2009). Why the mind is still in the head. In: M. AYDEDE, P. ROBBINS (eds.), The Cambridge handbook of situated cognition, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 78-95.
ADAMS, F., AIZAWA, K. (2010). Defending the bounds of cognition. In: R. MENARY (ed.), The extended mind, MIT Press, Cambridge (MA), pp. 67-80.
ALLEN, C. (2017). On (not) defining cognition. In: «Synthese», vol. CXCIV, n. 11, pp. 4233-4249.
ARAUJO, S.F., OSBECK, L.M. (forthcoming). Ever not quite. Pluralism in William James and contemporary psychology, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
ARFINI, S., MAGNANI, L. (forthcoming). Embodied, extended, ignorant minds. New studies on the nature of not-knowing, Springer International Publishing, Cham.
BAERVELDT, C., VERHEGGEN, T. (2012). Enactivism. In: J. VALSINER (ed.), Oxford handbook of culture and psychology, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 165-190.
BERLIN, I. (1990). The crooked timber of humanity, John Murray, London.
BEVIR, M. (ed.) (2012). Modern pluralism, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
BOEX-BOREL, J.-H. (1909). Le pluralisme. Essai sur la discontinuité et l'hétérogénéité phénomènes, F. Alcan, Paris.
BROWN, J.S., COLLINS, A., DUGUID, P. (1989). Situated cognition and the culture of learning. In: «Educational Researcher», vol. XVIII, n. 1, pp. 32-42.
BRUNER, J. (1990). Acts of meaning, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (MA).
BRUNSWIK, E. (1957). Scope and aspects of the cognitive problem. In: H. GRUBER, K. HAMMOND, R. JESSOR (eds.), Contemporary approaches to cognition, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (MA), pp. 5-31.
BUCKNER, C., FRIDLAND, E. (2017). What is cognition? Angsty monism, permissive pluralism(s), and the future of cognitive science. In: «Synthese», vol. CXCIV, n. 11, pp. 4191-4195.
CHANG, H. (2012). Is water H2O? Evidence, realism and pluralism, Springer, Berlin/New York/Boston.
CHEMERO, A. (2003). An outline of a theory of affordances. In: «Ecological Psychology», vol. XV, n. 2, pp. 181-195.
CLARK, A. (2003). Natural-born cyborgs: Minds, technologies, and the future of human intelligence, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
CLARK, A. (2005). Intrinsic content, active memory and the extended mind. In: «Analysis», vol. LXV, n. 1, pp. 1-11.
CLARK, A., CHALMERS, D. (1998). The extended mind. In: «Analysis», vol. LVIII, n. 7, pp. 7-19.
COLIVA, A., LEE, N.J., PEDERSEN, N. (eds.) (2017), Epistemic pluralism, Palgrave-Macmillan, London/New York.
COOPER, R.P., SHALLICE, T. (2010). Cognitive neuroscience: The troubled marriage of cognitive science and neuroscience. In: «Topics in Cognitive Science», vol. II, n. 3, pp. 398-406.
COSTA, E. (2018). Affordances-in-practice: An ethnographic critique of social media logic and context collapse. In: «New Media and Society» vol. XX, n. 10, pp. 3641-3656.
DALE, R., DIETRICH, E., CHEMERO, A. (2009). Explanatory pluralism in cognitive science. In: «Cognitive Science», XXXIII, n. 5, pp. 739-742.
DE GELDER, B. (1985). The cognitivist conjuring trick or how development vanished. In: C. BAILEY, R. HARRIS (eds.), Developmental mechanisms of language, Pergamon, New York, pp. 149-166.
DE JONG, H.L. (2001). Introduction: A symposium on explanatory pluralism. In: «Theory and Psychology», vol. XI, n. 6, pp. 731-735.
DEWEY, J. (1910). How we think, D.C. Heath, Boston/New York/Chicago.
DOUGLAS, H.E. (2009). Science, policy, and the value-free ideal, University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh.
DOUGLAS, H.E. (2016). Values in science. In: P. HUMPHRIES (ed.), The Oxford handbook of philosophy of science, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 609-630.
FABRY, R.E. (2017). Transcending the evidentiary boundary: Prediction error minimization, embodied interaction, and explanatory pluralism. In: «Philosophical Psychology», vol. XXX, n. 4, pp. 391-414.
FEEST, U. (forthcoming). Progress in psychology. In: Y. SHAN (ed.), New philosophical perspectives on scientific progress, Routledge, London/New York.
FODOR, J.A. (1975). The language of thought, Crowell Press, New York.
FODOR, J.A. (1980). Methodological solipsism considered as a research strategy in cognitive science. In: «Behavioral and Brain Sciences», vol. III, n. 1, pp. 63-109.
FRODEMAN, R. (2013). Sustainable knowledge: A theory of interdisciplinarity, Springer, Berlin/New York/ Boston.
FRODEMAN, R. (2017). The future of interdisciplinarity: An introduction to the 2nd edition. In: R. FRODEMAN (ed.), The Oxford handbook of interdisciplinarity, Oxford University Press, Oxford/New York, pp. 3-8, 2nd edition.
GALLAGHER, S. (2018). The extended mind: State of the question. In: «The Southern Journal of Philosophy», vol. LVI, n. 4, pp. pp. 421-447.
GARDNER, H. (1987). The mind’s new science, Basic Books, New York.
GIBSON, J.J. (1977). The theory of affordances. In: R. SHAW, J. BRANSFORD (ed.), Perceiving, acting, and knowing, Lawrence Erlbaum, Hillsdale (NJ), pp. 67-82.
GIBSON, J.J. (1979). The ecological approach to visual perception, Houghton Mifflin, Boston.
GOERTZEN, J.R. (2010). Dialectical pluralism: A theoretical conceptualization of pluralism in psychology. In: «New Ideas in Psychology», vol. XXVIII, n. 2, pp. 201-209.
GREENO, J.G. (1997). On claims that answer the wrong questions. In: «Educational Researcher», vol. XXVI, n. 1, pp. 5-17.
HALES, S. (ed.) (2011). A companion to relativism, Wiley-Blackwell, London/New York.
HARRÉ, R. KRAUSZ, M. (1996). Varieties of relativism, Wiley-Blackwell, London/New York.
HEIDER, F. (1957). Trends in cognitive theory. In: H. GRUBER, K. HAMMOND, R. JESSOR (eds.), Contemporary approaches to cognition, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (MA), pp. 201-210.
HUTCHINS, E. (1995). Cognition in the wild, MIT Press, Cambridge (MA).
JAMES, W. (1890). The principles of psychology, vol. I, Henry Holt and Co., New York.
JAMES, W. (1977). A pluralistic universe (1909), Harvard University Press, Cambridge (MA).
JAMES, W. (1983). Brute and human intellect (1878). In: W. JAMES (ed.), Essays in psychology, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (MA), pp. 1-37.
JANSSEN, A., KLEIN, C., SLORS, M. (2017). What is a cognitive ontology, anyway?. In: «Philosophical Explorations», vol. XX, n. 2, pp. 123-128.
KANT, I. (2009). Anthropology from a pragmatic point of view (1798). In: G. ZÖLLER, R. LOUDEN (eds.), The Cambridge edition of the works of Immanuel Kant (Anthropology, History, and Education), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 227-429.
KELLERT, S., LONGINO, H., WATERS, C.K. (2006). The pluralist stance. In: S. KELLERT, H. LONGINO, C.K. WATERS (eds.), Scientific pluralism, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, pp. vii-xxix.
KERBER, W. (1989). Pluralismus. In: J. RITTER, K. GRÜNDER (Hrsg.), Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie, Bd. VII, Schwabe & Co., Basel, pp. 988-993.
KIRK, G.S., RAVEN, J.E., SCHOFIELD, M. (eds.) (2013). The presocratic philosophers: A critical history with a selection of texts, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2nd edition.
KLEIN, J.T. (1990). Interdisciplinarity: History, theory, and practice, Wayne State University Press.
KLEIN, J.T. (2017). Typologies of interdisciplinarity. In: R. FRODEMAN (ed.), The Oxford handbook of interdisciplinarity, Oxford University Press, Ox-ford/New York, pp. 21-34.
KRUG, T.W. (1833). Allgemeines Handwörterbuch der philosophischen Wissenschaften, Bd. III, Brockhaus, 2nd edition.
KUHN, T. (1970). The structure of scientific revolutions, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2nd edition.
KUSCH, M. (2021). Relativism in the philosophy of science, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
LABORDE, C. (2000). Pluralist thought and the State in Britain and France, 1900-1925, Palgrave Macmillan, London/New York.
LAKOFF, G., JOHNSON, M. (1999). Philosophy in the flesh. The embodied mind and its challenge to western thought, Basic Books, New York.
LANER, P. (1905). Pluralismus oder Monismus, Albert Kohler, Berlin.
LAVE, J. (1988). Cognition in practice: Mind, mathematics, and culture in everyday life, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
LAVE, J., WENGER, E. (1991). Situated learning: Legitimate peripheral participation, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
LIU, I. (2018). Ethical pluralism and the appeal to human nature. In: «European Journal of Philosophy», vol. XXVI, n. 3, pp. 1103-1119.
LUDWIG, D. (2013). New wave pluralism. In: «Dialectica», vol. LXVII, n. 4, pp. 545-560.
MADSEN, R., STRONG, T. (eds.) (2003), The many and the one, Princeton University Press, Princeton.
MAIESE, M. (2018). Can the mind be embodied, enactive, affective, and extended?. In: «Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences», vol. XVII, n. 2, pp. 343-361.
MANDER, W.J. (2011). British Idealism: A history, Ox-ford University Press, Oxford.
MCCAULEY, R.N. (2009). Time is of the essence: Explanatory pluralism and accommodating theories about long-term processes. In: «Philosophical Psychology», vol. XXII, n. 5, pp. 611-635.
MCCAULEY, R.N., BECHTEL, W. (2001). Explanatory pluralism and heuristic identity theory. In: «Theory and Psychology», vol. XI, n. 6, pp. 736-760.
MENARY, R. (2010). Introduction: The extended mind in focus. In: R. MENARY (ed.), The extended mind, MIT Press, Cambridge (MA), pp. 1-25.
MITCHELL, S.D. (2003). Biological complexity and integrative pluralism, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
MITCHELL, S.D. (2009). Unsimple truths, University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
MONK, R. (1978). Cognitivism and cognitive psychology. In: «Behavioral and Brain Sciences», vol. I, n. 2, pp. 242-243.
MUENZINGER, K. (1957). Introduction. In: H. GRUBER, K. HAMMOND, R. JESSOR (eds.), Contemporary approaches to cognition, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (MA), pp. 1-4.
NERSESSIAN, N.J. (1985). Faraday’s field concept. In: D.C. GOODING, F.A.J.L. JAMES (eds.), Faraday rediscovered: Essays on the life & work of Michael Faraday, 1791-1867, Stockton/Macmillan, London/New York, pp. 377-406.
NERSESSIAN, N.J. (2005). Interpreting scientific and engineering practices: Integrating the cognitive, social, and cultural dimensions. In: M. GORMAN, R. TWENEY, D. GOODING, A. KINCANNON (eds.), Scientific and technological thinking, Erlbaum, pp. 17-56.
NERSESSIAN, N.J. (2008). Creating scientific concepts, MIT Press, Cambridge (MA).
NERSESSIAN, N.J. (2022). Interdisciplinarity in the making: Models and methods in frontier science, MIT Press, Cambridge (MA).
NEWELL, A. (1980). Physical symbol systems. In: «Cognitive Science», vol. IV, n. 2, pp. 135-183.
OSBECK, L.M. (2009). Transformations in cognitive science: Implications and issues posed. In: «Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology», vol. XXIX, n. 1, pp. 16-33.
OSGOOD, C.E. (1957). Discussion of paper by Egon Brunswick. In: H. GRUBER, K. HAMMOND, R. JESSOR (eds.), Contemporary approaches to cognition, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (MA), pp. 33-40.
PAIN, R. (2018), Phenomenology and cognitive neuroscience: Can a process ontology help resolve the impasse?. In: «Australasian Philosophical Review», vol. II, n. 2, pp. 204-208.
PITT, D. (2020). Mental representation. In: E.N. ZALTA (ed.), The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy, Spring Edition, URL: https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2020/entries/mental-representation/>.
POSNER, M.I., DI GIROLAMO, G.J. (2000). Cognitive neuroscience: Origins and promise. In: «Psychological Bulletin», vol. CXXVI, n. 6, pp. 873-889.
POSTOW, B.C. (2007). Toward honest ethical pluralism. In: «Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition», vol. CXXXII, n. 2, pp. 191-210.
PRICE, C.J., FRISTON, K.J. (2005). Functional ontologies for cognition: The systematic definition of structure and function. In: «Cognitive Neuropsychology», vol. XXII, n. 3, pp. 262-275.
RUPHY, S. (2017). Scientific pluralism reconsidered, University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh.
SCARINZI, A. (2020). 4Es are too many: Why enactive world making does not need the extended mind thesis. In: «JoLMA», vol. I, n. 2, pp. 237-254.
SHEA, N. (2018). Representation in cognitive science, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
SIMON, H.A. (1981). Studying human intelligence by creating artificial intelligence: When considered as a physical symbol system, the human brain can be fruitfully studied by computer simulation of its processes. In: «American Scientist», vol. LXIX, n. 3, pp. 300-309.
STANDAGE, D., TRAPPENBERG, T. (2012). Cognitive neuroscience. In: K. FRANKISH, W. RAMSEY (eds), The Cambridge handbook of cognitive science, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 235-256.
STILL, A., COSTALL, A. (1987). Introduction: In place of cognitivism. In: A. COSTALL, A. STILL (eds.), Cognitive psychology in question, St. Martin’s Press, New York, pp. 1-11.
STILL, A., COSTALL, A. (eds.) (1991). Against cognitivism: Alternative foundations for cognitive psychology, Harvester Wheatsheaf, Hemel Hempstead/London.
TWENEY, R.D. (1985). Faraday’s discovery of induction: A cognitive approach. In: D.C. GOODING, F.A.J.L. JAMES (eds.), Faraday rediscovered: Essays on the life & work of Michael Faraday, 1791-1867, Stockton/Macmillan, London/New York, pp. 189-209.
VAN GELDER, T., PORT, R.F. (1995). Mind as motion: Explorations in the dynamics of cognition, MIT Press, Cambridge (MA).
VARELA, F.J., THOMPSON, E., ROSCH, E. (1991). The embodied mind: Cognitive science and human experience, MIT Press, Cambridge (MA).
VARELA, F.J. (1996). Neurophenomenology: A methodological remedy for the hard problem. In: «Journal of Consciousness Studies», vol. III, n. 4, pp. 330-349.
VEIGL, S.J. (2021). Notes on a complicated relationship: Scientific pluralism, epistemic relativism, and stances. In: «Synthese», vol. CXCIX, n. 1-2, pp. 3485-3503.
VILLALOBOS, M., DEWHURST, J. (2017). Why post-cognitivism does not (necessarily) entail anti-computationalism. In: «Adaptive Behavior», vol. XXV, n. 3, pp. 117-128.
VON ECKARDT, B. (2012). The representational theory of mind. In: K. FRANKISH, W. RAMSEY (eds), The Cambridge handbook of cognitive science, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 29-49.
WAHL, J. (1925). The pluralist philosophies from England and America, translated by F. ROTHWELLThe Open Court Company, London.
WARD, J. (1911). The realm of ends or pluralism and theism, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
WERTHEIMER, M. (1945). Produktives Denken, Waldemar Kramer, Frankfurt a.M.
WERTZ, F. (1987). Cognitive psychology and the understanding of perception. In: «Phenomenological Psychology», vol. XVIII, n. 1, pp. 103-142.
WITHAGEN, R., DE POEL, H.J., ARAÚJO, D., PEPPING, G.J. (2012). Affordances can invite behavior: Reconsidering the relationship between affordances and agency. In: «New Ideas in Psychology», vol. XXX, n. 2, pp. 250-258.
WOLFF, C. (1722). Vernünfftige Gedanken von Gott, der Welt, und der Seele des Menschen, Renger, 2nd edition, pp. 19-20.
WUNDT, W. (1920). Erlebtes und Erkanntes, Alfred Kröner, Stuttgart.
ZANGWILL, N. (2020). The missing link and the ambitions of epistemology. In: «Metaphilosophy», vol. LI, n. 4, pp. 485-498.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.4453/rifp.2023.0002
Copyright (c) 2023 Lisa Osbeck
URLdella licenza: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
Rivista internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia - ISSN: 2039-4667 (print) - E-ISSN: 2239-2629 (online)
Registrazione al Tribunale di Milano n. 634 del 26-11-2010 - Direttore Responsabile: Aurelia Delfino
Web provider Aruba spa - Loc. Palazzetto, 4 - 52011 Bibbiena (AR) - P.IVA 01573850516 - C.F. e R.I./AR 04552920482
Dove non diversamente specificato, i contenuti di Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia sono distribuiti con Licenza Creative Commons Attribuzione 4.0 Internazionale.