Un approccio pragmatico al “problema reale” della coscienza
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Abstract
Riassunto: Nonostante le difficoltà teoretiche ed epistemologiche nell’affrontare il fenomeno della coscienza, l’autore individua una metodologia pragmatica e sperimentalmente consistente, fondata sull’approccio neurocognitivo bidimensionale: per evitare di rimanere incagliati nel “problema complesso” della coscienza, è preferibile infatti concentrarsi sul “problema reale”, ovvero sui meccanismi empiricamente rilevabili, lasciando in secondo piano le caratteristiche epistemiche e fenomenologiche degli stati mentali coscienti. Dall’analisi della relazione gerarchica tra stato di veglia e contenuto di coscienza emerge un’interessante interpretazione che tenta di rendere ragione dell’unitarietà della coscienza e, al contempo, della sua varietà fenomenica. Tuttavia, alcuni studi sul sonno, sulla fase REM e sugli incubi potrebbero mettere in discussione una certa versione forte di questa relazione gerarchica tra stati di coscienza. È inoltre importante chiedersi se una prospettiva bidimensionale sia sufficiente a definire esaustivamente le caratteristiche oggettive della coscienza o se sia auspicabile un diverso approccio tridimensionale.
Keywords: Coscienza; Problema reale; Veglia; Consapevolezza; Fase REM
A Pragmatic Approach to the “Real Problem” of Consciousness
Abstract: Despite the theoretical and epistemological complexities involved in dealing with the phenomenon of consciousness, the author describes defines a pragmatic and experimental methodology, based on a two-dimensional neurocognitive approach. Indeed, in order to avoid the hard problem of consciousness, it would be better to focus on the real problem, i.e. on mechanisms that can be empirically observed, leaving out all of the epistemic and phenomenological features of conscious states. The idea of a hierarchical relationship between the level (wakefulness) and the content (awareness) of consciousness could give rise to an interpretation which justifies both the unity and, at the same time, the phenomenal variety of consciousness. However, studies on sleep, REM phase and nightmares might challenge at least the strong version of this hypothetical relationship between different features of consciousness. Furthermore, it is important to consider whether a two-dimensional perspective, rather than a three-dimensional one, would be sufficient to exhaustively define all the objective features of consciousness.
Keywords: Consciousness; Real Problem; Wakefulness; Awareness; REM Phase
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