Franz Brentano e il cognitivismo emotivo
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Abstract
Riassunto: Il presente studio intende mostrare la natura specifica del cognitivismo emotivo proposto da Franz Brentano. In maniera più o meno evidente, la teoria del valore delineata da Brentano ha ricoperto un ruolo di primaria importanza nel dibattito assiologico-etico di fine Ottocento e inizio Novecento ed è ampiamente discussa anche all’interno del dibattito contemporaneo. Nel contributo (a) vengono richiamati gli aspetti generali di tale teoria soffermandosi sulla nozione di “rappresentazione intuitiva” intesa come modalità che permette di conoscere ciò che giusto e ciò che è ingiusto. Si passa dunque a (b) discutere l’accezione brentaniana di “preferibilità intrinseca”, (c) rilevando, in sede di conclusione, che l’effettiva centralità e attualità della teoria brentaniana sono conseguenza diretta della sua intrinseca natura “non univoca”.
Parole chiave: Franz Brentano; Valore; Emozione; Cognitivismo emotivo; Presentazione intuitiva
Franz Brentano and Emotional Cognitivism
Abstract: This essay aims to describe the specific nature of the emotional cognitivism sketched out by Franz Brentano. Indeed in a more or less direct way the value-theory he developed has played a key-role both within the ethical-axiological debate at the turn of the 20th century and in contemporary debate. In this paper I (a) describe the general traits of Brentano’s value-theory focusing primarily on his account of concrete intuitive presentation insofar as it allows us to acknowledge what it is right and wrong. Then (b) I discuss Brentano’s characterization of “intrinsic preferability” and conclude by arguing that (c) the historical-philosophical prominence and relevance of this value-account may be sought in its “not univocal nature”.
Keywords: Franz Brentano; Value; Emotion; Emotional Cognitivism; Intuitive Presentation
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