Chomsky on methodological naturalism. On the scientific status of Chomsky’s research programs

Enrico Cipriani

Abstract


Abstract: Immediately after introducing transformational grammar in Syntactic structures, Noam Chomsky began to employ the formal grammar he developed to investigate language from an internalist and nativist perspective. In doing so, he proposed that linguistics could be integrated into the core natural sciences. This ambitious project was met with immediate criticism, particularly targeting the abstract nature of the entities posited by linguistic theory. Chomsky responded by articulating the methodological principles underlying his work, known as methodological naturalism. According to Chomsky, in order for linguistics to qualify as a core natural science, it must adopt the same methodological framework as the hard sciences (e.g., biology, physics). In principle, Chomsky’s argument is persuasive; however, when applied to assess the validity of linguistic theory, it reveals a certain degree of arbitrariness. This issue is explored in §2. In §3, I address a deeper problem in Chomsky’s approach. After summarizing Lakatos’s concept of a research program, I turn to the theory of Universal Grammar (UG) and the Minimalist Program (MP) to argue that both lack the scientific status attributed to them by Chomsky and others. Specifically, following Lakatos, I propose replacing the notion of a UG theory with that of a UG research program. I argue that both the UG program and the MP should be considered unscientific, as the cores (in Lakatos’s sense) of these programs consist of unfalsifiable hypotheses, which prevent us from determining whether the programs are progressive or degenerative.

Keywords: Methodological Naturalism; Transformational Grammar; Universal Grammar; Minimalist Program; Falsifiability; Research Program

 

Chomsky e il naturalismo metodologico. Sullo statuto scientifico dei programmi di ricerca di Chomsky

Riassunto: Subito dopo aver introdotto la grammatica trasformazionale in Syntactic structures, Noam Chomsky iniziò a utilizzare la grammatica trasformazionale per indagare il linguaggio da una prospettiva internista e innatista. In questo modo, propose che la linguistica potesse essere integrata tra le scienze naturali di base. Questo ambizioso progetto ricevette critiche immediate, dovute soprattutto alla natura astratta delle entità postulate dalla teoria linguistica. Chomsky rispose articolando i principi metodologici alla base del suo lavoro, noti come naturalismo metodologico. Secondo Chomsky, affinché la linguistica possa qualificarsi come scienza naturale di base, deve adottare lo stesso quadro metodologico delle scienze dure (ad esempio la biologia e la fisica). In linea di principio, l’argomento di Chomsky è persuasivo; tuttavia, se usato per valutare la validità della teoria linguistica, rivela un certo grado di arbitrarietà. Questi aspetti saranno trattati nel §2. Nel §3 tratterò un problema più profondo: dopo una breve presentazione del concetto di programma di ricerca di Lakatos, prenderò in esame la teoria della Grammatica Universale (GU) e il Programma Minimalista (PM) per sostenere come entrambi manchino dello statuto scientifico che Chomsky e altri attribuiscono loro. In particolare, seguendo Lakatos, propongo di sostituire la nozione di teoria della GU con quella di programma di ricerca sulla GU e sostengo, inoltre, che sia il programma GU e che il programma minimalista debbano essere considerati non scientifici, poiché i nuclei (nel senso di Lakatos) di tali programmi consistono in ipotesi infalsificabili, che impediscono di stabilire se i programmi siano progressivi o degenerativi.

Parole chiave: Naturalismo metodologico; Grammatica trasformazionale; Grammatica universale; Programma minimalista; Falsificabilità; Programma di ricerca


Parole chiave


Methodological Naturalism; Transformational Grammar; Universal Grammar; Minimalist Program; Falsifiability; Research Program

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DOI: https://doi.org/10.4453/rifp.2025.0012

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