The Mechanics and Psychology of Practical Reasoning
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Abstract: In this commentary on Sinhababu’s Humean Nature I will explore three lines of inquiry. The first asks about the explanatory power of the Desire-Belief Theory of Reasoning, by way of wondering about how desires and beliefs combine with one another. The second question continues along these lines, asking about the further conditions Sinhababu places on reasoning and whether a theory of reasoning can be normatively neutral. The third points out the need for more clarity in his account of intention by contrasting it with practical reasoning.
Keywords: Desire; Belief; Humean Psychology; Intention; Practical Reasoning
Meccanica e psicologia del ragionamento pratico
Riassunto: In questo commento su Humean Nature di Neil Sinhababu intendo esplorare tre linee di indagine. La prima si interroga sul potere esplicativo della Desire-Belief Theory of Reasoning, indagando come desideri e credenze si combinano reciprocamente. La seconda prosegue su questa strada, interrogando le ulteriori condizioni che Sinhababu pone sul ragionamento e chiedendomi se una teoria del ragionamento possa essere normativamente neutrale. La terza individua il bisogno di maggiore chiarezza nella sua descrizione dell’intenzione, mostrandone le differenze rispetto al ragionamento pratico.
Parole chiave: Desiderio; Credenza; Psicologia humeana; Intenzione; Ragionamento pratico
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References
BROOME, J. (2013), Rationality Through Reasoning, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
GIBBARD, A. (1990), Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: A Theory of Normative Judgment, Harvard University Press.
GIBBARD, A. (2003), Thinking How to Live, Harvard University Press.
RAZ, J. (2011), From Normativity to Responsibility, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
SINHABABU, N. (2017), Humean Nature. How Desire Explains Action, Thought, and Feeling, Oxford University Press, Oxford/New York.