Dreaming Consciousness: A Contribution from Phenomenology
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**Abstract** The central aim of this paper is to offer a historical reconstruction of phenomenological studies on dreaming and to put forward a draft for a phenomenological theory of the dream state. Prominent phenomenologists have offered an extremely valuable interpretation of the dream as an intentional process, stressing its relevance in understanding the complexity of the mental life of subject, the continuous interplay between reality and unreality, and the possibility of building parallel spheres of experience influencing the development of personal identity. Taking into consideration the main characteristics of dream experience emphasized by these scholars, in the final part of the paper I propose to elaborate a new phenomenology of dreaming, which should be able to offer a theoretical description of dream states. My sketched proposal is based on Eugen Fink’s notion of the dream as “presentification”. By combining the past and the present of phenomenological investigation, I aim at suggesting a philosophical framework to explain the intentional features of dreaming as Erlebnis.

**KEYWORDS**: Phenomenology; Dreaming State; Presentification; Erlebnis; Ego

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FROM ITS VERY BEGINNING, WESTERN philosophy has dealt with the fascinating issue of dreaming, taking into account the various meanings that the dream state may have for the mental life of an individual. Both Plato and Aristotle considered the physiological aspects of dreaming processes, and Plato extended his enquiries to the role played by dreaming in his skeptical argument against the reliability of perception.

A similar argument was later put forward by Descartes in the first of his famous Meditations, though Descartes in his Treatise on Man considered the purely 62 physiological nature of dreaming while Schopenhauer went as far as to question the very possibility of distinguishing between being awake and dreaming, thus supporting the definition of life as a “long dream”.

We can find Schopenhauer’s view in his deep reflections on the relationship between being awake and asleep elaborated by Heraclitus, as he says “Men asleep are laborers and co-workers in what takes place in the world”. However, despite being taken into consideration, either as a mere physiological mechanism or as a term of comparison with awake life, dreaming did not attract any highly elaborated philosophical enquiry. Not even phenomenology attempted such an enquiry, although it presents itself as a philosophy that specifically deals with the study of consciousness.

The main reason phenomenological research ignored dreaming was the delimitation of its field of investigation to awake mental activities. This was recently reasserted e.g. by Dieter Lohmar, who excluded the possibility of examining the dream, as an “irrational”, “temporally disordered” phenomenon, which remains “ciphered” thus preventing phenomenological description and making it accessible only to psychoanalytic interpretation.

On the contrary, I believe that, precisely because phenomenology is a philosophy of consciousness (i.e., of mind), it cannot avoid dealing with dreaming, since dreaming represents the other side of our mental experience and is not, therefore, a separate part of it, but rather a sort of counterpart, essential to the functioning of the mind as a whole.

The analysis I am about to present will offer an overview of those thinkers, who represent eminent exceptions to the phenomenological tradition by virtue of devoting a part of their enquiry to the issue of dreaming; in my conclusion, I will outline a proposal for a new phenomenology of dreaming, which draws from some of the points elucidated in previous analyses.

Edmund Husserl: Dream between perception and imagination

Throughout his impressively extensive work, both published and unpublished, Edmund Husserl devotes very few pages to dreaming, considering it a notion that is difficult to access from a phenomenological standpoint.

He basically uses the term dreaming in a negative sense contrasting dreaming with the authentic field of research of a phenomenologist, i.e. the awake life of transcendental subjectivity. As an “unconscious” mental state, Husserl associates dreaming with illusion and hallucination – both experiences in which there is no awareness of any contrast with the present/perceptual reality – and for this reason dreaming is neither worthy nor even accessible to investigation.

In his texts, Husserl deals with the notion of dream mainly in four works: in volume XXIII of the series Husserlana, a letter addressed to Jean Héring in the 1930s, an unpublished manuscript dating back to the spring of 1933, and in a text from the 1920s now published as appendix XVII in volume XXXIX of the Husserlana.

The various writings gathered by Eduard Marbach in volume XXIII of the Husserlana cover a wide period, from the end of the 1800s to 1925, representing the richest source of in-
formation on Husserl’s enquiries into the concept of presentification (Vergegenwärtigung).

Generally speaking, Husserl’s notion of presentification indicates all the acts of mental life that occur in the present, referring, however, to what is no longer, or is not yet, or cannot be present; hence it concerns the acts that make something present, i.e. that presentify something, as in remembering, expecting, imagining. In the text entitled Imagination and Image Consciousness (Phantasie und Bildbewusstsein), which reproduces some of the lectures held in Gottingen in the winter semester 1904/05, Husserl develops some of the analyses of the relations between these two distinct forms of conscious life, both expressions of presentification: imagination, meaning the direct, immediate reference of consciousness to a mental state that is not present; and image-consciousness, indicating the experience of an object (the image), which mediates the relationship to the not-present.

Husserl begins his lectures by offering a general definition of imagination as different from experiences like dreaming, and establishes the relation to the present dimension as a criterion for this distinction. Imagination can be associated with expectation and memory considering that all these acts in the subject’s mental life can be contrasted with the representations (Vorstellungen) that result from perception, which in turn can also be defined as “presentations” (Gegenwärtigungen) by virtue of being rooted in the present.

Dreaming, like hallucination and illusion, allows for the appearance of something in a mode of presentation distinct from presentification, since its object is directly present as it appears, without any mediation by a presentification. Therefore, if the dream can be assimilated in imagination, with reference to something unreal, it cannot take the shape of a presentification.

In an appendix to the lectures, Husserl clearly states that “being lost in a reverie, in the form of both night dreaming and day-dreaming, does not involve presentifying (repräsentativ) consciousness”, because the continuous shining (schimmern) of awareness through the dream phases, i.e. the continuous passage from sleep to wakening, doesn’t allow for establishing a stable and clear conflict (Widerstreit) with the perceptual present. Such a conflict emerges instead in the case of authentic imagination, which brings to the present (reality) something not-present (unreal) that “wants to be present”.

In imagination one finds the intention to compete (Wettstreit) with the present, but this intention is absent in the case of dreaming, which occurs in an unconscious state thus characterized by a form of presentation that lacks both qualities of awareness – that of imagination, i.e. the as-if (als ob), and that of presentifying which entails conflicts with current perception.

In a text written a few years after the 1904/05 lectures, Husserl deals with the distinction between presentation and presentification as regards the notions of actuality (Aktualität) and inactuality (Inaktualität). Both notions play a significant role within the presentification process as well, since imagination is defined by two “basically different” concepts: inactuality and presentification. As presentification, imagination can also take the guise of memory and expectation, which stand for acts determined by reference to a phenomenon perceived as a primal impression.

The perceptual process, when original, triggers the process of the presentifying modifications of memory and expectation, which enrich it with the modal quality of the not-original material of imagination, i.e. the same material which constitutes the act of remembering and expecting. In this case, Husserl explains, “not-original” denotes an actual presentification, whereas in the case of a purely imagined process one deals with inactuality, i.e. sheer representation. In a purely imagined process one cannot find a memory, but rather a quasi-memory, a quasi-consciousness of a perceived past; instead of an actual presentification we have here a “quasi presentification”, i.e. an “inactual” presentification.

Actuality always entails a reference to the
present (and thus to reality), while pure imagination totally lacks any bond with the present, that could allow for a normal spatial-temporal development of consciousness’ mental processes.

In this respect, Husserl talks about imagination either as a presentification or as an inactuality. In presentification as inactuality, lacking any direct reference (Setzung) to the present, imagination is not subject to that conflict characteristic of presentification; hence it is presenting and not presentifying, and in this sense it is “quasi” presentifying. Now, even if only in this “weak” form expressed by the notion of quasi presentification, imagination as inactuality seems to allow for an evaluation of dreaming as presentifying consciousness, although inactual.

Husserl clarifies this claim by noting that if we project ourselves into the perceptual world by the process of imagining (hineinphantasieren), the dream becomes a part of this imagining, which then contributes inactual characteristics to perception itself:

We could say that through the projection into reality by imagining (Hineinphantasieren) the perceptual givenness undergoes some modifications, which make it a compound of inactuality [...] In the same way, an actual presentification too, by mixing with imagination, takes on the quality of dreaming.

Hence, the most Husserl concedes to the dream with regard to presentification is an indirect bond mediated by imagination in which the dream as inactuality is involved in the process of de-actualizing both the present sphere and the authentically presentifying sphere. (Nonetheless, in this passage the dream is presumably meant by Husserl more as an act of imagination than as an authentic act of sleep). As we pay attention to the relation between this sheer imagination and the current world, the “unreality” of such quasi presentification takes the shape of a “nothingness”.

In the 1930s, in answer a letter sent to him by Jean Héring, Husserl acknowledges the presenting activities of the dreamt ego, which is immersed in dreaming and lacks any conscious contact with reality, defining such an ego as a “pseudo-ego” living in a “pseudo-world”. The lack of authenticity characterizing the dream experience is reasserted by Husserl in another manuscript from the 1930s, where he describes the dream-world as “quasi-existing, quasi-valid”. As we shall see, Theodor Conrad takes up this very terminology in his analyses of dreaming. In conclusion, with reference to Husserl, he briefly deals with dreaming in a text written at the beginning of the 1920s, in which he considers the dream experience as the formation of a “second” world for the one and the same ego. Nevertheless, he adds no significant novelty with his notion of dreaming characterized always as an “illusion”.

Eugen Fink: Dream as presentification

In his remarkable and clever dissertation on Presentification and Image (Vergegenwärtigung und Bild), Eugen Fink supports a different interpretation of dream from the Husserlian idea.

Unlike Husserl, Fink includes the phenomenon of dream among the presentifications, treating it as a more absorbing (versunkener) form of imagination. On the one hand, the mental state of dreaming is difficult to analyze, given that a phenomenological reading must be based on the performance of an awake ego; but, on the other hand, Fink remarks that excluding an enquiry into dreaming already presupposes a specific idea of what dreaming is.

Therefore, one should honestly recognize the aporias emerging from the notion of dreaming (e.g. as “temporal missing phase within the unitary process of the constitution of world”, or “incomprehensible irrational break”, “dark pause of experiencing life”), although one should also not forget
to adequately understand the constitutive sense of the “worldlessness” (Weltlosigkeit) of the sleeper. “Worldlessness” is itself a specific mode of “having-the-world” (Welthabe): it is “having-the-world” in the extreme mode of absorption (Versunkenheit).24

However, lacking the world, losing the world, doesn’t mean having no world, as if the dream were isolating psychic immanence from any reference to external reality. Although it may sound paradoxical, reference to this world remains, but in the peculiar modality of loss: dreaming denotes exiting an awake relation to the world and entering into an absorbed relation.25 Precisely within this new relation dreaming constitutes a world (the “dream-world”, Traumwelt), wherein the subject continues to live according to her own consciousness whose features are transferred at the level of the dream level to the dream-world’s ego (Traumwelt-Ich).

Suddenly transformed from an inaccessible phenomenon to an intriguing topic of phenomenological study, Fink characterizes dreaming by the presentifying nature of this peculiar subjective mental state. More to the point, the presentifying nature of a dream is so deep and presents such a convincing alternative to the presentness (Gegenwärtigkeit) of the dreaming ego, that the dream stands for a presentification, in which all psychic performances in turn can only be presentifications:

Every other presenting mental process would at least partially remove sleep [...] The dream shows all the structures that we have emphasized as characteristic of presentifications.26

This latter point marks Fink’s distance from Edmund Husserl’s view that dreaming, because it does not conflict with the present, is a presentation instead of a presentification. Thus, Fink somehow bypasses the classic phenomenological objection to the theory of dream as presentification, an objection based on the idea that dreaming lacks contrast with the current moment. This was the objection that Husserl considered to be the most persuasive proof of the impossibility of considering dreaming as presentification.

According to Fink, if one takes into account the dreaming’s “absorbed” relation to its surroundings, such a relation doesn’t need anything else to develop into an aware conflict with the current reality; on the contrary, the more a mental state is absorbed, the greater the possibility to build an alternative to present reality. Precisely according to this new perspective, dreaming is regarded by Fink as the phenomenon of consciousness that is able to hold together all the structures existing separately in other presentifications (such as remembering, expecting etc.).

Fink then chooses to measure the difference between dream and imagination not through the criterion of presentation/presentification, but through the degree of egological freedom involved in the two mental processes. Although in the imagination-world the ego takes a passive role, Fink elucidates that:

While there the imagination-world is the free creation of the imagining ego, totally at her disposal, with the increasing degree of absorption the staging freedom decreases. The absorbed ego, deprived of her own will, produces in hidden passivity.27

This peculiar form of ego, who dreams involuntarily, and then re-presents, i.e. intentionally performs and constitutes something, highlights both the significant novelty of the phenomenological analysis of dream introduced by Fink and the favoured access dreaming enjoys to the dimension of unreality. The way in which dreaming develops itself demonstrates the possibility of a subjective experience in a peculiarly unreal dimension, an experience deprived of the ego’s will.

Dreaming unifies possibility and passivity, combining the presenting with the presentifying aspects of mental life. Dreaming thus represents a sui generis presentification, which is
structurally linked to the presentness of the sleeping ego, while the dreaming ego performs her mental processes in “place” of consciousness (Fink calls it “worin”, i.e. “wherein”) which unfolds as unreality (the not-present) operating simultaneously with reality (the present). Like imagination, the dream is a presentification that flows in conjunction with actual life, while referring to the absorbed state of the ego.

However, with regard to the dream’s development, the “space” (worin) emerging in the present allows the dreaming ego, who is a totally absorbed ego, to live in actuality in the modality of in-actuality, to stay in the real through the unreal, to experience the world from a “different”, “other” world.

Dreaming is the phenomenological notion which points to the most radical and authentic shape of unreality, because it lacks any boundary between present and not-present which characterizes other forms of presentification (for instance, memory and anticipation), producing instead an unreality within ("worin") reality. The dream causes a sort of short-circuit inside consciousness involving both the spatiality and the temporality of mental life. It is the opening of a gap, the creation of a space wherein the co-existence of reality and unreality, and of presence and not-presence, seems to be finally possible.

While imagination and dreaming differ in their levels of passivity, they both share the quality of iteration by virtue of being presentifications, although such iterability, in the case of dreaming, is deprived of the dreamer’s ego will.

Concerning the issue of waking up, Fink dissociates himself from the Husserlian approach: whereas Husserl, as we saw, focuses critically on the indefiniteness of the passage from dream to wakefulness, considering it one of the reasons to be skeptical about the phenomenal solidity of dreaming, Fink elaborates an internal description of dreaming itself, considering the waking phase not as a path to wakefulness, but as a “dreamed” awakening, hence, as an awakening that remains immersed within the dream dimension. It is worthwhile quoting here an entire passage, which testifies both to the meticulousness of Fink’s analysis and the fruitfulness of his conception of dreaming as presentification:

the first dream world, as long as the dreaming occurs without interruptions, is a “real world”; only afterwards, the conception of the previous dream world as a simply dreamed world is constituted in a new dream. The two iterations do not stand in a foundation relationship, but rather the “foundation” constitutes itself along with the constitution of the new dream. This iterative series, if it were actually possible to maintain the intentional encasement, could proceed ad infinitum never reaching a dream that would be at the basis of the “foundational nexus”. Hence, none of the iterations is “next” to the real I, i.e. the sleeping I; all of them are equally far from her, they all are dreams intertwined only by a dreamed foundational nexus.\textsuperscript{28}

As we deal here with a totally presentified nexus, that is completely internal to the unreal relationship of consciousness, such a nexus is incommensurable with the present sphere of the sleeping and dreaming I.

The understanding of presence is still essential to the definition of presentification (just as presentification) in Husserl as well as in Fink, who concludes his remarks on dreaming referring precisely to the present dimension, in relation to which any presentification defines itself:

The suggestive question, as to whether or not presenting is in the final analysis also a dream from which I could “wake up”, is an absurdity in principle. As long as we cannot interpret the presentness of sleep, we will not be able to establish a phenomenological demonstration regarding it.\textsuperscript{29}

This discussion of Fink’s position on dreaming allows us to emphasize its difference from Husserl’s standpoint. As Fink pre-
sented his ideas in the text of his dissertation, one may wonder what Husserl himself – being the referent of the dissertation – thought of his pupil’s view.

To my knowledge, none of Husserl’s comments on this issue have been preserved, although he actually had the opportunity to come back to it. I refer here to a report by Dorion Cairns of September 28th, 1931. At the end of a day, after a discussion addressing the topic of temporal flux and the status of the ego, Cairns reports that Fink started to talk about dreams. It is worth stressing the time when Fink begins to talk: «After we left Husserl, Fink was speaking of dreams», Cairns writes. Fink, then, introduced the topic of dreaming in the absence of Husserl, with whom he usually talked about any phenomenological issues as Cairn’s conversation testifies.

What does Fink say to Cairns that is so relevant that the latter chooses to recall it in his book, despite its being only a brief discussion towards the end of the day and after the meeting with his mentor (it concerns the last three lines of the § XXII of the diary)? Cairns reports:

> After we left Husserl, Fink was speaking of dreams, which he understands as Vergegenwärtigungen <presentations, non-original presentations> rather than as Wahrnehmungen <perceptions>, as I am inclined to do.32

Hence, Fink has just presented to Cairns his ideas on dream as presentification included in the dissertation published the previous year (which Cairns evidently had not yet read). This very brief discussion with Fink, which took place at the end of a day during which greater and more basic phenomenological issues had been discussed, such as time and subject, caught Cairns’ attention so much that some days later he decided to return to this issue in the presence of Husserl.

Another very brief report dates back to October 3rd (three lines again) and starts with Cairns himself who urges Fink to discuss the issue of dreaming as a presentification: «I took up most of the time criticising or objecting to Fink’s theory that all psychic activity in sleep is Vergegenwärtigungen»; unfortunately, although he had the opportunity to discuss this issue with his pupils, Husserl drew back: «Husserl added a bit here and there, but so far as I could see, we did not get very far».33

Jean-Paul Sartre: Dream as story of subject

In his psychological enquiry on imagination, which he develops along phenomenological lines, Jean-Paul Sartre34 devotes a part of his analysis to the concept of dreaming, an analysis defined by de Warren the “most significant” of phenomenological tradition.35 Starting with the quote from Descartes’ First Meditation, Sartre criticizes the skeptical thesis of the verisimilitude of dreaming by observing that the dream state is enabled by a form of unawareness, preventing it from assuming the shapes of a positing consciousness, in which one places the existence of what is experienced:

> the position of the existence of the dreamer cannot be likened to that of the person who is awake, because in the one case the reflective consciousness destroys the dream by the very fact that it presents it for what it is, while in the case of perception reflective consciousness confirms and reinforces the perception itself.36

Sartre specifies that the “position” taken in perception must not be confused with “belief”, i.e. with an affirmation of existence: while the former is a spontaneous act of consciousness,

> the thesis represents the very nuance of intentionality. It is that which corresponds, from the side of the noesis, to the noematic presence of the object itself.37

On the basis of the noetic-noematic correlation, Sartre shows how perception sets up a
direct, current relationship with the perceived object. The immediate evidence makes affirmation or belief superfluous, while the dream, lacking such a relationship to the present sphere of subjective life, takes the shape of an experience in which one is unable to posit anything and just for this reason one is forced to blindly trust what one dreams:

Everything that happens in a dream is something I believe. I do no more than believe in it: that is, the objects are not themselves present to my intuition.  

The insurmountable distinction between dream and perception is basically due to the imagining mark of dreaming consciousness:

The dream is a consciousness that is incapable of leaving the imaginative attitude [...] the dream consciousness is completely deprived of the faculty of perceiving.

Although lacking a perceiving dimension, this doesn’t prevent dreaming experience from developing its own world; while the hypnagogic moment in isolation is not able to set up a whole range of consciousness relations, the dream reconstitutes instead an experiential layer within which even each single phase contains something like a world.

The opening of a new sphere of experience by the dreaming state determines the corresponding opening of a “temporal world”, which one “abruptly” enters and which “appears to us as a story”. Once dreaming, the subject shifts her relation from the world to the dream state, from which she can never free herself, not even in an experience so unaware, and alienating as the dream state. The recreation of a world by dreaming consciousness is based on the need for a worldly relation felt by the ego, which can also transfer such a relation from perception to imagination:

And this world closes on my consciousness; I cannot free myself from it, I am fascinated by it [...] This world is sufficient unto itself, it can neither be dissipated nor corrected by a perception since it does not belong to the domain of the real. It is its very unreality which puts it beyond reach and which gives it a compact opacity and a strength [...] the transition to perception can only occur by a revolution.

Being completely imaginary, the dream world, paradoxically, deprives dreaming of the basic trait of the imagination itself: freedom. The story the dream tells lacks an aware teller who is able to lead its development, but rather occurs by itself according to an “unreal” logic. Being fully unreal, though not perceived as unreal, the dream continues to have the traits of a natural and irrefutable spontaneity:

So, contrary to what might be believed, the imaginary world occurs as a world without freedom: it is not determined, it is the opposite of free, it is necessary. Thus it is not conceiving other possibilities that the sleeper is reassured, saves himself from embarrassment. It is by the immediate production of reassuring events in the story itself. He does not say to himself: I could have had a revolver, but suddenly he does have a revolver in his hand. But too bad for him if at that very moment a thought should occur to him which in the waking state assumes the form of “what if the revolver had been locked!” This “if” cannot exist in the dream: this rescuing revolver is suddenly locked at the very moment when it is needed.

The example of a dangerous situation lived in the dream, i.e. a situation in which one feels in danger, allows Sartre to consider the subject’s involvement in the dream experience, which he defines as the appearance of the dreamer herself in the imaginary world opened by the dream. Sartre immediately specifies that this appearance doesn’t represent the entering of the real ego in the dream dimension, since this would imply self-consciousness on the part of the sleeper,
which as such would break the dream state.

The sleeper enters into the dream relations, created by herself, as an unreal ego, i.e. as an integral part of the dream experience and, as representative of dreaming consciousness, she has at once a privileged position. The appearing of the ego in the dream determines the personal involvement of the dreamer, who, enchanted by the dream state, doesn't perceive its unreal nature, since it is impossible to distinguish perception from imagination from within a state where everything is created by imagination.

Hence, the unreal ego becomes the actual and unique character of the dream, and lives immersed in the dream world and, in doing so, she drags the whole emotional dreamer with her:

Now, the feeling that is aroused is a feeling of belonging; in this imaginary world, in which one must be unreal if one is to enter it, an unreal me represents me, suffers, is in danger, even risks an unreal death which will put an end at once to me and to the world that surrounds me. An unreal game is going on with my unreal self as its stake. Now this condition of trance which cannot be completely realized in the reader (and which interferes with the aesthetic appreciation of the book) is just what realizes itself in the dream.

The entering of the ego into the dream, which means the beginning of the dreamer’s personal involvement, transforms the dream experience from an observed show into a lived world. Such a peculiar state generates a splitting in the subject, formally similar to the splitting that occurs in every act of imagination, in which one imagines herself in a different way than in the current state. Nevertheless, in the case of the dream, the two subjects, the unreal ego and the sleeper ego, don’t experience this splitting equally, since their relation to the imaginary world is different. The unreal ego, who Sartre also defines as “object-me” (objet-moi), experiences the unreal emotions caused by the direct involvement in the dream, and she has no other existential dimension but the dream one.

In contrast, the sleeper’s ego experiences such emotions only indirectly, precisely through her unreal ego, and in many cases she doesn’t suffer like her imaginary counterpart, who Sartre calls, not by accident, the “representative” of dreaming consciousness.

Only when nightmares occur, whose content also affects the sleeper ego, does the latter empathically experience the sufferings of the imaginary ego. However, while the unreal ego can’t exit the dream, since she is an integral part of it, the sleeper ego can free herself from the dream’s enchantment by awakening, – which, in the case of a pleasant dream, is the price to pay for recognizing the pleasure of a dream, – just like when the spectator breaks the spell of the performance by desiring it to become real. In the case of a nightmare, such awakening is sought with anxiety and in vain, because in spite of the sleeper’s efforts to wake up, «everything glides into fiction, everything is transformed in spite of him into imaginary».

Although it provokes the highest angst which is experienced by both the unreal ego and the sleeper, the dramatic epilogue of a dream leads in any case to the end of the dream, but not because it is «the fear that motivates the dream [...] but rather the impossibility of imagining an afterwards».

Closing his sharp remarks, Sartre states once more that dreaming does not ever constitute a real experience, i.e. one perceived as real, but rather a story so well imagined that it enchants consciousness, which finds itself “knotted” (nouée) by its own creation. Thus, the heuristic function of the dream experience consists in helping us «to conceive what a consciousness would be which had lost its “being-in-the-world” and which would be, by the same token, deprived of the category of the real».

Jean Héring’s critique of Sartre

In his review of Sartre’s essay, published
on *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, Jean Héring devotes a part of his synthetic remarks to the issue of dreaming. Based on the assumption that hyletic data can be experienced even while dreaming, as the dreamer’s sensations of cold and hunger show, Héring addresses a radical critique of the core idea in Sartre’s analysis, i.e. the idea that dreams are not perceptions.

Although he agrees with Sartre on the fact that she who is dreaming creates a world rich in objects and situations, Héring claims that this constitutes the cognitive function of dreaming, which allows for the apprehension of reality. Such a claim does not entail that perception in dreaming has the same validity as perception in waking, since waking up “depreciates” the dream world. The sleeper may wake up either because an external signal intrudes on the dream state revealing its fictive nature or because a sudden interruption breaks the tie between the dream world and the real world (a tie that in the first case, when an external signal intrudes on the dream state, can be maintained for a while).

Nevertheless, it is possible to detect a perceptual aspect of the dream state if one considers the way a dream is often “encased” in another dream, thanks to an operation that can be repeated on different levels of mental life, without any level aspiring to demonstrative validity “their epistemological status being zero”.

This focus on dream iteration is not intended to attribute a cognitive value to dreaming beyond dreaming itself, but rather aims at explaining that dreaming is something other than an idea. As regards ideas, any idea contained in others continues to essentially refer to them, while a dream at the second or third level, despite being contained in others, is autonomous, “self-sufficient” in its perceptual structure disregarding the dreams wherein it is encased.

If during a dream (dream 1) I dream that I wake up (dream 2) and then I actually wake up, the integrity of dream 1 is not influenced by dream 2 – which, being itself a dream, doesn’t interrupt the dream state belonging to either iteration – but rather vanishes along with dream 2 only at the time that I actually wake up. By contrast, if during a preparation for an exam a student imagines he has already written the work he will do, and in doing so he remembers both the handbook and some pages from it, the idea of the handbook (idea 2) is encased in the idea of the performance of the exam (idea 1), and beyond this relation it has no autonomous meaning.

According to Héring this difference between dream and idea is due to the fact that any idea is a modification of a perception, of which it constitutes an unfulfilled copy, while the dream is not a dream of a perception, but is in turn a perception presenting an original experience which does not modify that original experience. This difference is also illustrated by the contrast that one experiences when one wakes up, when the dreamed perception loses all its value. Even if the dream reveals its fictive nature, as reflecting consciousness destroys the dream belief, as Sartre states, the dream can’t be assimilated to an idea that has only those imaginative qualities to which the complexity of dreaming cannot be reduced.

Jan Patočka: The superiority of the real to dreaming

At the beginning of the 1940s, Jan Patočka published a brief essay on the issue of dreaming paying special attention to the problem of solipsism. After citing the examples of both classic skepticism and of Descartes as attempts to undermine the belief in the real through the objection of a dreamed reality, Patočka emphasizes Pascal’s revival of these topics.

He extensively quotes Pascal’s remark concerning the possible equivalence of reality and dreaming, whose differences are only “relative” to the extent of concordance and order in their respective apparitions. No wonder, Patočka remarks, that at the end of the XVII century this theoretical soil sup-
ported the elaboration of the theory of solipsism through the argument of the coherent dream. Phenomenological philosophy, as ego-centered, seems to be unable to adequately answer the following question: “What guarantee do we have that existence as a whole is not a more or less organized dream?” In order to refute the argument equating dreaming and reality, Patočka studies a similar thesis which aims to negate the existence of the past due to the unreliability of recollections. Since it is possible to invent a past by means of the imagination, no one can assure us that the past has actually occurred. According to Patočka, this thesis presupposes what it wants to deny, i.e. the notion of the past, and thus reveals the weakness of its reasoning. Even if we don’t have any certain recollection or we substitute it with an imagined one, neither the first fact nor the second are able to change the entire meaning of the concept of past. The reality of the past doesn’t depend on the recollection we have of it, but rather the latter presupposes the former.

Hence, whereas a recollection, though illusory, can’t undermine our belief in the past, the dream as “compact illusion” seems to be, on the contrary, a valid alternative to tangible reality. Patočka’s refutation of such an argument begins with an explicit reference to Fink’s Dissertation, to which he already devoted a brief review. Citing the radical passivity of the dream experience, Patočka proceeds to stress the absence of a future perspective in any dreamed situation and the related impossibility of recollecting it.

The full powerlessness (Ohnmächtigkeit) of the dreamer shows the intrinsic fleetingness (Flüchtigkeit) of the dream dimension, whose disorder doesn’t allow it to be equated with the real dimension. Patočka denies that a symmetric passage from reality to dreaming exists, as if falling asleep were a sort of reawakening in a new sphere of experience, since waking up means coming “back to oneself”, “regaining consciousness (sich seiner selbst zu besinnen)”, hence re-possessing the skill to master the real world that is “unique and homogenous (einzig und einheitlich)”. Conversely, the passage from dream to reality is not the shifting from an order to another order, i.e. from a reality to another reality, but it happens rather “only by dissolving the trick: it is the recovery of the unique and real I, and along with her of the real world.”

Thus, no solipsism can be legitimated by the theory of the coherent dream, because the dream as such has no coherence nor can aspire to be another reality, which could call into question the unique and absolute reality, precisely since it is this latter reality which makes dreaming possible.

Theodor Conrad: The real illusion of dreaming

The issue of dreaming is also meticulously analysed by Theodor Conrad, most specifically in On the eidetic Doctrine concerning psychic Life and Experience (Zur Wesenslehre des psychischen Lebens und Erlebens), a text written in the first half of the 1940s, but published only in 1968. There, Conrad deals with the complex question of psychic life and its constitutive acts. In the third chapter, Conrad introduces the topic of dreaming as a peculiar state of subjective relation to reality. Right from the beginning, he specifies that the dream-world is not in opposition to the awake world, which more properly stands in opposition to sleeping; the dream-world is instead the opposite of the real world.

The extent of such opposition becomes clear as we consider that starting to dream means starting to building up a proper world, which can’t include any part of reality, given its clear detachment from the world of reality. It is impossible precisely because of the alternative character of the dream-world, which completely absorbs us and prevents any form of control or capacity by intervention from the dimension of the real. Therefore, Conrad explains that entering into the dream-world requires acknowledging that
the real world no longer exists in front of us, but there is another world, an illusory world. Even if we could master this illusory world, it is impossible, given the condition of detachment from the real world, that such control be a part of the authentic and absolute control of the awake state that exists in that real world.55

The state of full absorption characterizing the dreamer leads her to accept without hesitation the new world created outside of the real world; this self-deception means the dream is not a variation on awake life, but rather a different layer. In order to further clarify the detachment of the dreamer from the reality in which the dreaming occurs, Conrad plainly distinguishes between the daydream (Träumerei) and the dream (Traum).

While the latter stands for the building of another dimension, wherein one doesn’t care anymore about the actual sphere of the real, the former stands in the middle between the active and aware involvement of being awake in reality and the state of total alienation of dreaming. From this perspective, the daydreaming ego experiences a splitting (Ichgabe-lung) that allows her to continue to feel tied to the sphere of the real i.e. that allows her to put the fictional in relation to reality.

As such, the daydream sometimes precedes the authentic dreaming state (this refers to the hypnagogic phase analysed by Sartre); precisely whenever one considers it as the phase that immediately occurs before the dream, one understands that the dream is the radicalization of the first form of farewell to reality (Wegversetztheit) in daydreaming, which then leads to the authentic state of absorption (Versunkenheit) in an all-encompassing fiction.56

Conrad explains that one suddenly loses the difference between the “here” of the present, wherein the daydreaming happens, and the “there” in which the daydreamt content is located. Given full immersion in the new dimension of dreaming, and the correlative opening of a new world, the daydreamt “there” coincides with the “here” of daydreaming, since both are set within the dream-world which no longer has reference to reality. The ego no longer experiences a splitting, but rather she reassembles herself in the unity of dreaming, in much the same way that the division between a “here” and a “there” has been overcome in the unique space now in force, i.e. the space of the new dream reality. The trick, the deception of dreaming, lies just in this realization of living in a self-sufficient, autonomous reality, wherein it is possible to live any kind of experience as if one were awake.57

Once it is established that this is the solidness of the dream experience, one should wonder whether the dream deals with representations (Vorstellungen), i.e. with images that refer to something not present58, or with perceptions which, despite their appearance, are deceptive. Conrad has no doubt in this regard: dream visions are perceptions (agreeing with Jean Héring and disagreeing with Sartre).

Nevertheless, in this context one has to point to a meaning of perception that belongs in turn to a wider notion of representation as a mental process presenting something in front of us (vor-uns-stellen). In the dream, an object doesn’t present itself (sich präsentiert), as in the case of a perception of something real, but rather gets presented (wird präsentiert), as in a representation. Yet, although the dream has the form of a representation, it maintains the characteristics of perception, since the presented object doesn’t refer to something absent that gets represented,59 but it is rather performed by the dreaming subject, who presents the dreamt object to the ego living in the dream, called by Conrad the “dreaming onlooker”.

In short, in the relation between the awake ego and reality, the object presents itself by itself (it is self-given), while in the dream state the object is presented by the dreaming ego to the onlooker-ego (it is given). Within the dream, the relation is threefold: (1) Dreaming ego; (2) Dream reality (performed by the dreaming ego, who presents the dream-world); (3) Dreaming onlooker (to whom the
dream-world is presented).

Conrad establishes then a clear distinction between, on the one hand, the dreaming ego and her surroundings and, on the other hand, the dream-ego (i.e. the onlooker, the dreamer involved in the dream) and her surroundings, i.e. the dream-world. In this respect, Conrad talks about two distinct dream-layers: (1) what is dreamt in the dream; (2) the mental process that occurs in the dream. The first layer stands for the material of the dream, while the second one can be defined as its experiential content. Whereas the material of the dream shows its deceptive appearance when the dreamer wakes up, the existence of the mental process of the dreamer is not illusory at all, since she has really experienced various sensations during the dream state.

This remark allows Conrad to point out another basic difference between dreaming and daydreaming: while in the latter case one can experience different situations maintaining a playful, disenchanted attitude, the state of total engrossment characterizing the dream makes it a "hard reality", which also explains its deceptive nature as articulated by the expression "as if we were awake".

Echoing points made by both Fink and Sartre regarding the subject’s condition of complete entanglement in the dream, Conrad stresses «how much our dream experience is authentic».60

In contrast to the daydream, which denotes a mental process of displacement into the two layers of reality and imagination, the dream is an “absolute” mental process of displacement, since it completely relocates the subject in the dream-reality. Nevertheless, the production of a space actually other than the space that the dreaming ego occupies in the real world doesn’t signify an actual relocation of the subject. Despite the “hard” reality of the dream state its space consists in a “spiritual”, “phenomenal” locus, a “quasi-location (Quasi-Standort)”, a “location borrowed (geliehen)" from reality.61 Accordingly, the peculiar relation formed between the subject and the dream-world is a “quasi-relation (Quasibezug)”, i.e. a relation, wherein what happens is not real, but as if it were real.

Nonetheless, considering the full immersion in this “quasi-reality” prevents any lucidity about the experiential truth in which we are involved, Conrad emphasizes that one is not able to live the dream as an absolute mental process of displacement, but rather, paradoxically and “grotesquely”, one lives the dream as a localized experience, namely without any shift in consciousness: «Dream is a mental process of displacement disguised as a mental process of non-displacement!».62

The past and the present of the phenomenology of dreaming

In order to sum up the main positions expressed by the authors discussed above, we can observe that all scholars attribute the following to the dream-experience: absorption, entanglement, splitting, transformed relation between the subject and her space/time. It is also possible to clearly detect some differences between each author, basically due to diverse views on the intentional nature of dreaming.

In Sartre, the dream develops as a story in virtue of a mental process that is entirely imaginary, in which there is no room for any perceptual activity that would destroy the dream-world. Fink in some sense anticipates Sartre’s position, stressing the opposition between dream as presentification and perception as presentation, and depicts the life of the dreamt ego in its autonomy from awake life. Overcoming the contrast between the perceptual layer and the one of dreaming by describing dreaming as a mental state with the appearance of representation and the characteristics of perception, Conrad shifts his attention to the analysis of the effects of dreaming on the subject, who experiences the peculiar mental process of a displacement which is experience, however, as a not-displaced condition.

These authors of the phenomenological tradition (which we can also call the classic phenomenology of dreaming) who addressed
the issue of dreaming, despite the thoroughness and richness of their analyses, did not go on to develop an effective dialogue, with the exception of Patočka’s already mentioned reference to Fink’s Dissertation, and a similar allusion by Héring, where he regrets that Sartre was not aware of Fink’s text, and a footnote in Conrad referring to the French version of Héring’s article. More to the point, we already mentioned Husserl’s refusal to himself to address this question with Fink and Cairns.

In the last few years, a novel though sporadic interest in the issue of dreaming has emerged in phenomenology. Hans Rainer Sepp presents two analytical descriptions both historical and theoretical of the phenomenology of dreaming; Julia V. Iribarne emphasizes the relevance of the dreaming experience for the life of the ego; Christian Ferencz-Flatz presents a very remarkable reflection on the notions of dreaming and imagination in Husserl and Fink; James Morley focuses on the originality of Merleau-Ponty’s interpretation of dreaming as a basic aspect of the imaginary.

In his recent essay on this topic, Nicolas De Warren suggests an actually intriguing approach to dreaming experience, as the “pre-reflective self-awareness” of the dreaming subject. According to De Warren, one of the historical objections to the cognitive validity of the dream experience, for instance by Leibniz, was the absence of the awareness by the dreamer of the fact that she was dreaming.

This objection was based on the equation of self-awareness and wakefulness. Suggesting a different perspective, de Warren talks about the dreamers’ self-awareness not of the dreaming, but rather “in” the dreaming. The dreamer becomes the subject of dreaming not as someone who is aware that she is dreaming, but as someone who is aware as dreaming. Thus, it is possible to develop a philosophical evaluation of the dream experience as a very peculiar phenomenon in mental life, in which the subject undergoes a self-modification without losing personal identity.

With the authors discussed above, especially Fink and Conrad (he doesn’t refer to Sartre’s analyses), de Warren shares the notion of ego-splitting and the status of absorption as conditions of the dream experience. Unlike Fink, however, he doesn’t see the dreamt ego as similar to an awake one living in her own world, but rather conceives of the ego who is dreaming as the expression of a consciousness continuing to refer to what remains from the day’s experience on the basis of processes of passive synthesis. In this respect, the ego receives her materials and motivations for dreaming from awake life and she experiences such materials and motivations while endorsing the form of the splitting dreaming ego/dreamt ego.

Thus, it would be possible to recover a genuine Husserlian sense of dream despite the fragmentary interest devoted by Husserl himself to the phenomenon of dreaming. According to this view, the dreamt ego is a peculiar form of modification of the self-affection of consciousness and is named by de Warren an “under-determined” or “flattened” ego, who is “unhinged and unmoored from oneself”. Echoing some remarks by both Conrad and Sartre, de Warren stresses that the condition of dreaming is that dreaming consciousness cannot appear “as itself dreaming” because of its being “beholden to the imaginary”.

Neither aware that she is dreaming nor unaware in that dreaming, subjectivity develops in dreaming a third life as a “medial voice” of consciousness, which constantly remains on the threshold of a fully perceptual experience.

### New phenomenology of dreaming: Sketch of a proposal

The reconstructed phenomenology of dreaming can be presented as an incoherent path; by this, I mean that reflection on the issue of dreaming has never represented a constitutive part of the whole phenomenological
investigation, but rather, as we have seen, has constituted from time to time a fragment of the enquiry elaborated by several phenomenologists, who never undertook the task of thoroughly dealing with the mental state of dreaming. As a result, there is no systematic assessment of dreaming by phenomenology.

The first reason for such an absence can be identified in Husserl’s refusal to investigate the dream state himself for the aforementioned arguments. The recovery of the issue of dreaming by Fink, Sartre, and Conrad didn’t develop into a wider evaluation of this issue but remained just an element in their thought, although interesting and worth analyzing. More to the point, such investigations offer a series of suggestions concerning a set of concepts that play a decisive role within phenomenology and philosophy in general, such as: the absorbed mental state, the relation between reality and unreality, the meaning of reality, the status of subjectivity with regard to unreal experiences, the notion of self, the plurality of worlds.

Maybe, if Husserl had devoted more space to an enquiry into dreaming, we would now have a phenomenology of dreaming in addition to a phenomenology of attention, perception, memory, imagination, to mention the mental states, and body, intersubjectivity, and feelings, to mention states other than mental ones.

On the other hand, further reasons for the absence of a phenomenology of dreaming – systematically developed – may arise due to the correlative absence of a philosophy of dreaming. There is no philosopher who made dreaming the core of his/her reflection, although we have many thinkers who dealt episodically with the issue of dreaming. We cited a few in our Introduction. This exclusion of dreaming from the field of philosophical enquiry is generally due to the difficulty of investigating a totally unconscious mental state and, in the last century, to the preeminence of both psychoanalytical and neuroscientific approaches to the dreaming state.

In the contemporary philosophical field, two significant critiques of the attempt to philosophically investigate the dream state have come from Norman Malcolm and Daniel Dennett. Disregarding their differences, both authors share the view that dreaming is a mental state lacking experience, where they identify “experiencing” with “being conscious”. Since while dreaming one is not aware of one’s own mental performance, it is not possible to offer a conceptual reading of the act of dreaming. Such a reading would indeed presuppose some form of consciousness, however in this case we would be dealing with a mental state that, if conscious, even partially (Malcolm’s notion of “half sleep”), is not an authentic dream state.

This view is based on the equivalence of consciousness and awareness, according to which there is no experience that is not a conscious/aware experience, and in this case we would have an experience of which one can’t talk of.

I believe the phenomenological idea of experience as Erlebnis, i.e. a mental process lived as such, regardless of the level of awareness, allows us to distinguish between consciousness and awareness and to identify “experiencing” with “being conscious” in the sense of “having consciousness” and not “being aware”. Thus, one can in principle investigate any form of consciousness, both conscious and unconscious, because mental activity coincides fully with consciousness.

In order to outline a phenomenological theory of dreaming, I believe one has first to find a common definition in phenomenological terms. I suggest we refer to dreaming as a “presentification”, because this term, explicitly proposed by Fink, although it is in conflict with Husserl’s view, includes both the feature of imagination highlighted by Sartre and the trait of a displacing mental act elaborated by Conrad, which I together consider to be basic characteristics of the dreaming state. Of course, the definition of dream as a presentification entails a rejection of the hallmark of presentification worked out by Husserl himself, i.e. the awareness of a contrast with perceived reality.
In so doing, I am aware I am in the company of Fink (who is indeed very good company), and remain isolated from the phenomenological mainstream. Nonetheless, I believe that Fink’s view, allows us to open up a new field of inquiry in phenomenology towards a more comprehensive understanding of mental life. The idea of the dream as a presentification is worked out by Fink within a more general evaluation of the subjective condition of experiencing. At first, he talks of the very common condition of attention and lack of attention; second, he introduces a specific condition linked to the mental state of presentification and expressed by the notion of the “rhythm” (Tempo) of presentification. It specifically concerns those cases of presentification in which the ego is free to decide how to reproduce a lived experience; the peculiar aspect of the rhythm of presentification consists in its coinciding neither with the time of the present nor with the time of presentifying.

While being generated by the encounter between the “time of remembering” and the “time of remembered”, the rhythm of presentification breaks with the normal temporal proceedings of consciousness. Finally, the third mode of experiencing is the one of “deep absorption” (Versunkenheit): Fink’s idea of such a mental state is the key element in thoroughly modifying the Husserlian theory of presentification. If one thinks, following Husserl’s idea, that the essential feature of the mental state of presentification is its “contrast” with reality, a contrast that the presentifying ego “consciously” experiences, then the only state in which a presentification can be performed is in the “awake” state. Nonetheless, one may ask, following Fink, whether or not is it right to claim that «the phenomenological sense of the “unreality” of imagination refers to the difference in clarity between an imaginative and an original experience?». Provided that we accept this contrast (“whose meaning is questionable”, Fink adds), we have it «only in those presentifications for the realization of which the ego is awake, namely she is open to her original world of the present, where she experiences through perceptions».

Only in this case, where the presentification takes place consciously along with perception, does one experience a situation of contrast among the different levels of performance of consciousness. And only in this case do «the simultaneous memories characterize themselves as experiences of the world according to the as-if mode, the fanciful images as “simple” fanciful images». Nevertheless, Fink goes on, there is also a “contrary” state to the awake state, i.e. the state of deep absorption, in which within the route of intuitive fulfillment consciously lived by ego, a fragment with such a strong affective force emerges, that the ego «fully forgets her original present, isolates herself from every time-passing tendency, and primarily and mainly lives in remembering».

Fink explains that once it is understood that this subjective state of absorption plays a fundamental role in the life of consciousness, one can comprehend that being awake doesn’t exhaust the range of possible presentifying experiences, for it represents only the case in which presenting determines by contrast the imaginative quality (the quality of the as-if) of presentifying; when the ego gradually dives into her presentifying world, as happens in pathological imagination, in obsession, or in a dream, the presenting disappears from subjective attention and the presentified seems to be something not merely imagined, but something real. If one accepts this interpretation, Fink says, one has to radically modify the phenomenological analysis of presentification, that must free itself precisely from taking the “as-if” as the fundamental characteristic determining its classification. Rather, the as-if is only the basic trait for describing all those presentifications performed by an awake ego, namely an ego open to her impressional present [...] Only in the be-
ing-awake of a current ego, in contrast with the clarity of actually experienced objects, does presentifying emerge as a quasi-experience in which that quality of as-if is constituted for the ego. Hence, only in the attitude of being-awake does one experience what is imagined as imagined, what is unreal as unreal.  

More to the point, if one considers the “reality” of experience as the only criterion that determines its originality, presenting consciousness alone reaches such originality, from which all ways of presentification are excluded; nonetheless, it is possible to define such a form of originality as “primary” and to enlarge the notion of originality to embrace «any kind of consciousness in which something reveals itself as such [...] whether it is a horizon, a something unreal or possible».  

From this new perspective, presentifications acquire a “secondary” grade of originality and give access to the temporal horizons of past and future. And as such, they allow us to consider the absorbed life of ego as a very relevant part of her intentional life, even in the absence of a conscious contrast with present experience.

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## Notes

1 “A man strikes a light for himself in the night” (DK 26).
2 PLATO, *Theaetetus*, 157c-158a-c. In the Eastern philosophical tradition, one finds the well-known “Dream of the Butterfly” elaborated by Zhuang Zhou: «Once Zhuang Zhou dreamt – and then he was a butterfly, a fluttering butterfly, self-content and in accord with its intentions. The butterfly did not know about Zhou. Suddenly it awoke – and then it was fully and completely Zhou. One does not know whether there is a Zhou becoming a butterfly in a dream or whether there is a butterfly becoming a Zhou in a dream» (translation from H.-G. MOELLER, *Daoism Explained: From the Dream of the Butterfly to the Fishnet Allegory*, Open Court, Chicago and LaSalle, IL 2004, p. 48).
4 Ivi, p. 870.

**“A man strikes a light for himself in the night”** (DK 26).
**1** Plato deals with both the ethical aspect of dreaming (*The Republic*, 571b-572a-d) and its psycho-physiological nature (*Timaeus*, 70d-72a-d). Aristotle offers an analytical description of the physiology of dreaming in his *De Insomniis*. 

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13 E. HUSserL, Phantasie, Bildbewusstsein, Erinnerung, cit., p. 150.

14 See ivi, p. 150, fn. 1.

15 See also E. MARBACH, Re-presentation, cit., p. 607.

16 E. HUSserL, Phantasie, Bildbewusstsein, Erinnerung, cit., p. 299, fn. 4.

17 It is valid in terms of expectation, as I expect something on the basis of the current experience.

18 See E. HUSserL, Phantasie, Bildbewusstsein, Erinnerung, cit., p. 240.

19 ivi, p. 300.

20 I am indebted to Eduard Marbach for raising this consideration.

21 E. HUSserL, Briefwechsel, cit., pp. 119-120. In the letter Husserl falls into a clear contradiction, for he specifies that «here, “pseudo” means only presentification». How is it possible to denote the presenting activity of the dreamt Ego by a presentifying character, given the incompatibility between presentation and presentification? In this respect, see the correct observations made by H.R. SEPP, Phänomen Traum, cit., p. 113; H.R. SEPP, Dream, in: L. EMBREE, H.R. SEPP (eds.), Handbook of Phenomenological Aesthetics, Springer, Dordrecht 2010, pp. 75-80, in particular pp. 75-76.

22 See E. HUSserL, Zwei Welten für ein Ich, cit., p. 221.


25 As Sepp observes: «Fink took the view that the worldlessness – the quasi-worldliness – of the dreaming I is in fact a certain mode of being-in-the-world» (see H.R. SEPP, Dream, cit., p. 76). Binswanger similarly proposes that the dreaming subject makes essential reference to the world. See L. BINSWANGER, Traum und Existenz, Gachnang & Springer, Bern/Berlin 1992.

26 E. FINK, Vergegenwärtigung und Bild, cit., pp. 64-65.

27 Ivii, p. 65.

28 Ivii, p. 66.

29 Ibidem.


31 ivi, p. 37.

32 Ibidem.

33 Ibidem.


38 Ivii, p. 191.

39 Ivii, p. 192 and 193.

40 Ivii, p. 195.

41 Ivii, pp. 197-198.

42 Ivii, pp. 198-199.

43 Ivii, p. 201.

44 Ivii, p. 205.


46 Ivii, p. 206.


49 J. HÉRİNG, Concerning Image, Idea, and Dream, cit., p. 201.

50 Although at the end of his considerations Hé-
ring comes back to the issue, wondering if the dream, also as a perception, can be conceived of as a “special” modification of a perception, if one carefully considers the “observing attitude” of dreaming consciousness as regards the dream scene (see ivi, p. 204). A much closer nexus between dream and perception is set by Henri Bergson, who states that “dream resembles the birth of all our perceptions. The mechanism of the dream is the same, in general, as that of normal perception”. See H. Bergson, *Le rêve*, in: «Bulletin de l’Institut Psychologique International», vol. I, 1901, pp. 97-122 (Eng. trans. *Dreams*, translated by E.S. Slosson, Huebsch, New York 1914, p. 37). The basic difference, then, lies on the fact that while dreaming one lacks any positive effort to have a perceptual experience. See ivi, p. 50.


52 Ivi, p. 49.


54 J. PATOČKA, *Die Frage des Solipsismus*, cit., p. 57. Hans Rainer Sepp identifies in Patocka’s refusal to accept any continuity between the real world and dream world a critique of Fink’s idea that the latter is a presentifying modification of the former (H.R. SEPP, *Dream*, cit., p. 76). Alfred Schutz, instead, stressed the link between the two worlds and, based on Freudian analyses, emphasized the effects of what happens during the waking state on the dream experience. See A. SCHUTZ, *Collected Papers, IV*, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht 1996, p. 42.


56 Gaston Bachelard distinguishes even more radically between dreaming and daydreaming denying the participation of the ego in dream activity: “Le rêve de la nuit est un rêve sans rêveur. Au contraire, le rêveur de rêverie garde assez de conscience pour dire: c’est moi qui rêve la rêverie, c’est moi qui suis heureux de rêver ma rêverie, c’est moi qui suis heureux du loisir où je n’ai plus la tâche de penser” (see G. BACHELARD, *La poétique de la rêverie*, PUF, Paris 1961, p. 20; see also ivi, pp. 124-147).

57 In his brief enquiry into dreaming, Jan Patočka also talks about the “trick” of the dreaming state, which dissolves in awakening and by recovering the real ego along with the real world (see J. PATOČKA, *Die Frage des Solipsismus*, cit., p. 57).


59 As in the case of a presentification that Conrad (ivi, p. 8 and 11-12) precisely connects with the representation.

60 TH. CONRAD, *Zur Wesenslehre des psychischen Lebens und Erlebens*, cit., p. 66.

61 In one of his late manuscript devoted to the issue of sleep and dream states as “limit-experiences” of consciousness, Husserl describes such experiences using terms that are very similar to the ones elaborated by Conrad, such as “quasi-soil” (Quasi-Boden), “quasi-earth” (Quasi-Erde), and stresses the “as-if” (Als-Ob) nature of dreaming processes. See E. HUSSERL, *Grenzprobleme der Phänomenologie*, cit., pp. 500-501.


72 Ivi, p. 478.


«When a person is sound asleep he cannot have any sensations, thoughts, and feelings at all; sound sleep cannot, in this sense, have any “content of experience”» (N. Malcolm, Dreaming and Skepticism, cit., p. 25); «one routinely recognized condition for having an experience is that one be conscious, or awake, and dreamers are not» (D. Dennett, Are Dreams Experiences?, cit., p. 163).

In his very recent and fascinating study on different mental states of the self, Evan Thompson, basing upon the Eastern Advaita Vedânta philosophical thought, states that while dreaming we are conscious «in the sense of undergoing qualitative states or processes of sentience or awareness» (see E. THOMPSON, Waking, Dreaming, Being: Self and Consciousness in Neuroscience, Meditation, and Philosophy, Columbia University Press, New York 2014, p. 252). According to this perspective, «deep sleep isn’t a nothingness of experience but rather an experience of nothingness» (ivi, p. 247) where deep sleep «is a kind of consciousness without an object» (ivi, p. 238).

Thompson clearly states the imaginative nature of dream processes: «To dream is to imagine, not to have false perceptions [...] we imagine a dream world and we identify with our dream ego. In a nonlucid dream we lack the meta-awareness that we’re imagining things; in a lucid dream we regain this awareness» (see E. THOMPSON, Waking, Dreaming, Being, cit. p. 179). In the neuroscientific field of research there is a wide debate on the nature of dreaming either as “perception” or “imagination”. Recently, two prominent scholars observed that «various lines of evidence suggest that dreaming is more closely related to imagination than it is to perception. From lesion studies, it is known that dreaming requires an intact temporo-parieto-occipital junction and that lesions in this region also affect mental imagery in wakefulness. Cognitive studies indicate that the skill that maximally correlates with dream recall in adults is visuo-spatial imagery. In children, dream recall develops hand-in-hand with visuo-spatial imagery. In epileptic patients, direct electrical stimulation in high-level regions, such as the medial temporal lobe, rather than the visual cortex, can elicit “dream-like” experiences, although such patients are simultaneously aware of their surroundings. Other evidence comes from lucid dreamers, who report that it is impossible to focus on the fine-grained details of visual objects, as is the case in mental imagery. Perhaps top-down connections lack the anatomical specificity to support detailed representations. The rare occurrence of smells or pain in dreams might also be related to the difficulty in imagining them vividly when awake. However, one important difference between dreaming and mental imagery is that while imagining, one is aware that the images are internally generated (preserved reflective thought» (see Y. NIR, G. TONONI, Dreaming and the Brain, cit., p. 97).

In recent times I tried to approach a concrete and very peculiar consciousness experience, i.e. the out-of-body-experience, by adopting this new perspective on dreaming state enriched with the idea of “phenomenological notation” worked out in: E. MARBACH, Mental Representation and Consciousness. Towards a Phenomenological Theory of Representation and Reference, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht 1993. See N. ZIPPEL, The Altered Self in Dreaming State related to the Out-Of- Body Experi...