Cognitive Naturalism and the Phenomenal Feel
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Abstract: According to Sandro Nannini’s Time and Consciousness in Cognitive Naturalism, we can draw an analogy between the shift in the conception of time that occurred in physics with the introduction of relativity theory and a shift towards a scientifically more graspable functional concept of phenomenal consciousness. This analogy is meant to persuade us of the eliminative materialist view that we should abandon our folk psychological concept of consciousness. In my commentary, I examine the naturalization procedure underlying Nannini’s cognitive naturalism, argue for its inability to account for the phenomenal feel of conscious states, and point to some important differences between the conceptual change in the case of time and the intended change in the case of consciousness.
Keywords: Eliminative Materialism; Phenomenal Consciousness; Explanatory Gap; Hard Problem; Cognitive Naturalism.
Naturalismo cognitivo e sensazioni fenomeniche
Riassunto: In Time and Consciousness in Cognitive Naturalism Sandro Nannini propone un’analogia tra il cambiamento radicale della nozione di tempo che ha avuto luogo in fisica con l’introduzione della Teoria della Relatività e un cambiamento radicale del concetto funzionale di coscienza fenomenica, che lo renderebbe più adatto a una descrizione scientifica. Questa analogia dovrebbe persuaderci della concezione materialistico-eliminativista, secondo cui dovremmo abbandonare la nostra concezione di senso comune della coscienza. Nel mio commento intendo esaminare la procedura di naturalizzazione sottostante al naturalismo cognitivo proposta da Nannini, cercando di mostrare come questo non sia in grado di rendere conto delle sensazioni fenomeniche che caratterizzano gli stati coscienti. Intendo inoltre rimarcare alcune importanti differenze tra il mutamento concettuale nel caso del tempo e quello ipotizzato in relazione alla coscienza.
Parole-chiave: Materialismo eliminativo; Coscienza fenomenica; Iato esplicativo; Hard Problem; Naturalismo cognitivo.
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References
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