Ways of mind-extending. A map to navigate the extended mind
Abstract
Abstract: In the contemporary debate in philosophy of mind a major problem has recently emerged about the nature of cognition: do we think just by means of our brain or, rather, our cognition extends outside of the skull? If so, what would “cognition” be? This article aims to focus on this question and to offer a map of the main positions about the Extended Mind Thesis. It firstly offers an introduction to the central problem and a crit-ical analysis of the “first-wave” arguments, based on the functional parity principle. Then, the article focuses on the “second-wave” arguments, based on complementarity and integration of cognitive resources. Finally, the article focuses on the “third-wave” arguments, that is, the most recent developments of this debate towards a social dimension of mind and cognition.
Keywords: Extended Mind; Cognitive Integration; Situated Cognition; Collective Mind; Scaffolded Mind
Modi di estendere la mente. Una mappa per orientarsi nella mente estesa.
Riassunto: Nel dibattito contemporaneo in filosofia della mente è recentemente emersa una questione di un certo rilievo a proposito della natura della cognizione: pensiamo solo con il cervello o, piuttosto, la nostra cognizione si estende al di fuori dei limiti cranici? Se così fosse, cosa sarebbe la “cognizione”? Lo scopo di questo articolo è mettere a fuoco questa domanda e offrire una mappa delle principali posizioni sulla Tesi della Mente Estesa. Si offre in primo luogo un’introduzione al problema centrale e un’analisi critica degli argomenti della cosiddetta “prima ondata”, basati sul principio di parità funzionale. Poi, l’articolo si focalizza sugli argomenti della “seconda ondata”, basati sulla complementarità e sull’integrazione delle risorse cognitive. Infine, l’articolo si focalizza sugli argomenti della “terza ondata”, cioè, gli sviluppi più recenti di questo dibattito verso una dimensione sociale della mente e della cognizione.
Parole chiave: Mente estesa; Integrazione cognitiva; Cognizione situata; Mente collettiva; Scaffolded mind
Parole chiave
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.4453/rifp.2025.0013
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