Imagined and delusional pain

Jennifer Radden


Abstract: Extreme pain and suffering are associated with depression as well as tissue damage. The impossibility of imagining any feelings of pain and suffering intersect with two matters: the kind of imagining involved, and the nature of delusions. These two correspond to the sequence of the following discussion, in which it is contended first that feelings of pain and suffering resist being imagined in a certain, key way (defined here as proprietary imagining P simpliciter), and second that, given a certain analysis of delusional thought, this precludes the possibility of delusional affections while allowing delusions about affections (here affective delusions).

Keywords: Pain; Imagination; Delusion; Affection; Feelings


Dolore immaginato e dolore illusorio

Riassunto: Dolore estremo e sofferenza sono solitamente associati a depressione e danni tissutali. L’impossibilità di immaginare il provare dolore e sofferenza dipende da due fattori: il tipo di immaginazione coinvolta e la natura dell’illusione. Questi due fattori saranno trattati in parallelo nell’analisi che qui si propone, in cui si discuterà in primo luogo come il provare dolore e sofferenza oppongano resistenza all’essere immaginati in un certo modo (qui indicato come carattere proprietario dell'immaginare P simpliciter) e in secondo luogo come, secondo una certa analisi del pensiero illusorio, questo preclude la possibilità di affezioni illusorie mentre consente illusioni circa le affezioni (qui indicate come illusioni affettive).

Parole chiave: Dolore; Immaginazione; Illusioni; Affezione; Sensazioni

Parole chiave

Pain; Imagination; Delusion; Affection; Feelings

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