Reflective Efficacy
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Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to highlight some difficulties of Neil Sinhababu’s Humean theory of agency, which depend on his radically reductivist approach, rather than to his Humean sympathies. The argument is that Sinhababu’s theory builds upon a critique of reflective agency which is based on equivocation and misunderstandings of the Kantian approach. Ultimately, the objection is that his reductivist view is unequipped to address the rclassical problems of rational deliberation and agential authority.
Keywords: Humean Theory; Rational Deliberation; Agency; Authority; Christine Korsgaard
Efficacia riflessiva
Riassunto: Questo articolo mette in luce alcune difficoltà della teoria proposta da Neil Sinhababu, che dipendono daun approccio radicalmente riduttivista. Si argomenta che la teoria di Sinhababu è basata su alcuni fraintendimenti a proposito dell'approccio kantiano alla teoria dell'azione. L'obiezione fondamentale è che questa posizione riduttivista non riesce a rendere conto adeguatamente della deliberazione razionale e dell'autorità dell'agente.
Parole chiave: Teoria humeana; Deliberazione razionale; Agentività; Autorità; Christine Korsgaard
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References
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