Paul’s Reconfiguration of Decision-Problems in the Light of Transformative Experiences
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Abstract: This paper focuses on cases of epistemically transformative experiences, as Paul calls them, cases where we have radically different experiences that teach us something we would not have learned otherwise. Paul raises the new and rather intriguing question of whether epistemic transformative experiences pose a general problem for the very possibility of rational decision-making. It is argued that there is an important grain of truth in Paul’s set up and solution when it is applied to a certain narrowly defined set of cases – choices to have a new taste experience in a safe environment, where no important objective values are at stake. But the way she generalizes this approach to large-scale life choices, such as the choice to become a parent, is less convincing. Furthermore, given a proper understanding of revelatory value, there is no need to reconfigure the agent’s choice situation in order to enable rational decision-making.
Keywords: Transformative Experience; Rational Decision-Making; Revelatory Value; Subjective Value
La riconfigurazione dei problemi decisionali nell’ottica di Transformative Experiences di L.A. Paul
Riassunto: Questo lavoro si concentra sui casi di esperienze epistemicamente trasformative, come le definisce Paul, casi in cui abbiamo esperienze radicalmente differenti che ci insegnano qualcosa che non avremmo appreso diversamente. Paul solleva una questione nuova e alquanto intrigante, ossia se le esperienze epistemicamente trasformative pongano un problema generale per l’effettiva possibilità della decisione razionale. Si sosterrà come vi sia un importante elemento di verità nella posizione e nella soluzione di Paul, se riferite a un ristretto numero di casi – la scelta di provare una nuova esperienza in un ambiente sicuro, dove non sono in gioco valori oggettivamente importanti. E, tuttavia, il modo in cui Paul generalizza questo approccio investendo un vasto ambito di scelte di vita, quali la scelta di diventare genitore, è meno convincente. Inoltre, data un’adeguata comprensione di valori rivelativi, non c’è bisogno di riconfigurare il contesto di scelta dell’agente per attivare un processo decisionale razionale.
Parole chiave: Esperienza trasformativa; Decisione razionale; Valore rivelativo; Valore soggettivo
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