Modularità ed esperienza cosciente in una prospettiva neurocognitiva

Andrea Nani

Abstract


Riassunto: L’esperienza cosciente sembra essere un soggetto di studio elusivo per la ricerca neuroscientifica. Tuttavia, da un punto di vista operazionale e neurocognitivo, l’esperienza cosciente può essere vista come una collezione di eventi inseriti in una cornice bidimensionale. Una dimensione è relativa al livello di vigilanza o grado di veglia, l’altra dimensione è relativa ai contenuti esperienziali, gli oggetti della nostra consapevolezza fenomenica. A dispetto della variabilità di queste due dimensioni, il senso di unità cosciente sembra essere di norma profondo, reale e immediato. Nondimeno, alcune condizioni neurologiche avvalorano l’ipotesi che quest’unità sia il risultato di una costruzione operata da delicati e complessi meccanismi cerebrali. Si esamineranno pertanto, in una prospettiva neurocognitiva, i dati provenienti da alcune ricerche empiriche su pazienti affetti da epilessia, i risultati degli esperimenti condotti su persone split-brain e di minima coscienza, che dimostrano come l’esperienza cosciente si basi su un’organizzazione modulare del cervello.

Parole chiave: Coscienza; Modularità; Livello; Contenuto; Epilessia; Split-brain; Stato di minima coscienza

 

Modularity and Conscious Experience in a Neurocognitive Perspective

Abstract: Conscious experience seems to be an elusive matter of study for neuroscientific research. From an operational and neurocognitive point of view, however, conscious experience can be considered as a collection of events within a bidimensional framework. One dimension relates to wakefulness or the level of arousal, the other dimension relates to experiential contents, the objects of our phenomenal awareness. The variability of these two dimensions notwithstanding, the sense of conscious unity generally appears to be deep, real and immediate. Still, certain neurological conditions provide evidence for the hypothesis that this unity may be the result of a construction achieved by subtle and complex brain mechanisms. Taking the neurocognitive perspective, I will examine data coming from empirical research on patients with epilepsy and present some results from experiments conducted on split-brain patients and individuals in a minimally conscious state, which show how conscious experience may be rooted in the modular organisation of the brain.

Keywords: Consciousness; Modularity; Level; Content; Epilepsy; Split-brains; Minimally Conscious State

 


Parole chiave


Coscienza; Modularità; Livello; Contenuto; Epilessia; Split-brains; Stato di minima coscienza

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DOI: https://doi.org/10.4453/rifp.2018.0022

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