Analogies, Non-reductionism and Illusions
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Abstract: This commentary focuses on three aspects of Sandro Nannini’s paper Time and Consciusness in Cognitive Naturalism: (1) the parallel between Einstein’s theory of relativity and the new science of the mind/brain; (2) the Cartesian characterization of non-reductionist positions in the philosophy of mind; (3) the alleged illusory status of consciousness, free will and the Self. We suggest, first, that Nannini overstates the success of cognitive neuroscience; second, that non-reductionism is not necessarily a Cartesian position; and third, that the neurocognitive science data do not show or even suggest, that consciousness, free will and the Self are illusory phenomena.
Keywords: Cognitive Neuroscience; Non-reductionism; Cartesianism; Self; Consciousness.
Analogie, anti-riduzionismo e illusioni
Riassunto: Questo commento si concentra su tre aspetti dell’articolo di Sandro Nannini Time and Consciusness in Cognitive Naturalism: (1) il parallelo tra la teoria della relatività di Einstein e la nuova scienza della mente/cervello; (2) la caratterizzazione cartesiana delle posizioni non-riduzionistiche in filosofia della mente; (3) il presunto status illusorio della coscienza, del libero arbitrio e del sé. Riteniamo, in primo luogo, che Nannini sopravvaluti i successi della neuroscienza cognitiva, in secondo luogo che l’anti-riduzionismo non sia necessariamente una posizione cartesiana e, in terzo luogo, che i dati della neuroscienza cognitiva non mostrino, e neppure suggeriscano, che coscienza, libero arbitrio e sé siano fenomeni illusori.
Parole chiave: Neuroscienza cognitiva; Anti-riduzionismo; Cartesianesimo; Sé; Coscienza.
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