Unforgivable Sinners? Epistemological and Psychological Naturalism in Husserl’s Philosophy as a Rigorous Science
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Peccatori imperdonabili? Il naturalismo epistemologico e psicologico nella Filosofia come scienza rigorosa di Husserl
Riassunto: In questo articolo intendo presentare e discutere le tesi avanzate da Husserl contro il naturalismo epistemologico e psicologico in La filosofia come scienza rigorosa. Intendo mostrare come la sua critica si rivolga a posizioni generalmente più estreme rispetto alle varianti del naturalismo oggi dibattute; e tuttavia le tesi husserliane hanno implicazioni interessanti per la discussione contemporanea. In primo luogo, egli mostra come vi sia un nesso importante tra naturalismo epistemologico (la tesi secondo cui la validità della logica può essere ridotta alla validità delle leggi naturali del pensiero) e naturalismo psicologico (la tesi secondo cui tutte le occorrenze psichiche sono semplici eventi che accompagnano parallelamente le occorrenze fisiologiche). In secondo luogo, egli mostra come una versione robusta di naturalismo epistemologico indebolisca se stesso, non riuscendo a traslare la cogenza logica in termini psicologici. In terzo luogo – e questo è il tratto più importante per la discussione contemporanea – egli attacca il cartesianesimo in quanto forma di naturalismo psicologico per via del considerare la psiche come sostanza. Contro questa posizione Husserl afferma la necessità di formulare nuovi obiettivi epistemici per le ricerche sulla coscienza, sostenendo che il fattore di maggiore interesse circa la coscienza non sia la sua fatticità empirica, bensì la sua funzione trascendentale, che garantisce accesso conoscitivo a ogni tipo di oggetto (empirico e ideale). Lo studio di questa funzione richiede un metodo specifico (l’eidetica), da non confondersi con i metodi empirici. Nella parte conclusiva intendo sostenere come le analisi husserliane offrano nuove prospettive sulla struttura della coscienza, di cui oggi si sente il bisogno, ma anche argomenti persuasivi contro le incerte speculazioni metafisiche circa il rapporto tra mente e corpo.
Parole chiave: Fenomenologia; Epistemologia; Filosofia della Mente; Coscienza; Naturalismo
Abstract: In this paper I present and assess Husserl's arguments against epistomological and psychological naturalism in his essay Philosophy as a Rigorous Science. I show that his critique is directed against positions that are generally more extreme than most currently debated variants of naturalism. However, Husserl has interesting thoughts to contribute to philosophy today. First, he shows that there is an important connection between naturalism in epistemology (which in his view amounts to the position that the validity of logic can be reduced to the validity natural laws of thinking) and naturalism in psychology (which in his view amounts to the position that all psychic occurrences are merely parallel accompaniments of physiological occurrences.) Second, he shows that a strong version of epistemological naturalism is self-undermining and fails to translate the cogency of logic in psychological terms. Third, and most importantly for current debates, he attacks Cartesianism as a form of psychological naturalism because of its construal of the psyche as a substance. Against this position, Husserl defends the necessity to formulate new epistemic aims for the investigation of consciousness. He contends that what is most interesting about consciousness is not its empirical fact but its transcendental function of granting cognitive access to all kinds of objects (both empirical and ideal). The study of this function requires a specific method (eidetics) that cannot be conflated with empirical methods. I conclude that Husserl's analyses offer much-needed insight into the fabric of consciousness and compelling arguments against unwarranted metaphysical speculations about the relationship between mind and body.
Keywords: Phenomenology; Epistemology; Philosophy of Mind; Consciousness; Naturalism.
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