Corpo vissuto ed esperienza virtuale. Una prospettiva fenomenologica
Abstract
Riassunto: Può la corporalità dirsi ancora una condizione costitutiva dell’esperienza nella presente era digitale? Esistono due fondamentali modi di affrontare la questione, la cui rilevanza è stata di recente sottolineata da ricercatori attivi nei campi dell’Intelligenza Artificiale Incorporata. Il primo interpreta la questione come incentrata su un’indagine della relazione fra corporalità e digitalizzazione, il processo cioè di digitalizzare dati il quale rende possibile simulare, aumentare e perfino costruire la realtà all’interno di uno spazio di esperienza virtuale (realtà aumentata e realtà virtuale), assumendo l’idea tradizionale del computing come un’attività che utilizza dispositivi artificiali, elettronici, per processare, gestire e comunicare informazioni. Il secondo considera la stessa relazione da una diversa prospettiva, facendo cioè riferimento al computing come a un’attività naturale, secondo l’emergente ricerca di computing naturale condotta nel campo del computing non convenzionale. Seguendo quest’ultima prospettiva, che sta acquisendo un crescente consenso all’interno della comunità scientifica, il lavoro indagherà il ruolo costitutivo della corporalità rispetto all’esperienza virtuale associata a una nota ed oramai autonoma area di ricerca del computing naturale, vale a dire il computing morfologico, utilizzando il metodo della fenomenologia genetica.
Parole chiave: Computing naturale e computing artificiale; Corporeità; Morfologia naturale e morfologia artificiale; Fenomenologia genetica
Lived Body and Virtual experience. A Phenomenological Perspective
Abstract: In what sense can corporality still be considered a constitutive condition for experience in the current digital age? Recent scholarship in the fields of Embodied Artificial Intelligence and the philosophy of Embodied Artificial Intelligence has probed the relevance of two approaches to this question. The first queries the relationship between corporality and digitization, i.e., examining how it is possible to simulate, augment, and even construct reality within a space of virtual experience (Augmented Reality and Virtual Reality) by digitizing data. This approach builds on the traditional idea of computing as an activity that uses artificial, mostly electronic, devices to process, manage, and communicate information. The second approach, increasingly favored by computer scientists, considers computing to be a natural activity, and approaches this same relationship from the perspective of emerging research in unconventional computing, specifically Natural Computing. This paper follows the latter approach, addressing the constitutive role of corporality in virtual experience associated with a well-known and still autonomous research area within Natural Computing, that is, Morphological Computing, from the from the point of view of genetic phenomenology.
Keywords: Artificial and Natural Computing; Corporality; Natural and Artificial Morphology; Genetic Phenomenology
Parole chiave
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PDFRiferimenti bibliografici
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.4453/rifp.2019.0022
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