Knowledge by Experience. Or Why Physicalism Should not be our Default Position in Consciousness Studies

Alfredo Tomasetta

Abstract


Abstract: Current philosophical and scientific approaches to consciousness are very often characterised by a strong background presupposition: whatever the precise details of a theory of consciousness may be, a physicalist – or materialist – view of consciousness itself must be correct. I believe, however, that this conviction, pervasive though it may be, is not really justified. In particular, I think (1) that the arguments offered in favour of the materialist presupposition are weak and unconvincing, and (2) that there is a very strong prima facie case for rejecting physicalism regarding phenomenal consciousness. In a previous article of mine I have already discussed the first point; the present paper is devoted to elaborating the second, presenting a common-sense-based argument against physicalism.

Keywords: Consciousness; Physicalism; Knowledge; Nature/Essence; Common Sense


Conoscere per Esperienza. O del perché il fisicalismo non dovrebbe essere la nostra posizione di default nello studio della coscienza

Riassunto: Gli attuali approcci filosofici e scientifici alla coscienza sono molto spesso caratterizzati da una forte presupposizione di sfondo: qualunque siano i dettagli precisi di una teoria della coscienza, una visione fisicalista – o materialista – della coscienza stessa deve essere corretta. Credo tuttavia che questa convinzione, per quanto pervasiva, non sia davvero giustificata. In particolare penso che (1) gli argomenti offerti a favore della presupposizione materialista siano deboli e non convincenti e che (2) ci sia un argomento prima facie molto forte per respingere il fisicalismo circa la coscienza fenomenica. Ho già discusso il primo punto in un articolo precedente; il presente articolo è dedicato a sviluppare il secondo punto, presentando un argomento contro il fisicalismo basato sul senso comune.

Parole chiave: Coscienza; Fisicalismo; Conoscenza; Natura/Essenza; Senso comune


Parole chiave


Consciousness; Physicalism; Knowledge; Nature/Essence; Common Sense

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Riferimenti bibliografici


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DOI: https://doi.org/10.4453/rifp.2016.0004

Copyright (c) 2016 Alfredo Tomasetta

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