The Moral Adequacy of Emotions

Contenuto principale dell'articolo

Paul Schuetze

Abstract

Abstract: Common philosophical approaches on the adequacy of emotions usually focus on the most objective assessment of the situation. In contrast to this, I claim that this objective stance, generally called “fittingness”, does not satisfy the current needs of emotional evaluation. Given the motivational role of emotions and their influence on social interactions, it is of utmost importance to also evaluate their moral value. Yet, a further development towards such a moral judgment is missing. In this paper, I provide an approach for the moral adequacy of emotional responses in a social context. I aim to show that in today’s social and political culture the link between emotions and moral norms cannot be neglected. Introducing two instances of judging the moral adequacy, I focus on evaluating either the cause or the consequence of an emotional reaction. By assessing the moral value of emotional responses, I think moral growth can be facilitated – not only in individuals but also in whole societies.

Keywords: Emotions, Morality, Adequacy of Emotions, Moral Norms, Moral Judgment of Emotions

 

L’adeguatezza morale delle emozioni

Riassunto: Usualmente gli approcci filosofici più noti circa l’adeguatezza delle emozioni fanno leva su una valutazione quanto più oggettiva possibile della situazione. Al contrario intendo suggerire che questa posizione oggettiva, solitamente denominata “fittingness”, non soddisfa il bisogno di valutare le emozioni. Considerato il carattere motivazionale delle emozioni e la loro influenza sulle interazioni sociali, è estremamente rilevante anche valutare il loro valore rispetto al giudizio morale. Tuttavia, non vi sono ancora sviluppi in questa direzione. In questo articolo provo a delineare un approccio che descriva l’adeguatezza morale delle reazioni emotive in un contesto sociale. Il mio scopo è quello di mostrare che nella odierna cultura politica e sociale non si può trascurare il legame fra emozioni e norme morali. Introdurrò due istanze per giudicare l’adeguatezza morale e le userò per valutare o la causa o la conseguenza di una reazione emotiva. Sono persuaso che determinare il valore morale delle reazioni emotive possa favorire la crescita morale non solo degli individui, ma anche delle intere società.

Parole chiave: Emozioni; Moralità; Adeguatezza delle emozioni; Norme morali; Valutazione morale dell’emozione

Downloads

Download data is not yet available.

Dettagli dell'articolo

Sezione

Ricerche

Biografia autore

Paul Schuetze

Institut für Kognitionswissenschaft, Universität Osnabrück, Wachsbleiche 27 - 49090 Osnabrück (D)

Come citare

The Moral Adequacy of Emotions. (2019). Rivista Internazionale Di Filosofia E Psicologia, 10(1), 33-48. https://doi.org/10.4453/rifp.2019.0003

Riferimenti bibliografici

Beauchamp, T.L. (2007). The “Four Principles” Approach to Health Care Ethics. In: R.E. Ashcroft, A. Dawson, H. Draper, J.R. McMillan (eds.), Principles of Health Care Ethics, Wiley & Sons, Chichester 2007, pp. 3-10.

Birnbacher, D. (2011). Analytische Einführung in die Ethik, 3. Auflage, De Gruyter, Berlin.

Blasi, A. (1999). Emotions and Moral Motivation. In: «Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour», vol. XXIX, n. 1, pp. 1-19.

Boddice, R. (2018). The History of Emotions, Manchester University Press, Manchester.

Chapman, H.A., Anderson, A.K. (2012). Understanding Disgust. In: «Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences», vol. MCCLI, pp. 62-76.

D’Arms, J., Jacobson, D. (2000). The Moralistic Fallacy: On the “Appropriateness” of Emotions. In: «Philosophy and Phenomenological Research», vol. LXI, n. 1, pp. 65-90.

De Sousa, R. (1979). The Rationality of Emotions, in:«Dialogue », vol. XVIII, n. 1, pp. 41-63.

De Sousa, R. (2004). Emotions: What I Know, What I’d like to Think I Know, and What I’d like to Think. In: R. Solomon (ed.), Thinking about Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 61-75.

De Sousa, R. (2017). Emotion. In: E.N. Zalta (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Winter Edition 2017, URL: https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2017/entries/emotion/.

De Sousa, R., Morton, A. (2002). Emotional Truth. In: «Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society», vol. LXXVI, pp. 247-275.

Deonna, J., Teroni, F. (2012). The Emotions: A Philosophical Introduction, Routledge, Abingdon.

Dretske, F. (2010). Triggering and Structuring Causes. In: T. O’Connor, C. Sandis (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Action, Blackwell, London/New York, pp. 139-144.

Frijda, N.H. (1986). The Emotions, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Gert, B. (1999). Common Morality and Computing. In: «Ethics and Information Technology», vol. I, n. 1, pp. 53-60.

Gordon, R.M. (1986). The Passivity of Emotions. In: «The Philosophical Review», vol. XCV, n. 3, pp. 371-392.

Haidt, J. (2008). Morality. In: «Perspectives on Psychological Science», vol. III, n. 1, pp. 65-72.

Haidt, J., Rozin, P., McCauley, C., Imada, S. (1997). Body, Psyche, and Culture: The Relationship between Disgust and Morality. In: «Psychology and Developing Societies», vol. IX, n. 1, pp. 107-131.

Keltner, D., Kring, A. (1998). Emotion, Social Function, and Psychopathology. In: «Review of General Psychology», vol. II, n. 3, pp. 320-342.

Kühne, R. (2012). Media-induced Affects and Opinion Formation: How Related and Unrelated Affects Influence Political Opinions. In: «Living Reviews in Democracy», vol. III - doi: 10.5167/uzh-68721.

Lazarus, R.S. (1982). Thoughts on the Relations between Emotion and Cognition. In: «American Psychologist», vol. XXXVII, n. 9, pp. 1019-1024.

Lazarus, R.S. (1991). Emotion & Adaptation, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Müller, J.M. (2011). Emotion, Wahrnehmung und evaluative Erkenntnis. In: J. Slaby, A. Stephan, H. Walters, S. Walters (Hrsg.), Affektive Intentionalität: Beiträge zur welterschließenden Funktion der menschlischen Gefühle, Mentis, Paderborn, pp. 110-127.

Rawls, J. (1987). The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus. In: «Oxford Journal of Legal Studies», vol. VII, n. 1, pp. 1-25.

Salmela, M. (2014). True Emotions, John Benjamins, Amsterdam/Philadelphia.

Scarantino, A. (2017). Do Emotions Cause Actions, and If So How?. In: «Emotion Review», vol. IX, n. 4, pp. 326-334.

Shields, S.A. (2005). The Politics of Emotion in Everyday Life: “Appropriate” Emotion and Claims on Identity. In: «Review of General Psychology», vol. IX, n. 1, pp. 1-15.

Slaby, J. (2017). Affekt und Politik. Neue Dringlichkeiten in einem alten Problemfeld. In: «Philosophische Rundschau», vol. LXII, n. 2, pp. 134-162.

Smith, C.A., Lazarus, R.S. (1990). Emotion and Adaptation. In: L.A. Pervin (ed.), Handbook of Personality: Theory and Research, Oxford University Press, Oxford / New York, pp. 609-637.

Stephan, A. (2017). On the Adequacy of Emotions and Existential Feelings. In: «Rivista internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia», vol. VIII, n. 1, pp. 1-13.

Teroni, F., Bruun, O. (2011). Shame, Guilt and Morality. In: «Journal of Moral Philosophy», vol. VIII, n. 2, pp. 223-245.

Thompson, R.A. (1991). Emotional Regulation and Emotional Development. In: «Educational Psychology Review», vol. III, n. 4, pp. 269-307.

Vasilopoulou, S., Wagner, M. (2017). Fear, Anger and Enthusiasm about the European Union: Effects of Emotional Reactions on Public Preferences towards European Integration. In: «European Union Politics», vol. XVIII, n. 3, pp. 382-405.