Fodor, Kim e l'autonomia delle scienze cognitive
Abstract
Riassunto: Lo statuto della psicologia come scienza speciale è l’oggetto del dibattito pluridecennale intercorso tra Jerry Fodor e Jaegwon Kim. La questione epistemologica delle leggi delle scienze cognitive si intreccia inestricabilmente con riflessioni di tipo metafisico sul dilemma mente-corpo: se Fodor ammette la validità delle leggi psicologiche, considerate irriducibili alle leggi della fisica, il fisicalismo riduzionista di Kim esclude invece tale possibilità. Così, il dialogo tra i due paradigmi funzionalisti delinea una serie di snodi problematici relativi sia allo status delle proprietà mentali, come alla possibilità di una scienza che possa aprirsi alla inter-specificità, o alla trasversalità delle strutture di implementazione. Centrale, nel dibattito, è la nozione di realizzabilità multipla: tale argomento, che viene addotto a sostegno di un certo grado di autonomia del mentale, viene da Kim giudicato, invece, essenzialmente aporetico.
Parole chiave: Filosofia della mente; Scienze cognitive; Realizzabilità multipla; Funzionalismo; Fisicalismo riduzionista
Fodor, Kim and the autonomy of cognitive sciences
Abstract: The status of psychology as a special science is the main topic of the debate between two of the most important philosophers of mind in our times: Jerry Fodor and Jaegwon Kim. The epistemology of psychological laws is inextricably intertwined with the metaphysical quarrel over the mind-body problem. Fodor argues for the validity of psychological laws and their irreducibility to physical ones, whereas Kim’s reductive physicalism rules out their validity. Therefore, the dialogue between these two functionalist paradigms covers a range of open questions concerning the status of mental properties within a physicalist framework, as well as questions concerning the possibility of cross-species cognitive sciences. The notion of multiple realization is a pivotal point in this debate: it should indicate that the mind enjoys a certain degree of autonomy, yet Kim judges it to be aporetic in nature.
Keywords: Philosophy of Mind; Cognitive Sciences; Multiple Realization; Functionalism; Reductive Physicalism
Parole chiave
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.4453/rifp.2021.0006
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