Vivid Representations and Their Effects
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Abstract: Sinhababu’s Humean Nature contains many interesting and important ideas, but in this short commentary I focus on the idea of vivid representations. Sinhababu inherits his idea of vivid representations from Hume’s discussions, in particular his discussion of calm and violent passions. I am sympathetic to the idea of developing Hume’s insight that has been largely neglected by philosophers. I believe that Sinhababu and Hume are on the right track. What I do in this short commentary is to raise some questions about the details. The aim of asking these questions is not to challenge Sinhababu’s proposal (at least his main ideas), but rather to point at some interesting issues arising out of his proposal. The questions are about (1) the nature of vividness, (2) the effects of vivid representations, and (3) Sinhababu’s account of alief cases.
Keywords: Vivid Representation; Desire; Procrastination; Akrasia; Alief
Le rappresentazioni vivide e i loro effetti
Riassunto: Humean Nature di Neil Sinhababu contiene molte idee interessanti e importanti; tuttavia in questo breve commento intendo concentrarmi sulle rappresentazioni vivide. Sinhababu eredita l’idea di rappresentazione vivida dalle analisi di Hume, in particolare dall’analisi delle passioni calme e violente. Condivido l’intento di sviluppare questa intuizione di Hume, ampiamente trascurata dai filosofi. Credo che Sinhababu e Hume siano sulla strada giusta. Quanto intendo fare in questo breve commento è sollevare alcune questioni di dettaglio, il cui fine non è quello di mettere in discussione la proposta di Sinhababu (quantomeno nei suoi intenti principali), quanto piuttosto di indicare alcuni punti interessanti che emergono dalla sua proposta. Le mie questioni investono (1) la natura della vividezza, (2) gli effetti delle rappresentazioni vivide e (3) la descrizione di Sinhababu dei casi di alief.
Parole chiave: Rappresentazione vivida; Desiderio; Temporeggiare; Akrasia; Cattiva volontà
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