The Moral Adequacy of Emotions
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Abstract Common philosophical approaches on the adequacy of emotions usually focus on the most objective assessment of the situation. In contrast to this, I claim that this objective stance, generally called “fittingness”, does not satisfy the current needs of emotional evaluation. Given the motivational role of emotions and their influence on social interactions, it is of utmost importance to also evaluate their moral value. Yet, a further development towards such a moral judgment is missing. In this paper, I provide an approach for the moral adequacy of emotional responses in a social context. I aim to show that in today’s social and political culture the link between emotions and moral norms cannot be neglected. Introducing two instances of judging the moral adequacy, I focus on evaluating either the cause or the consequence of an emotional reaction. By assessing the moral value of emotional responses, I think moral growth can be facilitated – not only in individuals but also in whole societies.

KEYWORDS: Emotions; Morality; Adequacy of Emotions; Moral Norms; Moral Judgment of Emotions

In the interdisciplinary field of emotion research, which progressively combines philosophy with other relevant fields like psychology, neurobiology and sociology, a mostly philosophical consideration is concerned with the adequacy or appropriateness of emotions. As it is a difficult question, when or under what circumstances an emotion is adequate to feel, the appropriateness is a controversial topic in the philosophy of emotions.

Usually, when referring to the adequacy of emotions, it is agreed that there are several different criteria according to which one can judge a particular emotion. There are gener-
ally four stances prevalent which were introduced by Justin D'Arms and Daniel Jacobson, namely epistemological justification, prudential reasoning, a moral perspective, and fittingness. Additionally, one might also include the viewpoint of emotional truth as established by Ronald De Sousa and further developed by Mikko Salmela. Properly distinguishing between these different criteria is important and necessary, as each is concerned with distinct qualities of the emotion at hand.

To take the epistemic viewpoint means to consider whether the agent had good reasons for feeling the emotion, if it was, so to say, justified to emote in such a way. A prudential evaluation, asks for the benefit of the emotion for the agent, if it was good or bad for the agent to feel the emotion. Questioning whether it was morally right or wrong to feel the emotion, the moral perspective is concerned with the moral value of an emotion. In contrast, the viewpoint of fittingness asks whether an emotion was rightfully directed at its target, if the object or event had objectively sufficient properties to trigger the emotional response. Similarly, emotional truth seeks an objective truth value of the emotion, but, other than fittingness, it is a more specific and detailed evaluative process. Accordingly, all of these criteria take different characteristics of an emotion into account and therefore lead to a different judgment.

When it comes to deciding upon the overall adequacy, whether an emotion is judged to be either appropriate or inappropriate, there is no compulsory combination of the criteria. One could refer to one of the stances or a combination of all of them, depending on the perspective one intends to take. However, in the respective literature there appears to be an implicit agreement among many to always refer to only one of the stances mentioned above: the viewpoint of fittingness – the criterion which is concerned with the most objective judgment of the emotion, whether the emotional response “fits the facts” and is therefore rightfully directed at its target.

In their paper The Moralistic Fallacy, D’Arms and Jacobson point out the differences between the criteria mentioned above. They especially emphasize the distinctness of fittingness from the moral judgment. But, they seem to implicitly favor fittingness, as they assume that it is the critical stance for the overall adequacy of an emotion and that it is the defining viewpoint when it comes to our everyday judgment of emotions. The same understanding applies to the theories of emotional truth described above. For instance, Salmela, in his account of truth-apt emotions, primarily focuses on the fit between an emotion and the world whereby he essentially provides a developed account of fittingness. In that sense, in most approaches to the appropriateness of emotions, it is the goal to tie the adequacy of an emotional reaction to an objective judgment along the lines of fittingness.

In the literature, this implied consent has led to a negligence of further development and interest in the other, less objective stances. Nevertheless, some concepts are questioning this prevalence of fittingness; they address emotional appropriateness in terms of a combination of the stances mentioned above and emphasize the sociocultural context of emotions. But, even though there are these few advances, most of the criteria above remain unspecified. In my view, this inaction is a mistaken lack of interest. Especially, when considering that emotions are hardly ever objective phenomena, but are the bases for our social life and are «providing a sense of what [...] feels good and bad, and what feels right and wrong».

Now, when taking this into account and when assessing emotions in their social context, it seems particularly interesting to look at how social and moral rules pertain to emotional responses. As a result, there is an obvious need to specify an evaluation of emotions that does not solely ‘check for the facts’. If we see emotions as central to our social interactions and not as solitary objective experiences, there are certain social and moral stand-
ards which apply to emotional responses, making them either adequate or inadequate. To judge emotions according to such standards is inconsistent with an objective assessment in the scope of fitness, and there then is a necessity for a perspective which takes moral standards into account.

When looking at the effects emotions have on moral motivation, as well as the connections between emotions, moral values and moral behavior, a judgment along the lines of morality imposes itself. Even though it is generally accepted that emotions may be morally right or wrong to feel, it remains unanswered how such an evaluation is composed and what its implications are. So far, there seems to be no particular interest in the development of a moral judgment of emotional adequacy.

In contrast to the trend of neglecting morality in the judgment of emotional adequacy, I propose a more detailed concept of a moral viewpoint and especially emphasize its importance and current relevance. Thereby, I assume that people inherently want to be good, or in a sense relevant here, I suppose that people want to emote in a socially and morally appropriate way. There would not be a significant meaning to judging anything at all according to moral standards if there was not the underlying purpose of improvement. The goal of improvement only makes sense, if there is a willingness to improve. Thus, for a moral judgment of emotions to be meaningful, I presume that people have such a will.

Now, since this paper is partly concerned with morality, one should also expect a definition of this term or at least some specification of what is meant by it. Naturally, this is a rather complex topic, and an appropriate concept of morality is not established just like that. It is for that reason that I will adopt and settle on a folk notion of morality, a concept along the lines of what Tom L. Beauchamp and James F. Childress, among others, took on as “common morality”. Accordingly, I presume the idea of an “overlapping consensus” as John Rawls puts it. An agreement that is present in our society and that one might also understand as the common sense of morality. When it comes to deciding what is morally right or wrong, I will always refer to that idea of a common sense, i.e. commonly shared values between all people. I am aware of the difficulties this brings with it, and, although this is a rather vague and inaccurate concept, I believe that it does suffice the current purpose. Developing or incorporating an additional moral framework would go beyond the scope of this paper and may be added at a later point in more detail. With that in mind, I will now turn to the primary goal of this paper.

At first glance, a moral judgment regarding all emotions might seem somewhat questionable, especially when considering that emotions are thought to arise unintentionally and not to be directly controllable. From this perspective, it is rather counterintuitive to judge emotions in the same way as one would do with actions. Why should people be judged for something that is beyond their control?

However, emotions often are controllable within certain measures. And, at the end of this paper, we will see that morally judging emotions may not be so counterintuitive at all. In that sense, considering what I have touched upon before, namely the complex and wide influence emotions have on people’s social life, I believe it is unavoidable to consider moral standards in regards to emotions. This is particularly important when respecting their motivational aspects and their influence on a person’s actions. Supporting this, recent studies show the effects that emotional reactions towards certain topics have on public opinion making. Concerning today’s public and political culture, in which right-wing populists, especially in the U.S. and Europe, increasingly gain power by emotionally charging public debates, I therefore suggest that it is urgently needed to evaluate the moral value of our emotional responses.

In the following, I will propose an account of how one can judge the moral adequacy of emotional reactions and why this might be
relevant in regards to the societal developments indicated above. To do so, I will show the importance of the moral judgment by examining how emotions are evaluated in everyday practice. I will then explain how one might properly apply this judgment, and accordingly, I aim to show the purpose and relevance of such a moral evaluation.

The importance of the moral viewpoint in everyday life

Judging the adequacy of emotions is not only a theoretical deliberation: In everyday life, people commonly judge each other’s emotions. This is because it is an essential part of interacting with others to know and react in accordance with their emotional responses. If one waits in a short line at the supermarket checkout and the person behind starts yelling out of anger about the long waiting time, one will undoubtedly wonder why this person shows such an inappropriate reaction. By evaluating the emotional responses of others, one learns something about those people. Someone who becomes furious because of a short queue at the supermarket is probably easy to irritate and should be approached with care. In that sense, it is normal to judge a person’s emotional authenticity in order to obtain knowledge about her.19

One will notice that up to this point I have not given a clear description of the phenomena I designated as “emotions”. However, to avoid any misconceptions or ambiguities in what follows, it is necessary to be more explicit. To do so, I do not want to present anything new, but I will follow what Fabrice Teroni and Julien A. Deonna, among others, point out in accordance with the latest literature of philosophy and psychology regarding emotions. In that sense, when talking about emotions, I am concerned with affective episodes that are directed at the world. It is not character traits, moods, sentiments and other attitudes I want to address, but the emotions I am talking about are episodes of jealousy, pride, anger, happiness, disgust and so on.20

Connecting that to the everyday judgment of emotions, we may find that this common practice can be attributed to certain universal characteristics of emotions which are seemingly independent of the subject. As was just mentioned, it is commonly viewed that emotions are intentional, in the sense that they are directed at certain situations or objects in the world.21 More specifically, one might say that emotions are reactions to their respective targets and that they include evaluative presentations of the world.22 Concluding from this, emotions always have a basis in the matter, an intentional object: the fundamentum in re.23

The everyday practice of judging emotions appears to be based on precisely this somewhat subject-independent fundamentum and seeks to answer questions about the correctness of the respective evaluative presentations. One then essentially appears to be asking for the fittingness of the emotional reaction, i.e. if it is rightfully directed at its target. Consider an example: if – in an otherwise good partnership – one’s partner gets furious about not getting a good morning kiss, this is probably not regarded to be an adequate reaction. One would intuitively question the emotional response and its appropriateness. In that case, the target of the anger, namely the missing good morning kiss, does not seem to be worthy of fury and the emotional response is not fitting. After explaining the inappropriate reaction, the partner might later realize the incorrect emotional response. Thus, fittingness is sufficient to indicate necessary adjustments in regards to one’s emotional reactions. It seems to be the first intuitive thing one will question if an emotional reaction appears to be inappropriate.

However, there are many situations in which the theoretical concept of fittingness is not practically applicable and other criteria of judgment come into consideration. Take a similar example to the one before, suppose a couple with a good and working relationship. Now, it is their anniversary, but one partner
is angry. He did not receive flowers, and he believes that his partner forgot their anniversary. What he does not know is that his partner did not forget their special day and did send him flowers, but they got lost along the way. The anger is therefore unfitting, his partner did not forget their anniversary and even bought flowers, but the emotion seems understandable because there were good reasons for him to believe that his partner forgot the day. In this scenario, fittingness alone is not a reasonable judgment and the decision upon the overall adequacy is difficult, as the two different results are competing.

The everyday practice of judging emotions is therefore not solely dependent on fittingness, but it is, in fact, a combination of many different viewpoints. It seems that when judging another person’s emotional response, one intuitively combines the different criteria of appropriateness. When combining these criteria to an overall judgment there sometimes appear to be competing results and the overall answer is not entirely clear, as in the example before. However, in many cases, there is an underlying hierarchy between the viewpoints and their respective results. This means that one of the stances will be more important than the others. To make this clearer, let us suppose another example: people are laughing about a blind person who walked into a lamppost in a slapstick-like manner. Looking at this from the objective stance of fittingness, it might be seen as a correct case of Schadenfreude: the target of the emotion has properties that render the emotional response fitting. Yet, one would still call the joy or amusement inappropriate; this is because from a moral perspective being happy about the misfortune of a disabled person, given the context, is a wrong reaction. In this scenario, there again are two competing results to the adequacy, but there is a hierarchy between the stances and the moral viewpoint outweighs fittingness.

While I am not interested in the exact hierarchy between the different criteria, I want to highlight the particular importance of the moral standpoint for our everyday judgment of emotions. It seems that once moral values are involved, they always significantly influence our judgment about the overall adequacy of an emotional response. To emphasize this point, suppose a different more controversial example: a policewoman working during the well-known “refugee crisis” in Germany. Imagine that during that period most of the cases she gets called to revolve around refugees. Due to her work, most of the refugees she meets have been in trouble with the law or are involved in any kind of criminal activities. For that reason, she developed a dislike for refugees in general, which eventually turned into what one might call “racial disgust” or “hatred”. Such an emotional response towards refugees is clearly inappropriate and, presumably, most people would agree to that.

Yet, judging this emotion from the viewpoints of the different criteria, one might get differing results. One could argue that the policewoman’s racial dislike is epistemologically justified as she has good reasons for it: most of the refugees she knows are criminals and broke the law. Equally, one could say that there are instances of when her racial disgust may be fitting. When taking into account one of the functions of disgust, namely preventing infections and diseases by avoiding contact with unknown substances, objects and individuals, one may find many situations in which the policewoman’s disgust has exactly that function. Accordingly, being disgusted by those refugees would be a fitting emotional reaction in her situation. One could even argue on a more general level, looking at racial disgust in terms of what Ronald De Sousa calls “paradigm cases”, cases according to which one first learns an emotion. In these situations, disgust is learned in response to a foreign, possibly hazardous and infectious object. Hence, racial disgust might serve this very function in the policewoman’s life, protecting her from potential hazards.

Nonetheless, even though all of these results could be argued for, one would whole-
heartedly judge racial disgust or hatred to be inappropriate. This is because, in the end, it is a morally wrong reaction - people should not be judged, approached or treated differently on the basis of generalized assumptions and experiences. This means, that although there are differing results to the question of adequacy of this emotional response, the moral standpoint is the decisive one: racial disgust is an inadequate emotion because it is a morally wrong emotion. In contrast to the first example of the good-morning kiss, in the two latter cases, there are moral values involved which significantly influence one's judgment.

Summarizing the above, it seems that the common everyday judgment of emotional adequacy is usually a combination of the different criteria, and sometimes these might lead to opposing results. But, we have seen that once moral norms and values are touched upon, the moral judgment becomes much more important and dominant than the other stances. That is to say, when it comes to the adequacy of an emotion in an everyday situation, the moral judgment seems to overrule the other viewpoints. From this, we may conclude that the criterion of morality should not be as easily disregarded as has been done thus far and that it is very relevant to judge emotions from a moral standpoint when it comes to emotional adequacy. Having shown the general importance of moral values in our everyday judgment, I now want to develop this moral perspective in more detail.

The moral adequacy of emotions

Of course, it is not self-evident to conclude from the few examples above that the moral stance always overrules the other criteria when it comes to emotional adequacy. It merely shows the importance of morality in a case when the other viewpoints lead to a different assessment. Accordingly, I do not want to argue that a criterion like fittingness is invalid or not suitable in some situations. Instead, I aim to show that a moral judgment of emotions is of high significance in regards to today's social and political culture. And I thereby want to oppose the implicit agreement towards the most objective stance in the literature.

When considering the complex effects emotions have on behavior, i.e. the motivational role they play for actions, and their influence on public opinions, a judgment which is solely asking if an emotion “fits the facts” does not seem to suffice for evaluating such intricate phenomena. When analyzing emotions in their social context, almost all emotions have the potential to be either morally adequate or morally inadequate. Since our social interactions are largely shaped by emotions, there are certain moral values and rules which also apply to our emotional reactions. The moral judgment of those reactions then has the aspiration of ensuring that these moral norms and values are respected.

Take the racist disgust example from before. In contrast to the other stances, the moral judgment is grounded on certain moral norms. By questioning whether those norms are violated, the moral judgment provides a basis for change and moral development in a specific direction. This is not to say that a person will all of a sudden change and adjust her emotional reactions, but this purely implies that by morally judging an emotion one can facilitate the moral growth of a person. In the following, the theoretical development of this moral judgment will help to show how it might be possible to apply said judgment when analyzing the adequacy of emotions.

Several difficulties arise when one tries to morally judge all emotional responses equally. Not every emotion can be evaluated as straightforwardly as the racist disgust example in which the moral value of the feeling itself seems to be clear and rather obvious. In contrast, take an example of a couple where one of the partners is cheating. The other is furious about it and is driven by an intense feeling of jealousy to kill the lover of his partner. In this case, it is difficult to morally evaluate the very feeling of the emotion. Merely feeling
jealousy is not a morally wrong thing in itself; it follows, that this emotional reaction is not morally wrong in the same obvious way as racist disgust. Even though the very feeling of the emotion does not seem to be morally relevant, such an extreme feeling of jealousy is nonetheless morally inadequate due to its terrible consequences. Evidently, there are different cases for why an emotional reaction can be morally relevant.

On the one hand, there are emotions of which the sole feeling is already morally bad, and, on the other hand, there are emotions which have morally questionable consequences. Both of these cases – feeling an emotion and acting out of it – display undeniable moral relevance: There is a moral value to feeling an emotion – e.g. racist disgust – and there is moral value in the following consequences of an emotion – e.g. killing someone out of jealousy. One cannot neglect either one, both are essential parts of the emotional experience and are equally important components of an emotional response. However, when morally evaluating the examples given before, racist disgust and killing out of jealousy, there are different lines of reasoning indicating their moral value. For the general moral adequacy of emotions, this naturally means that one needs to distinguish between such cases. The moral value of racial disgust has to be evaluated on a different basis than the moral value of the jealousy that causes someone to kill her partner’s lover.

In the following section, I aim to further elaborate on this difference and amplify the idea that an emotion can be morally relevant in terms of two different reasons. I will show that in the first case it is not, as previously assumed, the feeling of an emotion which constitutes its moral relevance. And in the second case, I will explicate the kinds of consequences that may account for an emotion’s moral value.

**Appraisable causes and appraisable consequences**

According to what was mentioned before, there are emotions which seem to be morally relevant by merely feeling them and, secondly, there are emotions which are morally relevant due to their consequences. I will, more generally, refer to them as *appraisable cause* emotions and *appraisable consequence* emotions in the following. Whereas in the latter case the reasons for choosing such denotation are already rather obvious, the former term will become more clear once explained in the next paragraph.

So, what exactly are these two different cases of morally relevant emotions? To begin with, *appraisable cause* emotions are all those emotions of which intuitively one would say that their very feeling is morally relevant, like the racist disgust example. Yet, this is a somewhat indefinite and unsatisfactory basis for a moral evaluation and is not what makes for a proper judgment. To make this clearer, suppose the following example: A murderer is in jail for killing several people. He had no reason for killing those people and, even more, he is proud of his actions. It seems evident that the murderer’s pride is morally wrong and that one would condemn his emotional reaction. However, in principle pride is not necessarily a morally bad emotion and in a different scenario, pride might very well be morally good. Hence, an emotion cannot be morally wrong in itself or just by being a particular type of emotion. As a consequence, one is looking for reasons to justify a moral evaluation.

An emotional response can never be analyzed in isolation, but it is always the agent in a certain context one has to take into consideration. To be more explicit, the agent feels the emotion as a reaction towards situations or objects in the world, and it is his bodily changes eliciting that very feeling. An emotion is then not only dependent on the agent, but it is the agent’s response to specific objects or events. In the beginning, I referred to these as the intentional objects of emotions, however, as these objects may be of many different kinds and may not be actual objects after all, it needs to be clarified what exactly an emotion is directed at.
Every emotion is directed at something, but these “things” might radically differ. One might be afraid of a dog, or one might be afraid of going to die someday. In the first case, the target of the emotion is a real object, whereas in the second case the target is an imaginary event. Now, while these are two completely different types of targets, they have one thing in common: they need to be accessible to the agent. In other words, for the emotion to appear, the agent needs to either perceive the dog or imagine the event of dying. Both of these targets thus depend on another mental state to be accessible to the agent and to trigger an emotion. These mental states are referred to as the “cognitive bases” of an emotion, and they provide the target of the emotion to the agent. The targets that are provided by the cognitive bases are then referred to as the “particular objects” of an emotion. We may say that an emotion is directed at its particular object which is itself provided by its cognitive bases. To put this more generally, an emotional reaction invariably depends on mental states or cognitive processes: the cognitive bases, such as perception or imagination. These bases supply the representations of target circumstances and the knowledge underlying the emotional reaction. In that sense, an emotion is elicited by such representations. One is afraid, because one perceives a dog, and one is afraid because one imagines dying some day.

At this point, it has to be mentioned again that emotions are reactions of an agent and as such, they also depend on the agent’s evaluations and judgments. The representations of the target circumstances are always evaluated and judged by the agent. In that sense, these evaluations elicit an emotional response. One is afraid of a dog, because one judges it as dangerous, and one is afraid of dying one day because one evaluates it as an unpleasant experience.

From this, it follows that there is not only one, but there are two distinct influences on an emotional response: the representations provided by the cognitive bases and the agent’s evaluations regarding these. If one is afraid of a dog, one needs to perceive the dog and one needs to evaluate this dog to be dangerous. If one is afraid of dying one day, one needs to imagine such a scenario and one needs to evaluate it as unpleasant or painful. Without either of these factors, the emotion would not occur in the first place and, therefore, together these influences can be said to cause a specific emotional reaction. To come back to the initial issue that an emotion cannot be morally wrong by merely being of a specific kind, take the example of the proud murderer again. Why is his pride morally inadequate? In light of the reflections above, we may justify the moral judgment of the emotional response by examining what caused the emotion.

Generally, as just mentioned, one can identify two parts causing an emotional response: The factor that induced the emotion, i.e. the representations of the target circumstances, and the factor that explains why the emotion happened, i.e. the agent’s attitude towards these representations. Hence, one can describe the cause of an emotion in two different ways. To spell out this distinction in more detail we can refer to what Fred Dretske called the triggering and the structuring causes in the context of causal explanations of human behavior. To make this more clear, it will be useful to shortly summarize what Dretske had in mind.

According to Dretske, the triggering cause describes what actually made an event happen, whereas the structuring cause reveals why the event happened in this particular way. He gives a very general example: a person pressing a key on a keyboard and thereby making a cursor move. Dretske now says, there are two different explanations for the cursor’s movement. On the one hand, it is the event of pressing the key that makes the cursor move. On the other hand, the cursor is moving because of the internal electrical wiring of the computer which explains why the cursor moves when pressing the key. To put it more generally, there is the triggering cause, namely the event of pressing the key which makes the
cursor movement happen, and there is the structuring cause, namely the electrical wiring which explains why the cursor moves.

To clarify what exactly this means in terms of emotions, let us apply this concept to our pride example: the killer who is proud of murdering several people. In this case, the triggering cause refers to the perception of the murder, or, in other words, the representation of the target circumstances. The triggering cause of the pride is the perceived murder, i.e. the knowledge or representation the killer internally has of the actual murder. However, the structuring cause may not be as easily assigned. Why is it that the murderer is proud of this action, why is the emotion occurring in response to the triggering event? To answer this, it is important to remember that a person’s emotional response always depends on the attitudes she has towards the event she responds to.\(^\text{37}\) A person will be happy about a sunny summers day only if she likes warm weather and the sun. Similarly, she will be sad about not seeing her family only if she deems this to be a bad thing. Accordingly, the murderer can only be proud of his action – killing several people – if he believes that killing someone is a good achievement. The structuring cause can hence be identified with a set of beliefs. The structuring cause of the pride is the set of beliefs that accounts for the killer’s evaluation of murder being an accomplishment.

Now, let us recapitulate what I have just explained. When morally judging an appraisable cause emotion – an emotion which seems to be morally relevant by merely feeling it – we are judging what causes the emotion. Moreover, an emotion’s cause can be assessed in two distinct ways. Firstly, the part that induced the emotion, namely the representations of the target circumstances, and, secondly, the part that explains the emotion, namely the agent’s evaluations. I referred to these two parts as either an emotion’s triggering cause or its structuring cause. Now then, when looking for the moral judgment of an emotion, there is one question that remains: Which of those causes is the decisive one that determines if an emotion is morally right or wrong? More specifically in terms of the example from before: Is the murderer’s pride immoral because of its triggering cause – the perception of killing several people – or is it immoral because of its structuring cause – the belief that killing someone is a good achievement?

Suppose the same scenario, a murderer kills the same people without any reason. But this time, the murderer is not proud of his actions, instead, he is sad. This time, his emotional reaction is not morally wrong, if anything it even seems to be appropriate. Still, the triggering cause of the emotion is the same as it was before, but the moral value of the emotion changed. Therefore, it cannot be the triggering cause that determines the moral value of an emotion, but the moral value of an appraisable cause emotion depends on its structuring cause.

I briefly mentioned before that the structuring cause of an emotion can fundamentally be understood as a set of beliefs of the agent. This may not just be a single belief but rather a framework of beliefs, as emotional reactions are necessarily based on a construct of beliefs, desires and attitudes within the agent.\(^\text{38}\) This construct may then be understood as the structuring cause of one’s emotional reactions in the meaning relevant to a moral evaluation and it will be called a person’s personal framework in the following. Once more taking up the example of the proud murderer, we may now find a proper and accurate answer for what constitutes the pride’s moral relevance. The moral value of the pride is referable to the murderer’s personal framework. This contains the immoral belief that killing someone is a good achievement and it is that attitude which is then the relevant cause of the emotional response. It follows that this is the proper reason for why the pride is immoral.

So far, we looked at emotions that have an appraisable cause, a certain attitude or belief within the personal framework, that deems them to be morally relevant. The other kind, appraisable consequence emotions,
seems harder to be evaluated from a moral viewpoint as it is not already their mere feeling which is morally relevant. To give an example, take the extreme case of jealousy from before: the agent was driven to kill her partner’s lover by an immense feeling of jealousy. In contrast to appraisable cause emotions, in this scenario, no immoral attitude causes the emotion and accounts for the moral relevance of jealousy. Prima facie, it seems as if this emotion may not be morally relevant at all. Though, when looking at the consequences of the jealousy, this premature conclusion should be questioned. Appraisable consequence emotions then raise the issue in how far an emotion can be morally relevant in terms of its consequences.

Indeed, there are few cases which are as clear and intuitive as the jealousy example. The consequences do not usually constitute an emotion’s moral value in the same way as appraisable causes do. This may become more clear when looking at another example: In recent years, there has been an increasing number of terroristic attacks in western countries and the fear of such attacks has grown. Fearing a terror attack is undoubtedly a reasonable response, similar to being afraid of getting hit by a car or being robbed in the streets. The emotion does not occur based on any immoral beliefs or attitudes: There is no morally relevant appraisable cause. However, the fear of terror attacks in many cases became so extreme that people started discriminating against Muslims or generally Arabic people. The fear lead to immoral behavior and caused people to develop questionable opinions about immigration. The consequences of the emotion certainly have moral relevance. An emotional reaction, which in moderation is not morally relevant and maybe even normal, suddenly has moral implications.

Now, it is not exactly intuitive to conclude that the extreme fear of terroristic attacks is all of a sudden immoral just in terms of its consequences. Compare this to the racist disgust example from before: In this case, the emotion has an apparent moral value due to its appraisable cause, namely the preceding immoral beliefs. In the fear scenario, the moral relevance of the emotion is not that accessible. Nevertheless, there are indisputable immoral consequences which follow the emotion. And due to these consequences, the extreme fear of terror attacks becomes involved in a morally relevant situation. It may be that in contrast to the appraisable cause emotions we cannot simply say that the emotion itself is immoral, but we may direct the moral judgment at the whole situation which was evoked by the emotion. By doing so, we may then transfer the moral value of the consequences onto the emotion.

This appears to be counter-intuitive and there are several questions which do arise: One might ask, why is it not just the consequences which have a moral value, why should one involve the emotion as well? Are we not looking for a judgment of emotions and not consequences or even whole situations? To address these issues, it is of importance to first clarify what exactly is meant by consequences, and secondly, why they do influence the moral value of an emotion.

Firstly, what are the appraisable consequences of an emotion? In the beginning, I mentioned the motivational influence of emotions and I stated that it is this influence which leads to inevitable consequences of an emotion; an example of which is the extreme fear of terror attacks. Theses consequences are the result of emotions manifesting themselves in action tendencies, such emotional action tendencies then lead to certain actions or behavior. In fact, a person’s emotional actions are the outcome of controlling and regulating their action tendencies. In that sense, action tendencies can be understood as programs of behavior which may be executed and turned into actions. Commonly, these emotional actions consist of activity which aims at altering or keeping the state of the world in a desired way. But, emotional behavior goes much further: more complex emotions usually activate more complex and flexible programs. These flexible programs are in turn controlled by assessing feed-
back from actions and are guided by the aims and intentions of the agent.\textsuperscript{43} Emotions can, therefore, induce whole cascades of actions and they even affect the cognitive behavior of the agent.\textsuperscript{44} Now, all of the performed actions and behaviors, which are elicited by an emotion in the meaning just described, fall under the appraisable consequences of an emotional reaction. Additionally, it has to be noted that mere emotional expressions are also consequences of emotional action tendencies,\textsuperscript{45} and – even though emotional expressions are only a small subset of emotional behavior – they are therefore morally appraisable consequences as well.

Secondly, why are consequences a plausible reason for judging the moral relevance of the emotion? We have just seen what an emotion’s appraisable consequences are and how they come about. It is the latter part which also explains the close connection of consequences and emotional reactions, and it is what justifies the moral judgment of an emotion in terms of its consequences. As I elaborated above, emotions reveal themselves in emotional action tendencies which inevitably lead to certain consequences. Because an emotional reaction necessarily leads to consequences, these consequences are by definition attached to the emotion. Due to this necessary connection, the moral value of the consequences in return changes the moral value of the emotion. To clarify this, take the fear example from before. Disregarding all consequences, there does not seem to be any significant moral value to the fear of terrorist attacks. But once one assesses the whole situation, namely the fear causing immoral actions as well as immoral opinions, the moral relevance changes. Although the fear does not have an obvious or even intuitive moral value, its moral relevance is determined due to the intimate connection between an emotion, its action tendencies and therefore its consequences. In that sense, an emotion and its consequences build a structure which is then subject to moral evaluation.

It is not the aim of this paper to explain the proper connection of emotions and emotional actions, therefore the above is only a rough explanation of how appraisable consequences are to be understood and why they are genuinely connected to the emotion. Yet, I believe it is now clear why an emotion’s consequences are of importance when judging the emotion itself. Furthermore, when taking into account what I mentioned in the beginning – the impact emotions have on today’s public and political culture – the significance of assessing emotions in regards to their consequences is evident. In terms of the motivational character of emotions, manifested in its action tendencies, and the influence an emotion can thus have on a person’s actions, it can hardly be dismissed that appraisable consequence emotions should be morally evaluated.

At this point, it has to be mentioned that of course appraisable cause emotions can have morally wrong consequences as well, but once there is an underlying immoral belief causing the emotion, this cause will always be the first reason for a moral judgment. The consequence of an emotional reaction is only relevant for the moral judgment in terms of emotions which are not structured by an appraisable cause.

\section*{The relevance of the moral adequacy}

So far, I presented and explained two different kinds of morally relevant emotions: emotions judged by their cause, appraisable cause emotions, and emotions judged in terms of their consequences, appraisable consequence emotions. I thereby clarified the distinction that appeared when morally judging emotional responses. Nevertheless, there is still a, so to say, realm of emotional reaction which I did not address yet. There are of course emotions which are not morally relevant altogether, emotions which may not be usefully judged according to the criteria just mentioned. Even though the claim of this paper is that emotions should be evaluated from a moral viewpoint, there are of course many cases in which this is just not possible
or irrelevant. Being sad about a rainy day, being afraid of getting hit by a car or being angry about missing the bus – these are emotional reactions which have no moral relevance. Admittedly, it is a valid concern in regards to the usefulness of the moral adequacy of emotions that a significant number of our emotional reactions cannot be assessed in terms of morality. Such emotions may be interesting to evaluate for single persons, however, it is my view that these are not the kind of emotions which are of interest and relevance in social interactions. In the beginning, I introduced the necessity of a moral judgment especially in terms of people’s social life, emotional reactions in their social context and the complex settings in which they arise. These are the cases which touch upon morality due to their social impact and these are the cases which seem most interesting and rewarding to analyze. They are the emotional reactions I am concerned with.

In the beginning, I mentioned the role emotions play in current societal developments, especially in terms of political opinion making. In that sense, I explained the effect emotions have in a generic social context and that the link between emotions and moral norms should not be neglected. Therefore, I think it became clear that a moral judgment of emotions is necessary and of direct relevance. I then aimed to explicate how this moral judgment can be applied to almost all emotions and how it can, therefore, be beneficial in terms of emotional appropriateness. For emotions in a social context, a distinction between appraisable cause and consequence emotions is the basis of an emotional adequacy relying only on morality. In accordance with that distinction, in this final part, I want to emphasize the relevance of morally judging emotions. With the understanding of how and why emotions can be morally right or wrong to feel, there seem to be certain implications for the general judgment of emotions. By morally judging a person’s emotional reactions, the social environment of a person not only seems to have an impact on her emotional behavior but also on her beliefs and attitudes. Accordingly, in the following, I will explain what the moral adequacy of emotions brings with it in regards to social feedback. As it is the nature of any moral judgment to demand improvement, it is the same in terms of the moral adequacy of emotions. In that sense, judging both, appraisable cause and appraisable consequence emotions, has the ambition to influence the emoter positively.

On the one hand, appraisable cause emotions give access to a person’s system of beliefs and desires, their personal framework underlying her emotional responses. If an emotional reaction is deemed morally wrong, this might lead to questioning one’s own beliefs and desires. Of course, the respective emotion has to be visibly expressed in some way, otherwise, an external judgment would not be possible. Take again the rather bold example of the murderer who is proud of his actions. Judging his pride to be morally wrong – which may just be by external repercussions – might make him realize that killing someone is not a good achievement at all. Murder is not something one should be proud of, and his initial belief should thereafter be adjusted. At this point, it is important to note that the moral value of an emotional reaction is not indicated by its triggering cause, but by the moral relevance of its structuring cause. It is, therefore, the structuring cause, namely the personal framework, which deems the pride to be morally bad. As I mentioned before, condemning such an emotional response then does not lead to the conclusion that murder is bad, but it indicates an immoral personal framework. Indeed, this does not suppose that a person will all of a sudden change her personal framework, but it should instead be understood as a process: Learning to include moral values and norms into one’s personal framework by judging the respective emotional reactions, i.e. emotional reactions with an appraisable cause.

It seems that the example of the proud murderer is a bit cumbersome, yet, it is an excellent example to support the preceding
argumentation. But to make this final point clearer, take the relevant example of racial disgust which I also introduced before. By actively judging this emotional reaction to be morally wrong, the emoter gets the feedback that his personal framework needs to be adjusted. The particular beliefs, which give reasons for the disgust, are morally questionable and need to be reconsidered, i.e. abandoned. This will not happen in an instant, but it will occur over time and it will occur over many responses that indicate an unjust personal framework. In that sense, morally judging an appraisable cause emotion is a tool for detecting immoral beliefs.

On the other hand, appraisable consequence emotions indicate a need for emotional regulation and also indicate questionable beliefs in the agent’s personal framework. I explained before that emotional actions are essentially the result of regulated emotional action tendencies. From this, it follows that appropriate regulation can influence, shape and change the consequences of an emotion. If the consequences of an emotion are morally wrong, the emotional reaction should have better been regulated. As a matter of fact, learning and changing one’s emotional regulatory abilities is not just imaginable, but emotional regulation is mostly adapted and learned in accordance with the social surroundings during emotional development, thus during childhood and adolescence. It is therefore rather clear that morally judging emotional reactions during this phase will improve regulatory abilities in a way that moral values and norms are respected. However, even in adult life, a person will adjust her emotional regulatory abilities according to social influences. It follows that, throughout all stages of life, a moral judgment of emotional responses will facilitate moral norms and values. Suppose once more the case of extreme jealousy in which the emotion leads to the killing of the partner’s lover. It is clear that this emotional reaction should have been adjusted in order to prevent its consequence. Therefore, morally judging the jealousy might improve the agent’s regulatory abilities. Emotional reactions which become problematic when not properly regulated can then be avoided by adjusting one’s emotional regulation.

However, the behavior following an emotion is not only shaped by one’s regulatory abilities, but also by one’s personal framework. I explained before that emotional behavior is guided by aims and intentions. These attitudes are part of a person’s personal framework and are conversely influenced by social encouragement and approval of her emotional actions. Consequently, emotional behavior partly depends on a person’s personal framework which is shaped by social influences. When judging appraisable consequence emotions within their morally relevant context, a person’s regulatory abilities, as well as her personal framework, are evaluated.

To make this more conclusive, consider again the example of fearing terror attacks. The extreme fear led to immoral actions, behavior and opinions. By judging these consequences, we may find that, on the one hand, there is a need for better emotional regulation. If being afraid of a terror attack leads to discriminating behavior, e.g. treating Muslims differently, the fear should probably be better controlled. On the other hand, if the fear leads to an overall immoral opinion, e.g. how to treat refugees, there is a need for reevaluating one’s personal framework. This is because such a shift is not only induced by the emotion, but it also depends on other underlying attitudes, e.g. strong beliefs about specific topics. In the end, as mentioned above, emotional behavior is not only affected by emotional regulation, but also by a person’s personal framework.

Of course, by condemning appraisable consequence emotions in their relevant context, there will be no sudden improvement and change in a person’s regulatory abilities and personal framework. However, both, emotional regulation and the personal framework are guiding emotional behavior and are affected by social approval. In that sense, so-
cial repercussions towards appraisable consequence emotions can guide regulatory behavior and alter beliefs in one’s personal framework. Bearing that in mind, a moral judgment of the respective emotional responses needs to happen over some time. Only then can regulation be learned, adopted and finally exerted, and only then can the beliefs within a personal framework be affected.

Finally, I want to address one last concern. When comparing appraisable cause emotions with appraisable consequence emotions and how their moral relevance comes about, one might see similarities and question the independence of appraisable consequence emotions. The objection may be that for appraisable consequence emotions, it is also the cause of the emotion which deems its moral relevance and not its consequences. It seems that in both cases the personal framework of a person largely affects the emotions. One might ask, whether it is not a belief or attitude causing the appraisable consequence emotion to be immoral.

Now, there is a crucial difference which has to be stressed. Let us suppose the two different examples of racial disgust and the fear of terror attacks. In the case of racial disgust, there is a distinct set of beliefs which causes the emotion, we referred to this as the emotion’s structuring cause. At the point of feeling the emotion, this cause ensures the moral value of the disgust. It is for that reason that the racial disgust has a clear moral value, which we may intuitively ascribe. In contrast, this is not the case with fearing terror attacks. This time, there is no structuring cause which indicates a moral value. At the point of feeling the emotion, there is no obvious or intuitive moral relevance. Fear of a terror attack is perfectly natural. The moral value is determined afterward, in terms of the emotion’s consequences, namely immoral actions and opinions induced by the fear. Indeed, the fear then does not possess a clear-cut moral value which is comparable to racial disgust. But it is due to the crucial connection between an emotion and its consequences that one cannot neglect the moral relevance of appraisable consequence emotions.

### Conclusion

In this paper, I demonstrated that an emotion can be morally relevant in terms of either its cause or its consequences and that these appraisable causes or appraisable consequences determine the moral value of an emotional response. Appraisable cause emotions are evaluated on the basis of their structuring cause, namely a person’s personal framework underlying her emotional responses. Appraisable consequence emotions are judged in regards to their consequences, that is emotional behavior following an emotion’s action tendencies.

Subsequently, I pointed out that evaluating the moral adequacy of emotions provides the possibility to facilitate moral growth. Judging appraisable cause emotions pushes for incorporation of moral values into a person’s framework, i.e. her system of beliefs, desires and attitudes. Whereas, judging appraisable consequence emotions contributes to the adjustment of the personal framework, as well as the improvement of a person’s emotional regulatory abilities. By adjusting her personal framework in accordance with moral values, a person will also have to assess her emotionalized opinions.

Therefore, public debates which are often shaped by such opinions might be subject to moral evaluations by prior judgment of emotions. Modifying and improving emotional regulation might eventually reduce emotionally charged actions and behavior of all sorts. In the end, by considering the moral adequacy of emotional reactions, it might be possible to encourage moral norms in today’s society which is shaped by exploiting people’s emotions.

### Notes

7 Cf. Ivi, here pp. 70-72.
14 Cf. A. BLASI, Emotions and Moral Motivation, cit., p. 8
21 Cf. A. STEPHAN, On The Adequacy of Emotions and Existential Feelings, cit., p. 2; A. BLASI, Emotions and Moral Motivation, cit., p. 6
28 Cf. F. TERONI, O. BRUUN, Shame, Guilt and Morality, in: «Journal of Moral Philosophy», vol. VIII,
31 Cf. Ivi, p. 3 - 6
33 Cf. Ivi, pp. 609-637.
34 Cf. J. DEONNA, F. TERONI, The Emotions: A Philosophical Introduction, cit., p. 5.
40 The exact connection of emotions, action tendencies and emotional actions is not of importance here. Andrea Scarantino in his paper Do Emotions Cause Actions, and If So How? showed that emotions cause actions independent of the relationship between emotions and action tendencies.
42 Cf. N.H. FRIJDA, The Emotions, cit., pp. 75-95.
43 Cf. Ivi, p. 95.
44 Cf. Ivi, p. 103-110.
45 Cf. Ivi, p. 94.
46 Cf. A. SCARANTINO, Do Emotions Cause Actions, and If So How?, cit., p. 329.
48 Cf. Ivi, p. 294.