Il modello corporeo e la teoria neuropsicologica del sé corporeo minimale. Una rassegna tematica
Abstract
Riassunto: Il concetto di modello corporeo è un’acquisizione relativamente recente della neuropsicologia. Studiosi attivi in questo ambito di ricerca interpretano il concetto di modello corporeo come facente riferimento ad un modello interno, una rappresentazione cognitiva delle proprietà anatomiche, volumetriche e posturali del corpo umano. È stato dimostrato come il modello corporeo fornisca un background cognitivo stabile a processi d’integrazione dell’informazione multisensoriale riferita al corpo proprio. In questo senso, si ritiene che esso concorra a generare una forma elementare di autocoscienza corporea, il cosiddetto sé corporeo minimale. Il presente contributo intende fornire un’aggiornata rassegna tematica sul modello corporeo trattato contestualmente alla teoria neuropsicologica del sé corporeo minimale. A tale scopo, saranno discussi studi teorici di rilievo che condividono una comune base sperimentale: le Illusioni della Proprietà Corporea (IPC). Attenzione verrà riservata anche alle principali ricadute che un tale lavoro di sistematizzazione teorica ha recentemente conosciuto in psicopatologia, filosofia della neuroscienza e neurofilosofia. Saranno infine segnalati alcuni problemi aperti nella contemporanea ricerca sul modello corporeo.
Parole chiave: Neuropsicologia; Modello corporeo; Sé corporeo minimo; Illusioni della proprietà corporea
The body model and the neuropsychological theory of the minimal bodily self. A thematic revie
Abstract: The body model is a relatively new concept developed by neuropsychologists that refers to an internal model or cognitive representation of the anatomical, volumetric, and structural aspects of the human body. The body model has been shown to provide a stable cognitive background for body-related multisensory integration, thereby contributing to the formation of an elementary kind of corporeal self-consciousness, the so-called minimal bodily self. Here, I provide an updated thematic review of research on the body model in the context of the neuropsychological theory of the minimal bodily self. It examines theoretical studies based on experiments on Body Ownership Illusions (BOI) and the important implications this work has for psychopathology, the philosophy of neuroscience and neurophilosophy. Finally, it points to some unanswered questions in contemporary research on the body model.
Keywords: Neuropsychology; Body Model; Minimal Bodily Self; Body Ownership Illusions
Parole chiave
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PDFRiferimenti bibliografici
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.4453/rifp.2022.0021
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