

SYMPOSIUM

Reply to Symposiasts

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AFTER ITS PUBLICATION, HUME LAMENTED that *A Treatise of Human Nature* «fell dead-born from the press».¹ I thank the editors of the *Rivista internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia* and the symposium contributors for ensuring that *Humean Nature* receives a more lively reception.

First I'll respond to Carla Bagnoli's classic anti-Humean arguments for the authority of reason over desire. Second, I'll consider Nevia Dolcini's exploration of issues concerning moral judgment that are central to my project's philosophical significance. Third, I'll engage with Kengo Miyazono's clear and focused discussion of vividness. Fourth, I'll address Alex King's illuminating questions about how mental states combine in reasoning.

Bagnoli and the authority of reason

Carla Bagnoli advances the classic objection that Humeans neglect the influence of normative reasoning over desire. Noting

Kant's distinction between pure reason and empirical practical reason, she argues that «desires as well as any other unreflective elements in our mind do not exercise their authority *directly*: they do so under the guise of incentives that have to be assessed by reasoning».² She similarly agrees with Scanlon that «the explanatory power of desires ultimately depends on the fact that they work as normative items whose normativity is taken for granted».³

If empirical evidence suggests that the explanatory power of desire in is dependent on rational assessment of its normative status, it'll support the anti-Humean psychological commitment that Kant, Scanlon, and Bagnoli share. But if the evidence turns out otherwise, it suggests that they've overstated the significance of rational assessment. The Kantian claim explicitly concerns how our minds work, and if Scanlon's theory is to apply to human desires, it'll need to accurately characterize what happens in our minds as

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well. So I'll evaluate these claims by seeing whether they accord with what we know about how humans act, think, and feel.

Bagnoli argues that the Humean Theory «cannot explain how one is motivated by a desire that regards more important, even though less intense».⁴ She illustrates the objection with the case of Al on his spaceship, desiring to immediately consume all the resources, but restraining himself with an evaluative judgment that he shouldn't do so because the resources need to be saved for the future or shared with others (Bagnoli presents the case both ways). Anti-Humean views might treat the evaluative judgment as a belief produced by reason which accompanies the less intense desire to resist temptation, and which prevents Al's more intense desire to consume the resources from being effective. How can a less intense desire motivate Al to overcome his desire to consume the resources, on a Humean picture?

Many Humean explanations are available, and clarifying what "less intense" means would narrow things down. If Bagnoli means that the desire motivating Al to resist temptation has a less intense emotional phenomenology, appealing to differential vividness lets Humeans explain how it would still motivate Al. Following Hume's discussion of calm and violent passions, stronger desires may have a less intense emotional phenomenology than the weaker desires they overpower, if the stronger desires' objects are less vividly represented. As future benefits and benefits to others are often less vividly represented than immediate benefits to oneself, Al might resist immediate temptation even while its vividness creates a more vivid emotional phenomenology. Moreover, if he has a desire to do what's important (*de dicto*), Al's belief about importance could be part of a desire-belief pair motivating him to do what's important. A strong desire can be overcome by two weaker desires working together.

There are many Humean explanations of how to resist temptation and choose one's acknowledged greater good. Depending on the specifics of the case, such explanations

might invoke strong desires in the absence of vivid representations, *de dicto* desires for valuable states of affairs, or willpower. Al's motivation may come from a desire to save resources for the future, an aversion to depriving others, or a desire to do what's most important. If a desire of this kind is stronger than Al's desire to consume the resources even when the appeal of consuming is vivid, Al will refrain from consuming them.

The Humean Theory doesn't allow belief about the importance of a weaker desire, by itself, to let it overpower a stronger desire. This lets Humeans accurately predict irrational behaviors like procrastination where people pursue vividly represented temptations despite judging them to be less important. *Humean Nature* argues that Scanlon's theory can't accurately predict these phenomena, precisely because he gives evaluative judgment too much control over desire. Bagnoli doesn't explain how Scanlon's view can be rescued from this empirical disconfirmation.

The empirical facts about people like Al support explanations in terms of desire over explanations where evaluative beliefs motivate by themselves. The kinds of people who can resist temptation and not consume the resources would also feel bad if they discovered that they had left nothing for the future or for others. Generalizations like this Hedonic Correlation suggest that Al's motivation comes from desire than from belief. Desires cause displeasure when combined with thoughts of failing to attain what's desired – this is the Hedonic Aspect. In the absence of desire, beliefs have no such systematic connection to hedonic phenomenology. This is how empirical evidence from first-personal hedonic phenomenology supports Humean accounts of motivation over Kantian accounts.

Why do our actions so often align with our evaluative beliefs? Bagnoli anticipates a Humean explanation on which "the evaluation is nothing but a desire". This noncognitivist position is a traditional Humean option, but the emotional perception model in-

stead suggests cognitivism about evaluative judgment. Emotional dispositions contain desires, and activating them causes hedonically charged feelings which cause beliefs. Just as color experience causes color belief, emotional experience causes evaluative belief. This lets Humeans treat evaluative judgments as beliefs, while regarding the accompanying motivation as driven by the desires at the heart of emotional dispositions.

Evaluative judgment is tied closely to effects of desire like motivation, emotion, and the direction of attention. So it's understandable that Bagnoli, Kant, and Scanlon see evaluative judgment as regulating desire's effects. *Humean Nature* argues that they have things backwards – desire explains evaluative judgment. The Humean view fits into a simple and unified explanation of a vast range of psychological phenomena, including resisting temptation, acting against our acknowledged greater good, feeling good about the things we're motivated to attain, and forming beliefs on the basis of experience. If the views Bagnoli shares with her distinguished predecessors can be integrated into a psychological theory of similar simplicity and explanatory power, no one has shown how. The authority of evaluative judgment over desire then seems like the ability of chemical processes to turn lead into gold – a figment of an obsolete theory that should be banished from our picture of the world.

Dolcini and moral judgment

Nevia Dolcini considers my account of moral judgment, which encompasses two of the most significant ideas in *Humean Nature* – the emotional perception model and experientialism. She considers two broad issues. First, she argues that some of the distinctions I draw in developing my account of moral judgment compromise the simplicity of the Humean Theory. Second, she explores the implications of my theory for psychopathy.

As Dolcini notes, the emotional perception model treats moral beliefs as typically

generated by emotional experience, but also by testimony and reasoning. She's right that the model gives moral beliefs directly produced by experience a closer relation to action than those produced by testimony or reasoning. This helps to explain why most people are motivated to act in accordance with their moral beliefs, and also why others who lack the relevant emotions can form still moral beliefs through testimony and reasoning without the accompanying motivation. Psychopaths are agents of the latter kind, and are often invoked in arguments against internalist theories that treat intrinsic motivational force as essential to moral judgment.

Dolcini thinks I've sacrificed the simplicity of the Humean Theory in explaining these phenomena. She describes my view as follows: «Moral beliefs not originated from experience are very dissimilar from those caused by experience: only the latter possess motivational force, whereas the former are motivationally inert».⁵ She thinks I posit «two different sorts of concepts, namely, concepts with or without motivational force» and argues that this «leads to the undesirable result that the category of concepts *lacks homogeneity*».⁶ Invoking two different sets of moral concepts, one that conferred motivational force on beliefs and one that didn't, would indeed be undesirably complex. I would've been embarrassed to include such an inelegant theory in *Humean Nature*. Moreover, giving any beliefs motivational force would violate the Humean Theory.

Here Dolcini misunderstands the emotional perception model. It doesn't ascribe intrinsic motivational force to any beliefs, no matter how they're formed or which concepts they contain.⁷ Whenever motivational force accompanies belief, it comes from a desire that accompanies the belief and not from the belief alone. In the cases at hand, these desires are constituents of our emotional dispositions which give emotion its motivational force and explain its hedonic phenomenology. So when a moral belief is formed from experience, the desire that explains the experience can also motivate action. When testi-

mony or reasoning are needed to generate moral belief because emotional experience is absent, that's a sign of desire's absence, suggesting that we won't be accordingly motivated. In short, the emotional perception model maintains a simple and unified conception of belief by letting the presence or absence of desire explain the presence or absence of motivation.

Dolcini also argues that experientialism also offends against simplicity in its «recourse to the notion of accuracy».⁸ Experientialism defines virtues as character traits objectively represented by accurate admiration. Other moral properties like goodness and wrongness are similarly defined as the things objectively represented by accurate feelings of hope and guilt. She notes that this analysis leaves many questions unanswered, such as such as “what makes a moral feeling accurate?” and “how to distinguish between accurate *vs.* inaccurate feelings?” The only direct answer I can offer here is purely definitional – a feeling is accurate if and only if the thing it represents is the way the feeling represents it.⁹ But substantive questions of what to admire are hard to answer.

Invoking accuracy here doesn't reduce the simplicity of the theory, as the theory isn't committed to its existence of accuracy. It's merely part of the experientialist definition of moral terms like “virtue”, “good,” and “wrong”. Definitions don't commit us to the existence of the things defined or the things in terms of which we define them. An experientialist could deny that accurate feelings of admiration, hope, and guilt are possible because there's nothing in the world to make them accurate, and then hold that virtue, goodness, and wrongness don't exist. This is error theory about morality, the view that all moral beliefs are false.

The unanswered questions Dolcini poses are simply the classic questions of moral philosophy, translated into experientialist language. “What makes admiration accurate?” is a way to ask “Which character traits are admirable?” or “What are the virtues?” “How

can I distinguish accurate and inaccurate guilt?” is another way of asking “How can I tell whether the actions that feel wrong to me really are wrong?” Experientialists can be error theorist and say that guilt and admiration are never accurate, since there's no wrongness or virtue. Experientialists can also be moral realists and say that reality includes objective moral facts that make these feelings accurate. Treating these objective moral facts as irreducible to scientific facts will indeed lead to a loss of simplicity. But on the reductionist form of moral realism I favor, the accuracy-conditions for moral feeling can be explained entirely in terms of scientific facts, maintaining a simple ontology.¹⁰

A psychological theory need not answer the questions of moral metaphysics or normative ethics. It should explain how we think about these questions, since our thoughts are part of our psychology. But the answers might lie outside our psychology, and finding them is a topic for substantive moral philosophy. So it's best to leave Dolcini's unanswered questions to the moral philosophers.

Now I turn to Dolcini's discussion of psychopaths. As suggested earlier, their lack of motivation to act rightly results from differences between their desires and ours, not differences between their beliefs and ours. This is the standard Humean cognitivist treatment of amoralists – they have moral beliefs just like everyone else, but they act differently because they have different desires.

Dolcini asks whether psychopaths and other amoralists can be held morally responsible for their misdeeds. She writes, «if human morality depends upon the subjects' capacity for experiencing feelings, how is it possible to claim the amoralist (morally) responsible for his or her despicable actions?».¹¹ Experientialism treats psychopaths as unable to master moral concepts. They can only partially grasp the concepts through semantic deference. So if mastering or non-deferentially grasping moral concepts is necessary for moral responsibility, they aren't morally responsible for their actions.

I think psychopaths and other amoraliſts are morally responsible for their actions, as the ability to grasp moral concepts isn't necessary for moral responsibility. There's no general problem with concepts applying to people who don't grasp them – psychopaths need not have the concept of being psychopaths. The same holds for the concept of being morally praiseworthy. Creatures who never grasped the concept of rightness, goodness, virtue, or praise might still be praiseworthy if they fully grasped the concept of pain and tried their best to prevent the pain of others. Ordinary people seem to agree that dogs who undergo personal risk to help other dogs are proper subjects of moral praise. Internet videos depicting animals helping other animals often have many comments praising the moral character of the benevolent animals. If this is right, and blame is like praise, psychopaths can be blameworthy despite not understanding what "blameworthy" means.

Finally, Dolcini raises the issue of how to consider intelligent and successful psychopaths who act like ordinary people for self-interested reasons despite lacking the moral feelings. In some cases, such psychopaths would do the same things that conscientious people would do, but for self-interested reasons rather than moral reasons. Dolcini notes that my view requires a moral distinction between these two types of action.

This distinction is one that moral philosophers already know they need to draw. Immanuel Kant describes a shopkeeper who doesn't cheat anyone, not for moral reasons but because a reputation for honest dealing is better for business than the profits of cheating. Moral theory since Kant has developed many ways to draw this distinction, and the same distinction will deal with successful psychopaths. Maybe conscientious people act rightly while psychopaths act wrongly. Or maybe (on the view I favor) both act rightly, but only the conscientious people's actions have moral worth. Either way, categorizing successful psychopaths requires no new moral

distinctions – only well-understood ones at the core of contemporary ethical theory. So the Humean Theory leaves us no worse than before.

Miyazono on vividness

Following Hume, I use desire's interaction with vivid sensory and imaginative representations to explain a variety of psychological phenomena. But I don't give a precise account of what vividness is, introducing it largely with examples. After noting these points, Kengo Miyazono provides a helpful discussion of how I might provide a clearer account of vividness and its role in psychological explanation.

Vividness is a matter of degree. Some representations are more vivid than others on what seems like a continuous scale. Moreover, the effects of increasing vividness on desire, emotion, and motivation seem to vary continuously. So an account of vividness might identify the psychological states and processes that increase the vividness of representations when their magnitudes increase. Our final psychological theory might have precise mathematical rules for quantifying these factors, incorporating them into a calculus that determines a representation's degree of vividness. It'll be a long time before this can be worked out with any sort of precision. So the most I can do is to consider which factors might go into such a vividness calculus.

Miyazono helps with this task by presenting several hypotheses concerning how I might understand the levels of vividness that various representations have. I like a version of the first hypothesis he suggests: that sensory representations are typically more vivid than imaginative representations. We might understand imaginative representations as being on a continuum where the most vivid ones are sensation-like. Less vivid imaginative representations fall short of sensation-like vividness to varying degrees.

Attention's effects on vividness complicate this picture. The more I attend to par-

ticular sensed or imagined things, the more their vividness rises. We exercise willpower by exploiting this relationship between attention and vividness. One can resist a temptation by directing attention away from it and towards a long-term goal. In Hume's terminology, this calms the passion for the temptation, and raises the violence of the passion for the long-term goal. Perhaps in some successful exercises of willpower, the imaginative representation of the long-term goal becomes more vivid than the sensory representation of the temptation.

Attending to a representation increases its vividness. I would need a better theory of the relationship between attention and vividness to accurately describe how this happens. It seems natural to regard sensory representations as having a baseline level of vividness, to which attention contributes further. Do imaginative representations similarly have baseline levels to which attention contributes? Or does the degree of attentional focus partly constitute the vividness of an imaginative representation? Perhaps imagination constitutively involves attention to a possible state of affairs that isn't being sensed. Whatever the relationship between attention and imagination may be, attending to what is represented increases the vividness of the representation.

A second hypothesis Miyazono offers is that «vividness has something to do with visual modality (and possibly other sensory modalities)». ¹² I don't quite understand what this hypothesis amounts to. Everything, I suppose, has something to do with everything else. I should note in passing that vividness should apply to sensory modalities other than vision. The more intense the aroma of the freshly baked bread, the more I may want to eat it. In any event, Miyazono opposes this hypothesis to the idea that vividness comes in degrees. He rightly notes that this would make it unacceptable for my purposes.

I like Miyazono's third hypothesis that «vividness has something to do with particularity». ¹³ Particular things are indeed usually more amenable to vivid representation than

abstract things. I can vividly imagine the taste of Guinness, the final lyrics of Wolf Parade's "Yulia", and my mother's face. But I can't so vividly imagine taste, sounds, or faces in general without imagining a particular taste, sound, or face. Miyazono notes that my example of procrastinating on Facebook rather than finishing my book manuscript leaves the appeal of Facebook too general. Such a general representation would be unlikely to motivate procrastination. That's why the example briefly became more particular: «I'm refreshing Facebook to see who liked a joke I made or continuing an interminable argument with a libertarian. What's vivid to me is the amusement of others at my joke, or the wrongness of his opposition to Keynesian countercyclical stimulus». ¹⁴ (It would've been even more vivid if I'd told the joke or quoted the libertarian.)

What is the fundamental relationship between vividness, particularity, and desire? Perhaps particularity is essential to vividness, so that a more vivid representation just is one that fills in more particular details. Perhaps it's a quirk of our sensory and imaginative capacities that they're suited to vividly representing particulars. Perhaps the objects of desire appear primarily in particular forms, making representations of particulars especially effective in amplifying desires. Many other hypotheses are worth considering, and perhaps future psychologists will test them.

Miyazono also asks, "In virtue of what is Facebook more vivid than the book manuscript?" This depends largely on situational factors. The joke or the argument might be more vivid if I engaged with them more recently. And if Facebook is open in front of me, its vividness will make it hard to tear myself away. But if I'm immersed in writing, intriguing theoretical questions may be more vivid to me, amplifying my desire to write. Thanks to Miyazono, that's my situation now.

Miyazono questions whether my complicated account of desire strength is consistent with a functionalist picture of desire. My accounts of practical rationality and motivation incorporate two different ways of understand-

ing desire strength. While this is indeed complex, I don't see any better way for functionalists to accommodate the complex phenomena surrounding vividness. I'll try to explain this more clearly.

If vivid representations aren't in play, the inputs to motivation are the (baseline) strength of desire and the subjective probability that acting will bring about the desired outcome. Multiplying these values gives the motivational force of the desire-belief pair. All this is a standard part of a functionalist account of desire.

How does Amplification by Vividness fit into this motivational calculus? Just as functionalists understand desires and beliefs as inputs to a motivational calculus where the output is intention, they can understand desires and vivid representations of their objects as inputs to a process where the output is temporary amplification of the desire's strength. To calculate desire's strength as it enters into the motivational calculus, take the desire's baseline strength (the strength when there are no vivid representations of the object) and add the degree of amplification. Calculating this requires thinking of two different levels of strength – a baseline level that leaves out the effects of vividness and a final level that includes them.

The effects of vividness help to predict what people actually do, but not what it's rational to do. If it's rational for me to press on with writing my book when the attractions of procrastination aren't vivid, it's similarly rational when the attractions of procrastination are vivid. If you agree, you'll see the point of using only the baseline values for assessing the normative questions of practical rationality. This explains what it's rational to do, and also how people can fail to do what's rational.

The final topic Miyazono discusses is alief. The differences in clarity between my account of desire and Tamar Gendler's account of alief are larger than he suggests. While my account indeed leaves "vividness" undefined, this term at least excludes some things. Gendler's exhaustive disjunctions like "consciously or nonconsciously" in defining

alief don't exclude anything.

Miyazono offers two criticisms of how I handle Gendler's *Grand Canyon Skywalk* case. First he writes, «I don't know why the amplified desire not to fall is not overwhelmed by the belief that the Skywalk is safe». He draws a comparison to my case where someone desires to eat a delicious-looking fruit, but has seen someone else get sick after eating it, and avoids eating the fruit out of a stronger aversion to getting sick. His suggestion seems to be that the belief that the Skywalk is safe should determine one's action, like the belief that the fruit will make one sick.

These cases are disanalogous, because it's hard to see what desire would interact with the belief about the Skywalk's safety to motivate walking on it. The belief that the fruit will make one sick helps to determine one's motivation because one is averse to being sick. But while people have aversions to walking on unsafe things, they don't in general have positive desires to walk on safe things. It would be strange if someone became gleeful at the sight of a safe thing to walk on. So it's hard to see how the belief that the Skywalk is safe would combine with a desire to positively motivate walking.

Miyazono's second criticism is more interesting. He notes that my account relies on the vividly represented drop amplifying one's aversion to walking. But doesn't something there also amplify one's positive desire to walk? After all, people came so far specifically to walk on the Skywalk – aren't the desired features of walking there also vivid to them? Maybe they don't positively desire to walk on something safe, but they must desire something else. Why isn't this desired thing vivid to the same degree as the terrifying drop, making them enjoy the walk?

My account requires that the desired thing isn't so vividly represented in the moment of walking. This desired thing will differ from person to person. I don't know what it is in general. Perhaps some go to escape boredom; some go for the memory of having walked; and some go for the feeling of ac-

complishment when they finish. (Recall the words on the souvenir photographs: “I did it!!!”) Absences and retrospective future events are usually represented with less vividness than present immediate things. So as they step out onto the Skywalk, the terrifying drop will be more vivid than whatever they desire. And then the greater effects of vividness on phenomenology than motivation will fill them with fear, even as they step hesitantly onto the glass.

King and the mechanics of reasoning

Among the novel features of *Humean Nature* is an account of how the Attentional Aspect of desire makes mental states combine in reasoning. I thank Alex King for carefully mapping out ways that this account could be further developed. I’ll begin by discussing how combining works, and how inconsistent intentions exclude each other. Then I’ll turn to questions about what makes particular mental processes count as reasoning.

King helpfully articulates three ways of understanding what happens when a desire and a belief combine in instrumental reasoning. Are they like puzzle pieces, coming together but retaining their individual identities? Are they like parents of offspring, producing a third thing distinct from the original two? Or are they like ingredients that go into a cake, ceasing to exist in their previous forms as a new thing is made? King identifies my view with the offspring model. She rightly notes that I see the original desire and belief as continuing to exist, and the new instrumental desire as existing as well.

I see the new instrumental desire as a third thing composed of the original desire and belief that are now interlocked. This doesn’t fit the offspring model. Offspring typically aren’t composed of their interlocked parents. Can the portion of a puzzle composed of two interlocking puzzle pieces itself be called a puzzle piece? If so, putting puzzle pieces together provides an analogy for instrumental reasoning as I usually describe it.

If not, putting them together provides an analogy for instrumental reasoning only on the terminological variant that I call the intrinsic-desires-only view. This view awards the name “desire” only to intrinsic desires, which helps to prevent double-counting in calculating psychological effects, but doesn’t match the ordinary tendency to call instrumental desires “desires”. I make the terminological choice to set it aside: «For ease of exposition, I’ll still write of instrumental desires, but “combinations of intrinsic desires and means-end beliefs” is all I mean».¹⁵

The way phrases combine provides a better analogy for instrumental reasoning as I usually discuss it. Phrases continue existing and being phrases when they’re combined with other phrases to become parts of new phrases. Desires continue existing and being desires when they’re combined with beliefs to become parts of new desires. “See you” keeps existing and being a phrase when “in the future” is appended to it. “See you in the future” is also a phrase, partly because “See you” is a phrase. Similarly, a desire to eat keeps existing and being a desire after it combines with a belief about the means to eat. The resulting desire for the means is also a desire, partly because the desire for the end is.

Understanding combinations of desire like combinations of phrases helps to understand what happens when new intentions are formed. King writes that intention-formation as I describe it «doesn’t produce a new mental state, but simply brings existing mental states together».¹⁶ But if mental states are like phrases, combining them creates a further mental state composed of the previously existing mental states. This is how I understand the generation of intentions and instrumental desires in practical reasoning. King rightly argues that I should understand both types of reasoning the same way. In fact, I do.

King raises another important issue about my account of intention. I explain our tendency not to form inconsistent intentions in terms of our tendency to form beliefs that intended events will occur. These beliefs prevent the

formation of inconsistent intentions – I can't intend to board the plane at 7:30 and also believe that I'll see you in town at 8. But what prevents us from forming inconsistent intentions when the subjective probability of satisfaction is low? Then our beliefs won't screen off inconsistent intentions. She writes:

[Sinhababu] discusses the case of a basketball player who believes that his making a halfcourt shot is unlikely. In such a case, why should exclusion take hold at all? What precludes the player's intending something else that is conflicting, but unlikely, since after all he *doesn't* believe that either of them will occur?¹⁷

Indeed, my desire-belief theory correctly predicts that the player could form conflicting intentions of this sort. I thank King for calling this to readers' attention, and I'll illustrate it with an example.

Suppose the shooter knows that an opponent standing near the basket has an obscure psychological disorder: if a player screams very loudly while shooting the ball, the opponent will grab the shooter's teammate and throw him into the air in front of the basket. This will block the path of the ball and prevent it from going in, but such manhandling will constitute a foul on the opponent and enable the shooter's team to win. Suppose the shooter thinks his chance of screaming loud enough to cause the foul is as low as his chance of making the shot. If screaming won't distract him from shooting, his best option is to scream while shooting, with the intention of making the opponent throw his teammate. Then he intends the ball to go in the basket, and also intends something that would ensure that the ball doesn't go into the basket. Such conflicting intentions are psychologically possible (and rational) in low-probability cases. If other theories of intention don't make this prediction, this is a point against them.

Now I'll turn to another important set of questions King raises: Why do particular men-

tal states come together in reasoning, and which mental processes count as reasoning? These questions concern fundamental issues where my explanations come to an end. Fortunately, my Humean project can achieve its psychological and metaethical goals even if I have little more to say here.

King first notes that I don't have much of a story about why particular mental states combine to generate others. As she writes, «if we want to know why *this* desire combines with *this* belief and why it produces *that* desire, it looks like we must be content with the answer that this is simply how things are».¹⁸ To illustrate: desire combines with belief about which events would raise the probability of satisfaction, composing instrumental desire for these events. Such desire-belief combinations don't compose instrumental desire for these events not to happen, or generate beliefs that the events are impossible. Why do these mental states combine as they do, and not in other ways?

Here we reach the basic laws of (intentional-state) psychology, which no deeper psychological laws explain. That desires and beliefs combine this way is to psychology what carbon's making four bonds is to organic chemistry. In both cases, more fundamental explanations can be found, but only by proceeding to a more basic science. Neuroscience or perhaps some level of psychology that doesn't invoke intentional states will tell us more about how desire-belief relations are constituted, while atomic and chemical physics tell us more about why carbon makes four bonds. But no deeper laws are found within psychology and organic chemistry themselves. We discover the basic laws through inference to the best explanation of the data these sciences address. It would be a great theoretical advance to discover a simpler set of psychological laws explaining the desire-belief combination rules. But I don't see how this can be done.

King provides a deeply illuminating discussion of why it's hard for me to say more about what would and wouldn't count as reasoning. I agree with her about nearly every detail, in-

cluding her conclusion that some kind of speed-and-syntax account is my best option, at least as far as extensional adequacy is concerned. She notes that this view isn't without costs. Characterizing reasoning in terms of speed and syntax might allow wishful thinking to count as reasoning. The problem of how to classify wishful thinking is in fact what dissuaded me from attempting a more explicit account of reasoning in *Humean Nature*. Probably I should just say it's bad reasoning, as she suggests.

Fortunately, my campaign against cognitivist internalists like Smith, Scanlon, and Kant doesn't require an account of reasoning. This is why I don't provide one. I'm happy to agree with them that if beliefs alone could directly motivate action or create new desires, that would count as reasoning.

My objection is that humans can't do this kind of reasoning. If angels exist, maybe they can, and maybe this angelic psychological process is the clearest case of reasoning in all God's creation. But many mammals can't do it, including humans. So if moral judgment requires the capacity for this kind of reasoning, humans can't make moral judgments.

But of course, humans can make moral judgments. So by *modus tollens*, moral judgments aren't beliefs which can by reasoning move us to act or generate new desires. And that entails the falsity of cognitivist internalism as defended by Smith, Scanlon, and Kant.

Notes

¹ D. HUME, *My Own Life* (1776), in: D. HUME, *The*

Letters of David Hume, vol. I, edited by J.Y.T. GREIG, Clarendon, Oxford 2011, pp. 1-7, here p. 2.

² C. BAGNOLI, *Reflective Efficacy*, in: «Rivista internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia», vol. IX, n.1, 2018, pp. 67-72, here p. 70.

³ *Ivi*, p. 71.

⁴ *Ivi*, p. 69.

⁵ N. DOLCINI, *Moral Beliefs and Cognitive Homogeneity*, in: «Rivista internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia», vol. IX, n. 1, 2018, pp. 89-94, here p. 91.

⁶ *Ibidem*.

⁷ See the diagram in N. SINHABABU, *Humean Nature. How Desire Explains Action, Thought, and Feeling*, Oxford University Press, Oxford/New York 2017, p. 64 (available also in my *Précis*, see this issue of *Rivista internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia*).

⁸ *Ivi*, p. 91.

⁹ Sometimes I wonder if Dolcini thinks I'm treating accuracy as an intrinsic property of the feeling. I'm not. Perceptual accuracy, like truth of belief, is a matter of correspondence with an external reality.

¹⁰ Defending reductionism and showing how it leads to hedonic utilitarianism will be the topic of my next book.

¹¹ *Ivi*, p. 93.

¹² K. MIYAZONO, *Vivid Representations and Their Effects*, in: «Rivista internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia», vol. IX, n. 1, 2018, pp. 73-80, here p. 75.

¹³ *Ivi*, p. 76.

¹⁴ N. SINHABABU, *Humean Nature*, cit., pp. 118-119.

¹⁵ *Ivi*, p. 28.

¹⁶ A. KING, *Mechanics and Psychology of Practical Reasoning*, in: «Rivista internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia», vol. IX, n. 1, 2018, pp. 81-88, here p. 86.

¹⁷ *Ivi*, p. 87.

¹⁸ *Ivi*, p. 83.