Distorsioni temporali e coscienza dell'azione intenzionale
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Abstract
Riassunto: Le “distorsioni” temporali paiono riguardare l’agentività umana in tutte le proprie manifestazioni. Da una prospettiva strutturale, l’azione si manifesta come un intreccio di processi che fondamentalmente comprende la formulazione di un’intenzione, l’esecuzione di un movimento e infine il processamento di un feedback che include gli effetti dell’azione. Lo studio dell’agentività umana ha incontrato molti ostacoli dovuti principalmente alla complessità dei processi mentali che accompagnano azioni specifiche. E tuttavia studi recenti hanno gettato luce sui processi mentali sottostanti l’azione. In questo articolo intendo sostenere che, lungi dall’essere “distorsioni” temporali, le discrepanze tra tempo soggettivo (in prima persona) e tempo oggettivo (terza persona) mostrano più profonde modalità soggettive inconsce di costituzione del tempo, che aggirano l’indagine scientifica e puntano direttamente alla costituzione fenomenologica di una rappresentazione del mondo coerente e dotata di significato, che non può essere ulteriormente ridotta mediante il riferimento al tempo oggettivo.
Parole chiave: Soggettività; Tempo; Agentività; Distorsioni temporali; Esperienza
Temporal Distorsions and Consciousness of Intentional Action
Abstract: Temporal “distortions” seem to affect human agency in all its manifestations. From a structural point of view, action manifests itself as a plot of processes that essentially include the formulation of an intention, the execution of a motion, and, finally, processing feedback including the effects of the action. The study of human agency has encountered several obstacles which are mainly due to the complexity of mental processes that accompany specific actions. Yet recent studies have shed light on the mental processes underlying action. In my paper I argue that, far from being temporal “distortions”, mismatches between subjective time (first person) and objective time (third person) indicate deeper unconscious subjective modes of in-forming time, which bypass scientific exploration and point directly to the phenomenological constitution of a consistent and meaningful representation of the world, which cannot be further reduced by referring to clock time.
Keywords: Subjectivity; Time; Agency; Temporal Distorsions; Experience
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