Control, Attitudes de se and Immunity to Error Through Misidentification
Abstract
Abstract: In his work on attitudes de se, James Higginbotham has observed that the silent subject of the infinitival complements of verbs such as remember and imagine is (i) unambiguously de se and (ii) immune to error through misidentification relatively to the subject of the matrix clause. In this article, we review and criticize Higginbotham’s reflexive analysis of these infinitival complements. We also show that the type of criticism we raise against Higginbotham’s account applies likewise to analyses based on the use of acquaintance relations and centered possible worlds. Finally, following recent ideas in cognitive science, we propose an amendment to Higginbotham’s account based on the idea that the thematic-role “Experiencer” corresponds to a function mapping events into “minimal selves”, in the sense of Shaun Gallagher.
Keywords: Attitudes de se; Immunity to Error Through Misidentification; Control; Thematic Roles; Minimal Self; Self-reference
Controllo, Attitudini de se e immunità da errore per misidentificazione
Riassunto: Nel suo lavoro sugli atteggiamenti proposizionali de se, James Higginbotham ha osservato che il soggetto nullo dei complementi infinitivi di verbi come ricordare e immaginare è (i) necessariamente de se e (ii) immune da errore per misidentificazione da parte del soggetto della frase principale. In questo articolo, presentiamo un sommario critico dell’analisi riflessiva che Higginbotham propone per questa classe di complementi infinitivi. Dimostriamo, inoltre, che le critiche sollevate contro l’approccio di Higginbotham si applicano con uguale forza alle analisi basate sull’uso di relazioni di acquaintance. Nella parte conclusiva dell’articolo, proponiamo di modificare l’analisi di Higginbotham sulla base di alcune recenti proposte nell’ambito delle neuroscienze. In particolare, proponiamo che il ruolo tematico di Esperiente corrisponda a una funzione da eventi a minimal selves, nel senso discusso da Shaun Gallagher.
Parole chiave: Attitudini de se; Immunità da errore per misidentificazione; Controllo; Ruoli tematici; Sé minimo; Autoriferimento
Parole chiave
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PDFRiferimenti bibliografici
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.4453/rifp.2014.0015
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