The Several Factors of (Self-)Consciousness
Abstract
Abstract: In prior essays I have sketched a “modal model” of (self-) consciousness. That model “factors” out several distinct forms of awareness in the phenomenological structure of a typical act of consciousness. Here we consider implications of the model à propos of contemporary theories of consciousness (e.g. higher-order and self-representational forms of awareness). In particular, we distinguish phenomenality from other features of awareness in a conscious experience: “what it is like” to have an experience involves several different factors. Further, we should see these factors as typical of consciousness, rather than essential features, allowing that some elements of awareness may be absent while others are present in certain less typical cases.
Keywords: (Self-)consciousness; Higher-order Theories of Consciousness; Self-representational Theories of Consciousness; Phenomenality; Phenomenological Theories of Consciousness
I diversi elementi della (auto-)coscienza
Riassunto: In lavori precedenti ho cercato di proporre un “modello modale” della (auto)coscienza. Questo modello “considera” forme differenti e distinte di consapevolezza che sono presenti nella struttura fenomenologica di un atto tipico di coscienza. Qui intendo considerare alcune implicazioni di questo modello in relazione ad alcune teorie contemporanee della coscienza (tra cui, le teorie di alto livello della coscienza e le forme auto-rappresentazionali di consapevolezza). In particolare, distingueremo la fenomenicità da altre proprietà della consapevolezza all’interno di un’esperienza cosciente: il “che cosa si prova” a essere titolari un’esperienza implica elementi differenti e distinti. Inoltre, dovremo considerare questi elementi come caratteri tipici della coscienza e non come proprietà essenziali, riconoscendo che alcuni elementi della consapevolezza possono essere assenti, mentre altri sono presenti in alcuni casi meno frequenti.
Parole chiave: (Auto-)coscienza; Teorie della coscienza di alto livello; Teorie auto-rappresentazionali della coscienza; Fenomenicità; Teorie fenomenologiche della coscienzaParole chiave
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PDFRiferimenti bibliografici
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.4453/rifp.2016.0032
Copyright (c) 2016 David Woodruff Smith
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