Dilemma della prima persona e fenomenologia dell’azione: quanto è minimale l’autocoscienza?

Mariaflavia Cascelli

Abstract


Riassunto: Negli ultimi anni sempre maggiore attenzione viene data alla possibilità che una forma minima, pre-riflessiva di auto-coscienza preceda l’auto-coscienza introspettiva. Diversi sono stati i tentativi fatti per sostenere che questa forma “sottile” di auto-coscienza sia un prerequisito necessario della coscienza. Dopo una breve considerazione dei problemi semantici ed epistemologici relativi all’uso del pronome di prima persona, questo articolo si concentrerà sulla letteratura che analizza le eccezioni al principio di immunità dall’errore per misidentificazione dalla prospettiva della fenomenologia dell’agentività. Il nesso tra problemi epistemologici e fenomenologici intende mettere in questione l’idea per cui l’auto-coscienza sia una componente essenziale di ogni esperienza cosciente, anche e soprattutto quando sia emendata come una forma minima di auto-coscienza. La fenomenologia dell’auto-attribuzione dell’agentività sembra suggerire che l’auto-coscienza corrisponda a un sé esteso più che a un sé minimale, ossia più a un’auto-coscienza riflessiva che non pre-riflessiva.

Parole chiave: Autocoscienza; Riferimento a sé; Sé minimale; Agentività; Propriocezione

 

First Person Dilemma and the Phenomenology of Action: How Minimal is Self-consciousness?

Abstract: In recent years, increasing attention has been given to the possibility that a minimal, pre-reflective form of self-consciousness precedes introspective self-consciousness. Several attempts to argue that this “thin” notion of self-consciousness is a necessary prerequisite of consciousness have been provided. After briefly considering the semantic and epistemological issues related to the first-person pronoun, this paper refers to the literature that investigates exceptions to the Immunity to Error Through Misidentification principle from the point of view of the phenomenology of agency. We interrogate the relationship between the epistemological and the phenomenological issues for the purpose of questioning the idea that self-consciousness is an essential component of every conscious experience, even and especially when it is considered to be a minimal form of self-consciousness. The phenomenology of the self-attribution of agency seems to suggest that self-consciousness corresponds to an extended rather than a minimal self, namely to a reflective rather than a pre-reflective self-consciousness.

Keywords: Self-consciousness; Self-reference; Minimal Self; Agency; Ownership


Keyword


Autocoscienza; Riferimento a sé; Sé minimale; Agentività; Propriocezione

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DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.4453/rifp.2016.0006

Copyright (c) 2016 Mariaflavia Cascelli

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