The Importance of Sensing One’s Movements in the World for the Sense of Personal Identity
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Abstract
L'importanza di percepire i propri movimenti nel mondo per il senso dell'identità personale
Riassunto – Nell’ambito della filosofia e delle scienze cognitive l’attenzione dedicata al problema dell’identità personale è stata rivolta quasi esclusivamente sul cervello. È nostra convinzione che questo abbia di conseguenza portato a trascurare il ruolo del corpo e dei movimenti corporei nel mondo, impoverendo la comprensione del modo in cui gli esseri viventi sviluppano il senso della loro identità. Esamineremo quindi l’importanza dell’avvertire i propri movimenti per lo sviluppo di un senso del sé di natura basilare e di carattere non-concettuale. Più in dettaglio, noi sosteniamo che all’origine del senso del sé vi sia la capacità di avvertire la propria motilità spontanea. È a partire da questo elemento che l’organismo giunge a sviluppare un senso del “mi muovo” e, infine, del “posso muovermi”. La propriocezione e le cinestesi sono elementi essenziali in questa dinamica. Al contempo, sulla scia di Gibson, noi pensiamo che la percezione del sé e dell’ambiente procedano inevitabilmente di pari passo, diversamente da quanto sostiene la tradizionale dicotomia tra i cosiddetti sensi interni ed esterni. Prenderemo in esame una distinzione tradizionale tra due aspetti del sé corporeo: il senso del proprio corpo e l’immagine del proprio corpo. A nostro avviso questi due aspetti colgono elementi differenti del senso del sé e sosterremo nello specifico che il senso del proprio corpo svolge un ruolo di fondamentale importanza per il nostro senso del sé di carattere non-concettuale. Tenteremo infine di indicare alcune conseguenze di questa posizione per la ricerca nel campo delle scienze cognitive, in particolare nel campo della robotica, esaminando un caso di assenza di propriocezione, nella convinzione che questo costituisca un passo in avanti nella comprensione del modo in cui gli esseri viventi agiscono nel mondo, ossia grazie al possesso del senso del sé.
Parole chiave: Sé; Identità personale; Propriocezione; Movimento; Corpo.
Abstract - Within philosophy and cognitive science, the focus in relation to the problem of personal identity has been almost exclusively on the brain. We submit that the resulting neglect of the body and of bodily movements in the world has been detrimental in understanding how organisms develop a sense of identity. We examine the importance of sensing one’s own movements for the development of a basic, nonconceptual sense of self. More specifically, we argue that the origin of the sense of self stems from the sensitivity to spontaneous movements. Based on this, the organism develops a sense of “I move” and, finally, a sense of “I can move”. Proprioception and kinesthesis are essential in this development. At the same time, we argue against the traditional dichotomy between so-called external and internal senses, agreeing with Gibson that perception of the self and of the environment invariably go together. We discuss a traditional distinction between two aspects of bodily self: the body sense and the body image. We suggest that they capture different aspects of the sense of self. We argue that especially the body sense is of great importance to our nonconceptual sense of self. Finally, we attempt to draw some consequences for research in cognitive science, specifically in the area of robotics, by examining a case of missing proprioception. We make a plea for robots to be equipped not just with external perceptual and motor abilities but also with a sense of proprioception. This, we submit, would constitute one further step towards understanding creatures acting in the world with a sense of themselves.
Keywords: Self; Personal Identity; Proprioception; Movement; Body.
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