The Several Factors of (Self-)Consciousness
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Abstract In prior essays I have sketched a “modal model” of (self-) consciousness. That model “factors” out several distinct forms of awareness in the phenomenological structure of a typical act of consciousness. Here we consider implications of the model à propos of contemporary theories of consciousness (e.g., higher-order and self-representational forms of awareness). In particular, we distinguish phenomenality from other features of awareness in a conscious experience: “what it is like” to have an experience involves several different factors. Further, we should see these factors as typical of consciousness, rather than essential features, allowing that some elements of awareness may be absent while others are present in certain less typical cases.

Keywords: (Self-)consciousness; Higher-order Theories of Consciousness; Self-representational Theories of Consciousness; Phenomenality; Phenomenological Theories of Consciousness

Consciousness and self-consciousness

An intuitive and traditional theory of consciousness holds that what makes a mental state or act conscious is a certain awareness of that activity. That type of awareness may be called self-consciousness: meaning not one’s consciousness of oneself, the subject of the mental act, but rather the act’s consciousness of itself. What is the form...
or structure of that awareness?

Following a line from Aristotle, Brentano argued that ‘inner consciousness’ is an intrinsic and incidental part of consciousness. Each act of consciousness, Brentano held, includes both a primary consciousness of some object and a secondary consciousness of the act itself: as the act is ‘directed’ toward its primary object and also incidentally toward itself. This secondary ‘inner consciousness’, Brentano argued, is not a form of ‘inner observation’, which would be a second act directed toward the first: say, “introspection”, as practiced by subsequent psychologists; or “phenomenological reflection”, as practiced by Husserl and later phenomenologists; or “higher-order monitoring”, as appraised by recent theorists in philosophy of mind.

Intrigued by Brentano’s notion of inner consciousness, by Husserl’s analysis of inner time-consciousness, and by Sartre’s conception of consciousness’s self-consciousness (conscience de soi), I set out, in The Structure of (Self-) Consciousness, to craft a basic analysis of the structure of awareness that these thinkers took to be constitutive of consciousness itself. In more recent essays I have amplified the basic idea in that early article. Here I should like to draw out some implications of what I’ve come to call the “modal model” of (self-) consciousness.

Briefly, the modal model of (self-) consciousness factors out several different “modal” characters (as I call them) in the phenomenological structure of a typical conscious experience. These characters (to be specified shortly) define not the way the object of consciousness is presented in an act of consciousness, but rather the way the act itself is experienced or carried out: that is, consciously, with a certain form of awareness.

My concern here is to emphasize the separable roles of these characters in the formal structure of a typical experience. These characters define, if you will, “what it is like” to enact or live through the experience. However, on the modal model, that what-it-is-like character is itself a structure incorporating the distinct “modal” characters singled out in the modal model of consciousness.

Models of awareness in the theory of consciousness

In recent decades philosophers have proposed several different models of the awareness that renders a mental state or act conscious. In 1986, as noted, I published an article titled The Structure of (Self-) Consciousness. There I proposed a formal model of the structure of inner awareness. In several essays in recent years I’ve amplified that basic analysis, in what I’ve come to call the “modal model” of consciousness, including “inner awareness”. I now want to bring out more explicitly the way in which that model distinguishes several distinct factors in the structure of an act of consciousness.

These “modal” characters in an act of consciousness include: phenomenality, or how the experience “appears” in consciousness; egocentricity, or how the “I” appears as subject of experience; inner awareness per se, or how the experience is reflexively experienced as “this very experience”; a spatiotemporal sense of embodiment, of the “here and now” as experienced (say) in seeing something “here and now before me”; the species of conscious activity (e.g. seeing, thinking, willing, etc.). These modal characters modify the presentation of the object of consciousness: that is, whereby the object is presented as such-and-such. (In the analytic tradition, intentionality is often assumed to require a propositional content, “that p”, but that assumption is far too restrictive, and I’ll here work with the case of a visual presentation of an object with various properties, as opposed to a visual belief that the object has such-and-such properties.)

Meanwhile, a somewise parallel development in philosophy of mind has produced competing models of the structure of awareness that renders a mental act or state conscious. In 1986 David Rosenthal proposed the Higher-Order Thought analysis of this
form of awareness. In 1968 David Armstrong had proposed what has come to be called the Higher-Order Perception model of “inner sense”. By the 1990s a generalized model called Higher-Order Monitoring sought to capture the structure of self-consciousness: whether a kind of perception or a kind of thought or simply a kind of self-monitoring. These models all sought to preserve a materialist theory of mind, while recognizing the subjective experience of consciousness. Many proponents of higher-order monitoring have thought of this awareness-of-mind as a functional or computational process, whereby a special form of information-processing concerns the mental act itself, a meta-cognition. Other philosophers have resisted the reduction of awareness to functional processing – even as some proponents of phenomenal consciousness still seek a materialist theory of mind.

Materialist, functionalist, and computational models of mind do not, however, capture the lived character of a conscious experience: what Thomas Nagel famously called “what it is like” for a being to be conscious, or to experience a conscious mental state. By contrast, Brentano simply assumed, if we may put it so, that consciousness has a phenomenal character, an intrinsic quality he took to inhabit “inner consciousness”. In Brentano’s wake Husserl struggled to characterize the structure of “inner time consciousness”, the form of awareness of a flowing experience that embodies its “now” occurring while carrying “retentions” of just-past phases of experience and “protentions” of about-to-occur phases of the stream of consciousness. Here I’ll assume a non-reductive approach to phenomenology, looking to phenomenological structure in its own right (regardless of how it is bound into neural function in a wider environment).³

### The modal model of consciousness

In the modal model, I’ve sought to bring out the phenomenological structure characteristic of conscious experience: or rather, I would now emphasize, a phenomeno-logical structure incorporating several distinct factors in the overall form of an act of consciousness.⁴

This modal model of consciousness is ultimately a theory of these several factors in the phenomenological structure of a typical conscious experience. Let me introduce the model (as I have elsewhere) in terms of a familiar type of experience. Perception is a fortuitous case study for phenomenology because it is rich in diverse content. In particular, visual experience is sensuous, cognitive, and embodied. As detailed by Husserl, Gurdwitsch, and Merleau-Ponty, the structure of visual consciousness is richly shaped by its place in the subject’s stream of consciousness, including bodily action, where the phenomenological form of “what is seen” is a fusion of sensory and cognitive content. Accordingly, we consider a visual experience occurring in a familiar everyday context.

As I am gazing on my environs, a movement catches my eye. A bird is swooping down from high in a fir tree, alighting on a bird-feeder nearby, its feet grasping the side of the feeder. It’s a woodpecker! How rare to see one up close. A red cape, black and white body, a long sharp beak. Skittish, as it seeks food while wary of its observer, me. This visual experience we may characterize in a formal phenomenological description as follows:

<Phenomenally in this very experience I now here see that swooping woodpecker.>

There is much more to my experience than is captured in this formulation. My visual experience in seeing the bird swoop down and perch is itself a temporal flow in my consciousness, a passing phase in my ongoing stream of consciousness. That flow of experience itself is part of my everyday activity in my world, as I look around, moving to see the flight of the woodpecker, all in relation to my “lived” body, in my surrounding “life-world”. What the formulation above does – in light
of the richness of that flow of experience – is to frame certain formal or logical features in the phenomenological structure of the visual experience so described. My task here is to distinguish certain “modal” factors in that structure: the factors articulated via the series of underscored expressions above (details to follow shortly).

The angle brackets are meant to articulate not the words enclosed, but the phenomenological structure of the lived experience – albeit articulated by means of the words used: note the several types of indexical expression. The structure so articulated is what Husserl called the noematic content of the act of visual consciousness. Husserl used quotation marks in this way to “quote” the content of the experience described. However, the structural analysis at hand is not laid out by Husserl himself, but is guided by logical notions I borrow from Frege and Hintikka.

The modal model divides the phenomenological structure of the exampled act into two basic parts. The mode of presentation in the act articulates the way the object of consciousness appears or is presented in consciousness:

<that swooping woodpecker>.

By contrast, the modality of presentation in the act articulates the way the act itself appears and is executed in presenting the object in a certain way:

<Phenomenally in this very experience I now here see>.

The term “presentation” is equivalent with “intention” or “intentionality”. The term “mode of presentation” is meant to resonate with both Frege’s and Husserl’s notions of sense (Sinn), articulating the core content of the intentional experience, the object-specifying content. The term “modality of presentation” is meant to resonate with Jaakko Hintikka’s notion of perceptual or intentional modality. For emphasis we might speak of the “modality of the act of presentation of the object”. Importantly, the modal model of consciousness would factor out several distinctive elements within the full “modal” character of the experience at hand, within the complex structure articulated as the modality of presentation. I return to the Hintikkian aspect of my modal model below.

### Factoring out “modal” characters in an act of consciousness

In the phenomenological description laid out above, I have underscored several logically distinct parts of the “modal” structure in the noematic content of the act so described – thus:

<Phenomenally in this very experience I now here see>.

These distinct factors in the noematic content embody importantly different characters of the experience at hand. We may gloss the phenomenology of these characters as follows:

<Phenomenally> – phenomenal character,

<in this very experience> – inner awareness,

<I> – egocentricity, or orientation from the subject,

<now here> – spatiotemporal awareness,

<see> – act species.

Each of these “modal” characters has been appraised in the phenomenological analyses richly detailed by Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, and others. What the modal model of (self-) consciousness does is to map out the formal or logical structure of an act’s noematic content in a way that both distinguishes and binds together the several factors cited just above. Phenomenality is, if you will, the starting point of
Inner awareness, as Brentano held, is a basic feature of the act’s “appearing” in the stream of consciousness. On the modal model, I have proposed, the form of inner awareness is a reflexive indexical awareness: “in this very experience...”. On this model, inner awareness is distinct from phenomenality.

Egocentricity is a form of orientation from the subject or “I” (“ego”), whereby the act is directed from the subject toward the presented object. Spatiotemporality is a modification of the subjective orientation of perceptual experience in particular. Thus, I “intend” the woodpecker from my locus in a phenomenal field within which the woodpecker appears.

Act species is often ascribed to an act framed in the idiom of “propositional attitudes”: seeing, judging, wishing, etc. – seeing that such-and-such, etc. However, we need not assume that the objective content is always propositional in form (<that ___>). In the above example, the objective or object-presenting content is more appropriately cast in the form <that swooping woodpecker>, rather than <that that woodpecker is swooping downward>. The logical formation of the “modal” content binds these distinct factors of content together in the modal structure:

<Phenomenally in this very experience I now here see>.

All of the underscored elements of “modal” content – the modality-of-presentation – articulate forms of awareness in the experience at hand: phenomenal awareness, inner awareness, subjective awareness, spatiotemporal awareness, visual awareness. And this complex modal content modifies the act’s mode-of-presentation of the object of consciousness, articulated by the object-presenting content <that swooping woodpecker>.

These five forms of modal content define distinct aspects of awareness in an act of consciousness. As characterized above, they perform different functions in the phenomenological structure of the act. Accordingly, I have marked out different “slots” for them in the modal content of the experience.

The history of phenomenology – from roots in Descartes and Hume to elaborate analyses in Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, and others – approaches these modal characters, as it were, one by one. Phenomenality is a basic feature seemingly taken for granted from Descartes onward into Kant and beyond; the term “phenomena” means appearance, that is, in consciousness.

“Inner” awareness is pinpointed by Brentano as “inner consciousness”. And inner awareness is given further structure in Husserl’s analysis of “inner time-consciousness”. Awareness of one’s self is a running theme from Descartes through Hume and Kant into Husserl and into Sartre. Spatiotemporality appears as embodied consciousness, richly detailed in Husserl and Merleau-Ponty. And so on. However, what the modal model offers is an explicit logical, or phenomeno-logical, structure that both separates and unites these several distinct factors of (self-) consciousness.

In recent philosophy of mind, I would note, phenomenality and subjectivity have vied for prominence. “What it is like” to have a conscious experience has been the leading notion in recent consciousness theory. Some theorists emphasize “phenomenal” character as defining consciousness and what it is like; other theorists emphasize “subjective” character, or what it is like for the subject. The modal model, however, factors what-it-is-like into some five distinct factors of (self-)consciousness. It follows that we should not try to define what renders an experience conscious solely in terms of any one of these factors.

- Typical, not essential, factors

Many philosophers seek analysis in the form of necessary and sufficient conditions:
here, for a mental act to be conscious. The debate then centers on a proffered condition, or counter-examples thereto. Following that form of analysis, then, the Higher-Order Monitoring theory of consciousness would hold:

A mental act A is conscious if and only if A includes a proper part of A that consists in a higher-order monitoring of A [say, a higher-order thought or perception that represents A in an appropriate way].

If the modal model is to be formulated in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions, then it would hold:

A mental act A is conscious if and only if A includes a proper part whose content includes the modal structure <Phenomenally in this very experience I now here> [and so A includes a reflexive awareness of A].

Now, the form of necessary-and-sufficient conditions gives a misleading analysis of what makes a mental act conscious.

For starters, there is a problem of whether the proffered defining condition is logically or perhaps conceptually necessary-and-sufficient, or instead psychologically or neurophysiologically necessary-and-sufficient, that is, according to principles of empirical psychology or neurobiology. Or better: a condition that is phenomenologically necessary-and-sufficient, that is, according to principles of phenomenology, rather than principles of either logic or neurobiology.

I am assuming we need a theory of phenomenological structure per se, perhaps along lines of the Husserlian conception of ideal “noematic” content. However we work out that issue, I submit, we should not frame the modal model of consciousness in terms of necessary-and-sufficient conditions on the modal content of an experience. Rather, we should view the model as defining a complex form of awareness that factors out modal characters of experience that are typical, rather than essential, factors in consciousness.

We should think of the distribution of these modal characters as something like a bell curve. These modal characters come together in a typical act of conscious, a form of experience that we adult human beings rather typically experience. In certain cases, though, some of these modal characters may be absent. These cases should not be seen as counter-examples to the model, but rather as relative outliers in the distribution of the forms of awareness we find, phenomenologically, in our experience. (Empirical studies may find which parts of the neural system are active in various forms of consciousness, and which parts may be silent even in a conscious experience. But such studies lie beyond, and presuppose, the phenomenological analysis of forms of consciousness.)

A common experience is where you are driving a familiar stretch of road and lost in thought. Many philosophers take this case to show that there is no inner awareness of your driving. But we should not say you are driving unconsciously (please do not!). Rather, we may allow that inner awareness — of “this very experience” — is absent or certainly muted in this case. Similarly, many philosophers find persuasive the claim that consciousness is typically or even essentially “transparent” or “diaphanous”, in that consciousness is intentionally directed outward toward some object (say, the deep-red rose visually before me), but with no particular awareness whatsoever of the experience itself. This claim is only plausible in cases where the subject’s attention is wholly absorbed in the object of consciousness. What we should say is not that consciousness is essentially transparent, but rather that in some cases the sense of inner awareness is either absent or muted.

A venerable claim has it that in deep meditation all sense of “self” disappears, yet one is not only conscious, but purportedly in a deep and altered state of “pure” consciousness with no sense of self. We should not then say that this state is without consciousness, hence without any experiential charac-
ter (of what it is like for the subject?). Rather, we may allow that egocentricity – awareness of “I” (“this very subject”) – is absent in this state of consciousness (as has long been held by Buddhist practitioners of deep meditation). At a more mundane level, we have all frequently experienced activities where we are focused intently on what we are doing (think of a watch-maker repairing a tiny element in a watch). In such an immersive experience, the sense of self or “I” virtually disappears, yet one is conscious, and vividly aware of what one is doing.

When I am thinking intently on a philosophical problem, I become “lost in thought”. Even as I am typing out my verbalized pattern of thought, my sense of spatiotemporal embodiment – of being “here now” as I so think and type – may virtually disappear. And yet my activity of thinking is conscious. Observing cases like these, then, we should view the modal model of (self-) consciousness as marking out a pattern of awareness in which one or more of these modal characters is either absent or at least so muted that, well, we hardly notice. And yet this complex form of awareness, phenom

Phenomenality in cognitive phenomenology and beyond

As philosophers of mind have turned to phenomenal consciousness, the question has arisen: What types of mental activity have a phenomenal character of what-it-is-like? A conservative empiricist view holds that only purely sensuous experiences, such as seeing a red round patch, are actually phenomenal. A more liberal view holds that consciously thinking that p (whatever the content <p>) has its own distinctive phenomenal character. Again, on the liberal phenomenological approach, perception is typically both sensuous and cognitively informed. And so, in the case of my experience in seeing this black-and-white-and-red woodpecker swooping toward the feeder, this conscious visual experience has its own distinctive phenomenal character – its own partly sensuous and partly cognitive “phenomenology”.

I myself have argued for a classical phenomenological view that every conscious experience – especially every conscious intentional experience – has its own bona fide phenomenal character. This is practically tautological, in my view. In any event, wherever phenomenality plays in various types of conscious mental activity, I would emphasize here that the modal model provides a structured framework within which to define the role of phenomenality.

Thus, a purely sensuous experience might have the structure:

<phenomenally I now see this red round patch>,

or perhaps more simply:

<phenomenally there now appears this/a red round patch>.

A purely cognitive conscious thought might have the structure:

<phenomenally I now think that Merleau-Ponty was right>.

And a conscious volitional action might have the structure:

<phenomenally I now here swing this racket in my backhand style>.

Again, a typical, richly contentful, visual experience might have the structure:

<phenomenally I now here see this
swooping red-caped woodpecker>.

Moving beyond the quotidian range of Lebenswelt experience, we may find that a “no-self” experience in Buddhist meditation has the structure:

<phenomenally there now appears this feeling of joy>,

or in an advanced meditative state of “pure” consciousness:

<phenomenally there appears this present field of consciousness>.

And similarly we may apply the modal modal of the structure of consciousness to other forms of experience as well. The modal model parses several distinct “slots”, or structural forms, that may be filled appropriately. And in each such form of experience the modal content <phenomenally> inflects the overall experience in such a way that “there is something it is like” to have the experience. We may say phenomenality rules in phenomenology.

Now, the phenomenal character of an experience is sometimes characterized as the quality of “what it is like for me” and so from the first-person perspective. Importantly, however, the modal model separates phenomenality per se from egocentricity. What it is like “for me” is transformed into what it is like as enacted “by me”, or in active voice what it is like as “I see/think/ ...”. Arguably, to be experienced as enacted “by me”, or as being directed “from me”, entails being experienced as occurring “for me” (the differences are variations in surface grammar). In any case, the <I> structure of consciousness needs to be distinguished from the overarching structure <phenomenally>.

This distinction allows us to recognize experiences where the “I” is absent, as in certain forms of meditation (noted earlier) where consciousness is experienced as without a “self”. Yet even in a “self”-rooted experience, we should see, the “self” aspect of the experience is distinct from its “what it is like” aspect per se.\(^{11}\)

### The logic of modal structures of (self-) consciousness

In the lineage of phenomenology, from Brentano into Husserl into Sartre, we find a basic view of pre-reflective awareness that is arguably constitutive of consciousness — at least in the forms of intentional consciousness ubiquitous in everyday experience.

As noted at the outset, my own “modal” model of (self-) consciousness began with basic pre-reflective inner awareness. However, on my analysis, this basic form of awareness exhibits a number of distinguishable factors: that is the point of the present essay, to emphasize this factored structure in typical consciousness. Again, there are, I believe, rather special forms of consciousness that are not so highly structured. I certainly count many other living beings as having bona fide consciousness without this variety of “self-consciousness”. At any rate, the form of awareness at stake here is a structured awareness typical of many forms of phenomenal intentional consciousness that we commonly experience.

The complexity of awareness articulated in the modal model follows two types of analysis that are not reflected in any way in current discussions. Here I should like to emphasize how these two types of analysis play in the modal model discussed above. One model derives from Jaakko Hintikka’s model for “intentional modalities” such as belief and (especially) perception. The other model derives from Edmund Husserl’s model of “noematic content” under my own detailed reconstruction.\(^{14}\) From Hintikka’s analysis of the logic of perception sentences I want to draw a model of the formal structure of an intentional experience such as perception. And within that structure, looking to Husserlian phenomenology, I want to define certain formal struc-
tures of consciousness as articulated in the modal model of (self-) consciousness.

In his *Models for Modalities*, Hintikka showed how “propositional attitudes” such as belief and perception have a formal structure akin to that of the metaphysical modalities of possibility and necessity. Intentionality is thus conceived as a *modal* structure, where an attitude is related to things in various “possible worlds”, and we may speak accordingly of *intentional modalities* including belief, perception, etc.\(^{15}\)

In particular, Hintikka’s logic of perception treats “A sees that p” as a modal sentence akin to “it is necessary that p”. Thus, in Hintikka’s logic, “A sees that the woodpecker is swooping down to the feeder” means, roughly, that in every perceptually possible situation compatible with what A sees, it is the case that the woodpecker is swooping down to the feeder. By analogy, “it is necessary that p” means that in every metaphysically possible world, it is the case that p. Building upon an ontology of possible situations or worlds, then, we may follow Hintikka’s lead in distinguishing intentionally possible situations, which are far more restricted in type than metaphysically possible situations or worlds. The latter types of possibilities have dominated philosophers’ attention, largely to the exclusion of intentional possibilities: that is, situations compatible only with phenomenological contents of intentional acts or attitudes.

Hintikka’s logic of perception is set within the framework of modal logic, specifically, in the style of possible-worlds semantics following model-theoretic semantics. Husserl’s conception of logic preceded developments in mathematical logic in the works of Carnap, Gödel, Tarski, among others, prior to Hintikka’s work in modal logic. In particular, Husserl’s conception of “pure logic” in his *Logical Investigations* (1900-01)\(^{16}\) sought to correlate structures of language, structures of thought or conscious experience, and structures of things in the surrounding world.\(^{17}\) As we approach the logic of perception sentences in relation to the phenomenology of perception, we bear in mind the effects of different methodologies.

Briefly, mathematical logic defines formal structures that abstract away from the richness of both ordinary language and everyday experience. What I’ve called the “modality” of presentation in (say) an act of perception embraces a wider range of “modal” aspects of the perceptual experience – carrying us beyond the basic formal structure of perception that is indicated in Hintikka’s semantics for sentences ascribing perceptual experience. Thus, on my development of the modal model of consciousness, the modal character in an act of perception begins à la Hintikka with the structure <I see that ...>, and that structure is extended to encompass further phenomenological elements of “modality”: thus, <phenomenally in this very experience I now here see ...> – combining several distinct aspects of (self-) consciousness beyond <... I see ...>.

As Ronald McIntyre and I detailed in *Husserl and Intentionality*,\(^{18}\) Husserl’s theory of “noematic” content or meaning (Sinn) involved a rich conception of the “horizon” of anticipated *possibilities* compatible with the content of a given intentional experience. These horizontal modifications refine the intentional focus of an experience with a given content.

In our featured case above, a Husserlian-Hintikkan analysis finds that my visual experience presents me intentionally with, well, that swooping red-caped woodpecker, heading for the feeder on the deck. Of course, my prior experience with birds and their flight and their feeding interests shapes what I now see: “that swooping woodpecker”. But that item of content carries a rich horizon of “motivated” background meaning that constrains what I see.

For example, it is quite possible that the woodpecker will alight on the feeder and perch nervously on its side, or it is quite possible that it will veer off when it/she/he spies me.

However, it is not a motivated possibility, for my visual experience, that the woodpecker...
er will drop a cherry bomb on the feeder, or that it will choose to attack me as I admire it. The horizon of motivated possibilities is rich and wide and indeterminate. For the record, the appropriate possibilities are not explicitly represented; they are merely implicit and vaguely tied into my current experience.\(^9\)

Now we are ready to invoke a more specific feature of the structure of the “noematic content” of an experience. Husserl distinguished the object-presenting content or Sinn in an experience from what he called the “thetic character” of the experience. In the present case the thetic character includes the quality of visual experience per se, that is, seeing (rather than hearing) the swooping bird. And once we recognize this formally distinct thetic structure in the noematic content of the experience, we may begin to parse out further modifying characters. I see the woodpecker clearly (rather than vaguely); I presently see it swooping (“now” in the temporal flow of my stream of consciousness); I see it within my situated embodied circumstance (“here”, as I sit facing the bird feeder and the swooping woodpecker). Further, well, of course, it is phenomenally within my stream of experience that I see the swooping woodpecker.

Of course, these distinct “thetic” characters in my experience are precisely the distinct factors of conscious awareness – “modal” characters – that are parsed in the modal model of (self-) consciousness. The full phenomenological content of my experience – what Husserl called its ideal “noematic content” – is accordingly mapped out in the articulated phenomenological description set out above:

\(\text{<Phenomenally in this very experience I now here see that swooping woodpecker>}.\)

With these details in mind, then, I would underscore how the ideal phenomenological structure of the experience is factored into the several formal “slots” appraised in the full content of the experience: the slots of phenomenality, inner awareness, egocentricity, locality, act-type, and object-presenting sense.

Without here elaborating on the ontology of meaning, I would defer to the detailed reconstruction of Husserl’s theory of noematic content in my Husserl.\(^2\) On such a line of theory: the logic of consciousness includes the phenomenology of experience, which in turn includes the ontology of meaning-content.

\hspace{1cm}\textbf{A Postscript on propositional content}

Many philosophers of mind, working in the tradition of analytic philosophy, focus on a narrow conception of intentionality whereby a “propositional attitude” consists simply in an attitude plus a propositional content. In the case at hand, this type of analysis would find in my experience: the propositional content \(<\text{that woodpecker is swooping down toward the feeder}>\) plus the attitude \(<\text{visual perception}>\). Well, that’s a start. But there’s more.

First, intentional content or Sinn does not always take a propositional form, which presents or “intends” a fact or state of affairs. It is one thing to see an individual “this woodpecker”, and it is another thing to see a state of affairs or situation to the effect that “this bird is a woodpecker” – as Husserl rightly emphasized. Second, there is more to the content of an experience than its act-type (say, seeing) and its object-presenting content (say, \(<\text{that swooping woodpecker}>\)). The modal model marks out further elements in what I called the “modal” character of an experience.

In philosophy of mind, as John Searle turned from speech act theory to intentionality theory,\(^3\) he defined an intentional state as an intentional state type with a propositional content, the latter defined by its conditions of satisfaction. So for Searle the structure of an intentional experience is basically: state-type + proposition. In logical theory, Hintikka’s semantics for propositional attitudes\(^4\) assumes that a propositional attitude takes the form of an attitude in relation to a propo-
tion, where the propositional content of the attitude is defined, as noted above, in terms of intentionally possible situations or “worlds”.

Hintikka’s logic can be set in a wider context resonant with Husserlian intentionality theory. For each attitude the logical semantics assumes a relation between the attitude and its truth in relevantly possible “worlds” or situations. This style of semantics reflects a theory of intentionality whereby an act of consciousness is, as it were, directed toward appropriate things in a relevant range of intentionally possible worlds. By assuming that an intentional attitude has at least this basic structure, Hintikka then can define truth-conditions for a sentence ascribing the attitude. In the case considered above, we then say: “A sees that the woodpecker is swooping down” is true in every perceptually possible situation or world in which the woodpecker is swooping down, that is, in that possible world.23

The focus on propositional structure in intentional experience is helpful where the content of an experience is either expressible in language, as Husserl considered in Logical Investigations, or inflected by language, as many of our conceptual structures surely are, or arguably grounded in one’s language, at a sub-conscious level of “deep structure” where subject-predicate syntax rules. However, we do not live by language-shaped experience alone. Perceptual experience, experience in volitional action, and deep emotional experience all seem to have their own proper phenomenological forms. Accordingly, I have focused above on a simple form of visual experience that is not primarily shaped by our language, even though in my own experience the visual content <woodpecker> is shaped by the language of others familiar with such remarkable creatures.

I have framed the modal model of (self-) consciousness in a form inspired by the syntax of modal logic, following Hintikka’s logic of perception and of propositional attitudes in general. How to translate this model into a theory of basic phenomenological structures is part of what Husserl called the “infinite task” of phenomenology. In today’s science of consciousness that would mean plumbing the depths of neurological structure to better understand lived phenomenological structure—a task for many other days.

Notes

3 On relations between phenomenology and philosophy of mind, see: D. WOODRUFF SMITH, A. THOMASSON (eds.) Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind, Oxford University Press, Oxford/New York 2005; D. DAHLSTROM, A. ELPIDOROU, W. HOPP (eds.), The Reappearance of the Mind, cit. These per-
spectives form the larger context within which I would place the modal model of consciousness: looking toward phenomenology per se and toward the metaphysics of consciousness as addressed in recent philosophy of mind.


See my reconstruction of these correlations in D. WOODRUFF SMITH, Consciousness, Modality, and Inner Awareness, cit.


Critics sometimes read too much explicit content into the Husserlian analysis, but that is a mistake, for the background of meaning for my current experience is not wholly stored in my memory banks but invoked from a broader range of background human experience. In Consciousness, Modality, and Inner Awareness I note that Husserl allowed for the “genesis” of meaning extant in my wider intersubjective arena, even though the explicit meaning may be merely something like “that swooping woodpecker”.

See D. WOODRUFF SMITH, Consciousness, Modality, and Inner Awareness, cit.


See J. HINTIKKA, Models for Modalities, cit.

See, again, D. WOODRUFF SMITH, R. MCI TYRE, Husserl and Intentionality, cit.