Generi psichiatrici come HPC: un nuovo approccio al dibattito discreto/continuo in psichiatria

Marco Casali


Riassunto: Questo lavoro cerca di mostrare come i disordini psichiatrici non possano essere inquadrati in chiave essenzialista, cioè non possano essere individuati attraverso proprietà necessarie e sufficienti. Preliminarmente introdurremo un modello chiamato Homestatic Property Cluster (HPC), che risulterà strumentale per comprendere, in prima istanza, la natura continua o discreta delle entità “disordini psichiatrici”. Sosterremo che i disordini mentali sono entità discrete. In seguito, per quanto riguarda la nostra critica all’essenzialismo, analizzeremo il disease model(un modello essenzialista molto utilizzato in ambito medico), ponendo l’attenzione soprattutto sui suoi limiti, cercando di mettere in rilievo varie obiezioni rispetto alla sua applicabilità. Infine, cercheremo di illustrare come il modello HPC possa essere un buon punto di partenza per identificare e classificare i generi psichiatrici e come esso possa mediare tra una visione rigidamente discreta e una visione rigidamente continua dei generi psichiatrici, poiché il modello HPC, a nostro avviso, combina in maniera virtuosa proprietà di entrambe le concezioni.

Parole chiave: Modello HPC; Generi naturali; Continuo; Discreto; Filosofia della psichiatria


Psychiatric Kinds as HPC: A new Approach to the Discrete/Continuum Controversy in Psychiatry

Abstract: This paper aims to show that psychiatric disorders cannot be defined within an essentialist perspective – i.e. by means of necessary and sufficient properties. We introduce the Homeostatic Property Cluster model (HPC) which proves useful for addressing the question as to whether psychiatric disorders are continuous or discrete entities. From this discussion we find that psychiatric kinds are discrete. We then analyze the disease model – recognized in the medical field as an essentialist model – bringing attention to its limitations and raising objections to its applicability. Finally, we argue that the HPC model offers a good starting point for identifying and classifying psychiatric kinds, and show how it can provide a bridge between the rigidly discrete and rigidly continuous perspectives on kinds, bringing together aspects of both.

Keywords: HPC Model; Natural Kinds; Continuous; Discrete; Philosophy of Psychiatry


Modello HPC; Generi naturali; Continuo; Discreto; Filosofia della psichiatria

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