The soul, doubtless, is immortal
where a soul can be discerned

Robert Browning

IN HIS UNZEITGEMÄSSE LAUDATIONS OF Descartes, Galen Strawson1 repeats that there is nothing in the world so directly certain and evident as consciousness. This is often forgotten, and right. And yet not so perfectly, transparently right as we (and Renée Descartes, and Galen Strawson, and John Searle and Hector-Neri Castañeda, and, perhaps, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel and Johann Gottlieb Fichte) might wish – as we would wish that the self and surrounding faculties also were. Consciousness, esp. self-consciousness, is perhaps not an all-or-nothing matter – remarkably like language in other respects.

The huge phenomenon of (quasi-)indexicality, for instance, is interwoven with problems of semantic interpretation, syntax, grammaticalization, and knowledge. The consequent phenomena of de se (D.K. Lewis and others), and “de se communication”, so to speak, pose one more challenge – beyond those raised by Chomsky, Ann Banfield and others2 – to those who see language as communicational in essence and evolutionary origins. Marchi & Romano, and Fiorin & Delfitto, deal with these themes from different “transformational” perspectives. Marchi & Romano’s observations are relevant for the parallels between consciousness and cognitive/linguistic structures I refer to here.

In different ways, Marraffa tackles the problems of the self. The self is often so interestingly useless! For self-consciousness, close and evident as it may be with its implications, is episodic and brief. Moments of it, precious but inconstant, emerge from, and

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are submerged by, the flow of automatic responses or meditation, or non-selfcentered thinking, and deep, oblivious focusing on new things (or own thoughts) after volitional and self-centered corrections, and so on and on. Some forms of natural language are monologic; but transparency is not obvious. Self-thinking may be virtually there, but seldom in a well-defined foreground.3

This poses for him, as for so many, the classical problem of the “unconscious”, and the related structuring of “narratives”, postulated as necessary for the purposes of the self. G. Strawson must be again right that narrativity and such are fashionable terms, ipso facto abused terms. Can they bear the argumentative burdens so many discourses impose on them? Asking this is not to deny that, at some levels, the self(ves) may well depend on narrative mechanisms. For Marraffa, relevant levels here are associated with the communitarian, evolutive and integrated dimension of self-consciousness. The self and conscious mind originally display defense functions. Correspondingly, they exist through selections of unconscious contents. Such selections are, in their turn, related to the “self” as bearer of responsibilities and decisions. Interestingly, these two basic connections may be appreciated independently of narrativity per se.

So sometimes the self is not relevant, though it may retain a hidden primacy. An actual phenomenal self, resting on the distinction between simple awareness and consciousness proper (Chalmers, Kim),4 is the main candidate for that role of primacy. The distinction seems conceivable and logically possible, but is it conceptually and metaphysically, let alone physically right? I’ll briefly pursue this possibility. The papers collected here, e.g. Voltolini’s, do not address this possibility, but leave it open, in some cases clearing new grounds for it. (For Voltolini, a further, apt mark of the mental might be looked for in phenomeno-qualitative characters of thinking behind the structures of language, in non-intentional, non-normative properties). Be it mere possibility as it may, if taken seriously, this would make the scope and realm of consciousness vast indeed: through individualistic thinking (though not so-called Cartesian dualism, I’ll claim), through neutral monism, through panpsychism even. In the ’20s, Russell’ had envisaged these possibilities. The question of dualism stays, however, unclear. There are arguments in the literature to the effect that defending property dualism may be harder than defending substance dualism, maudit as it is. No contributions here deal with the matter of that historically unhappy turn of phrase, “Cartesian dualism”. I shall try to make up for this in the present pages.

But what are the limits of consciousness, and are they determinate, or fuzzy? And how large and deep is consciousness? Again not surprisingly, such questions may be repeated for human language, with its unique capability for self-ascription. In 1984, Langendoen and Postal, and now again Langendoen, notoriously claimed that natural languages may well be transfinite.6 The point Hinzen and Uriagereka do not dwell on in their 2006 paper is exactly that their «conclusion – that languages in their entirety don’t have generative grammars that can construct them – may well be empirically defensible on other grounds [...]». As Hinzen and Uriagereka note, this possibility raises «in the linguistic domain» questions akin to those posed for mathematics and logic by Penrose,7 and, I add, perhaps more subtly by Gödel’s speculations. The human mind may exceed what is called the “Turing bound”, i.e. be essentially more than a machine. This could be seen in the way it realizes computations of different kinds in language and maths. If such analyses are conceivable, a new level of depth is added.

Voltolini’s paper, as Marraffa’s and Orià’s, shows how subtle questions in the philosophy of mind and logic are essential to substantive issues about the language, ones considered by neurophilosophers. Let one more parallel be pointed out. When philosophers wisely leave the dimension of lan-
guage and thought, they go for propositions, i.e. mostly possible world semantics. Generative models of language seem to overgenerate sentences: no really understandable sentence has, say, 200 components or ten embeddings. But, as said, according to some they undergenerate too. It’s the same with propositions: either overgeneration (problems such as logical omniscience), or undergeneration (de se “propositions”, indexical self-identifications, etc.). Food for thought.\(^8\)

Not surprisingly, those who initiated new ways of looking at life, consciousness and language in their interrelationships were not philosophers. Up to the present day, psychologists, Continental thinkers, and “epoch-making” gurus, both from the right and the left, went on telling us that society, history and politics promise a new synthesis that never came alive – or is just stillborn – to explain such fuzziness and infinity. It was the modest job of scientists to point to a new scientific horizon for all these “speculative” matters.

This began in the days of Bohr and Schrödinger and Gödel and Einstein, of Wheeler and Dyson and Penrose. We see it clearly in the works – disparate as they are – of Gerald Edelman and Gregory J. Chaitin and David Deutsch, and above all (since his contribution is so fundamental that its strict limitation to technical aspects is enough to shed light on a whole new landscape) Noam Chomsky. And Russell may have been right in claiming that the philosophical and commonsensical mind/matter dichotomy is itself, obsolete even to define the opposite field of physics, and materialism: reality is constituted by quantum information, some say. Or all physicalistically defined reality is itself, somehow, in a formal way, mental, as we hinted above (and see below). Or, philosophically, a new foundationalism resting on “Cartesian truths”, in a sense, may well not contradict, but foster and found a new scientific ontology of abstract and concrete realities. This is the whole point of Orilia’s contribution, connecting new “old foundatio-
nalism”, a theory of propositions, and a form of descriptivist semantics esp. about first-person sing. indexicality.

Here’s a brand new piece of philosophical news. Functionalism is (a kind of) dualism, though not dualism in the sense of the physicalists or Popper and Eccles’s. The functionalist emperor’s new clothes, and intuitions, have been out in the open and the rain a long time, and he’s naked, and soaked. It is often assumed, however, that the major working breakthrough in scientific psychology and the cognitive sciences – the life-work of Chomsky, Kayne, Marr and a few others, with their followers – can be still made compatible with a kind of socially acceptable physicalism by adopting a functionalist background (what is not voiced is the trivial truth I exposed above, and the general difficulties I hinted at).

One has to admit that most depends, in these matters, on the fine technical details and even historical implications of the theories you build. For the dilemmas are old, and, even if formally developed, painfully clear to intelligence but hard to solve even to common sense. Russell (after 1919, with his definitive embracing of calculus ratiocinator, as Hintikka would put it), and Chomsky and others are basically right in surmising, in widely different forms, that after Newton (and Locke, and Reid, etc.) it became close to impossible (and still is) to understand what a form of “naturalism” clearly separated from “mentalism” (an even vaguer concept) might be.

As a consequence, the basis of nowadays physicalism may well be flawed from the start and in re. Sure, if one is still a physicalist and/or a naturalist, as Russell then, and Galen Strawson and others now, try to be, there seems to be little alternative to neutral monism – including or not something close to “anomalous monism” too (Chomsky’s naturalism, or Searle’s at that, seems however to be of different nature. And obviously, neomysterianism looms close to them).

There are consequences, well-discussed
by Hinzen and Uriagereka, or Piattelli-Palmarini, I will not delve into, though I follow them. First, a radical (mentalistic?) reform of all that is physical and experiential, and, second, possibly panpsychism itself. Similar consequences are both in Strawson and in Chalmers, though I do not claim that their views are similar. I advanced a criticism of Strawson’s take on the phenomenal at the beginning, and shall not insist. But as for language and mind – and this precious but dubious center of the naively considered mind, the self – other consequences seem both undeniable and of greater momentum. As I promised, they are more provocatively, and more convincingly, put forward as a historical point. Chomskyan scholarship and philosophy (let alone Strawsonian ones) are beside the point here. Let us ask bluntly: who actually said that Descartes was a dualist? (Though the Cartesius of the “metaphysical” tradition was.) And who said that he was not a physicalist? (Though the term is senseless in that tradition, and ambiguous today).

Well, Strawson certainly didn’t, and neither in a sense did Chomsky, nor did either admit to being materialist dualists. And more interestingly, this was never claimed, not even in another terminology, so far as I understand, by Descartes’ two earliest and best interpreters: no less than Arnauld and, above all, Pascal.

On the whole, most old scholarship proves – though it dare not express it verbatim – that Descartes was not a real dualist, was not a real (rationalist) metaphysician (he always preferred prima philosophia to metaphysica and theologia, which were derogatory terms in his book), and was not an enemy of a systematically general scientific view of the world. Whatever they (believed they) concluded with their findings, this is what all those researchers proved and found, from our point of view (such present-day key scholars are Jean-Luc Marion and Michel Henry). Showing this would require us to engage in extensive readings of scholarly texts that are often masterpieces of philosophy in their own right (mainly French, partly German, interpretations from the last two centuries), and that unfortunately almost no one reads any more, overwhelmed as we are by most of the Anglo-American vulgate and its theoretical simplifications (as people were, decades ago, by simplistic historical labels). But such interpretations, and recent ones too, at their best show that Descartes was, in more than one sense, a precursor of Kant, rather than the rationalist metaphysician that Kant just exposed and debunked.

This is not to deny Kant’s Revolution, nor that there is often more than a bit of national revanchism in old French, so-called secondary Descartes-Literatur (or in German writings on Leibniz or Kepler). But there were intuitions in Descartes, both naturalistic and transcendentalistic ones, that neither Kant nor his contemporaries (or ours) could fully appreciate.

Again, Strawson is right, though he discovered nothing new. Just because he exposed an unasserted (since Pascal) but evident truth: namely that Descartes, the anti-metaphysical Father of Modern Science (no doubt, in a soon superseded form), was a sort of physicalist, if we want to use jargon in the face of the subtleties of the lingua franca of philosophers (W. Sellars), the history of ideas. He was not a spiritualist, nor did he ever think about creating a science of the mind alternative to “mechanical science”. Mechanistic explanations, and vortexes and plenism, soon needed integration in a more complex view of reality, the Newtonian one – and here Chomsky’s specifications and criticisms fall into place. But this has little to do with transforming Descartes into a Dualist Metaphysician par excellence, and so, by extension, all his considerate contemporary followers into enemies of science and “materialism”: materialism is the Treppenwitz des zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts.

In the quantum revolution(s), we penetrated the secrets of matter and energy in a purely “materialistic” way, and thus did old, solid matter become utterly lost and un-
recognizable in the process, like “force”, “action”, and “cause”, as well as “mechanic components”, had in Newton’s wake.

Substantia sive forma is, in Descartes’ inherited and soon transformed Latin, not really a notion that can be applied to the world we are epistemically given in any straightforward way, but only per equivocationem (Descartes rejected metaphysics and theology, i.e., *grosso modo*, any talking about infinite substances as objects of real cognition; you can see this also as meaning that – *ante litteram – substantia* is to be applied, so to speak, exclusively in a “transcendental” way, not in any realist or empiricist fashion).

Ergo, as he writes – late in the path of the Meditations – about *substantia extensa ac substantia cogitans*, it is simply misleading to assume that they are on a par to him, even less that they constitute two worlds. He was a man between two worlds, but not in this sense, nor had he envisaged being a citizen of two worlds.

The Meditations are a kind of epistemological exercice spirituel, in a transfigured Jesuit understanding of this. Contextualistic aspects, more relevant than skeptic ones, ought to be taken into serious account too. Skeptic research must take place, but only *semel in vita*. It stays relegated here, in meditation, with respect to everyday practices of science, and even rationally guided living. What we mean, with Descartes, is just that the mind is a *res*, in the technical sense, but not a reality in today’s sense. It is as evident and undeniable an experience (it is experience), as the extension of reality is (and all we can experience, and measure, and cognize). But by no means do we imply that the former is an object of science, or of any inquiry going beyond the study of adequate language. Only the latter is an object of experimental science: a provable, analyzable, mathematizable part of reality.

It may seem to us a strange process, founded on subtle, *ad hoc* distinctions. And it is. But there is one more thing we gain thereby, as Pascal in his *De l’esprit Géométrique* was swift to recognize: the distinction between the two *res* has simply the purpose of showing that the *cogito* poses a definitive distinction between mind (and mathematics) and the real world, so that understanding the world is a purely mechanical enterprise.

My ironical quote of Browning’s ironic misgivings about Philistine, and unscientific, dualism stands even if we take “soul” in its full, yet strictly limited, Cartesian sense. We should not look for animacy or autonomy or agency where scientific descriptions aptly predominate. In the same spirit, we should not look for the self but in the realm of mathematical, formal and logical explanation of the transcendental, conceptual conditions of our explanation of behaviour – including our explanations of our processes of producing science and physicalist interpretations of the (only one given) world. In this limited sense the self is rightly downplayed. We hinted at that at the beginning. But for one aspect: that the self is not primary. In observable behavior and biologically considered processes it is not. There is no self or cognition in the brain. There is no Self in the world: Kant’s or even Descartes’.

I take this to sound almost as obvious. Yet, can we be sure that in some advanced dimension of language and of the ordering of reality – a dimension that is as far from the experience of givens as it is close to the self-understanding apprehension of order and structure through mathematical elaboration – a function such as (that of) the self is not primary?

I do not mean such a function as immediately produces an a priori certainty of existence, what is usually attributed to an “ethereal” Cartesian *cogito* – a piece of Cartesian understanding in itself to be revised, since Kant and others proved it wrong (there is no compelling evidence Descartes had actually endorsed it). I mean an abstract function of ordering of experiences and cognitions into unity, as in the Kantian *ich denke*, possibly in a further weakened form.

There is after all, in a sense, a primacy of
the self, though it is not in itself transparent. It resembles, I suggest, the primacy of language, that also has little to do with the world as it is vs the world as we think it, while trying to go beyond those preliminary representations of ours to find an ultimate rationale.

Pure neuroscientists and their followers, brain naturalists and materialists, conclude that there is no self, nor any distinctive (even only potential) structure for all mental states. And rightly so. If, I mean, the mind is the brain, or barely supervenes on it, there is no CPU in it, nor a distinctive, even less a metaphysical, science-transcending center. Moreover, it is argued, the self cannot be an object of science, and the conceivability of zombie-worlds is but a trick of human semantical imagination, of the representational mind itself.

The mind or brain, in its attempt to comprehend itself, overgenerates empty representations, the whole passing theatre and a régisseur in it (Dennettian scenarios are far from making all this clear instead of paradoxical from a philosophical standpoint. Attempts at solutions are sometimes elegant, and will hopefully be discussed in the next section I’ll help edit).

That the very general findings of transformational linguistics and the cognitive sciences make this vision, and its assumptions, dubious or worse is a suspicion I hinted at already. But, as far as I know, there are no fully convincing and shared arguments (yet). Nor should opponents from these sides have any real quarrel with the scientific monition that the mind’s attempt to comprehend itself is doomed. Many of them say so too, though for other ideological reasons – they do not imply it is only right this way, usually. Already existing problems lie elsewhere. And not just for neurophilosophers.

Firstly, the suggestion that the self, and (so-called metaphysical) self-consciousness, is a non-naturalizable, hence a non-natural, unreal, and semantically uncanny “reality” is itself bizarre. If you put two apples beside two more apples you get four apples. If you put them beside two pears you get four fruits anyway. If you put a male dinosaur beside a female dinosaur, well, chances are you get three or more dinosaurs. This is no refutation of elementary number theory, it just means that one needs to apply it in a more sophisticated computation in order to understand reality (even more complicated if, as in the Jurassic Park movie, dinosaurs can change sex and so two males will do.)

This is elementary, but as the Big Bang “came out” of a singularity (or quantum fluctuations, or imaginary time, or something else, or did not come out at all) the maths implemented was exquisitely complex. As in the case of dinosaurs, notice, there was no one to watch, and it was possible there would never be. Shall we deny this? Shall we say that maths, and logics, is/are an illusion of ours, of our human conceptual schemes and representations? Shall we say that we just (re-)construct an a posteriori or post festum matematization or logicization of purely natural, physical events and things? That is, 2+2=4 is not always, tenselessly true, at least for things with identity and numerosity?

See it the way you like, naturalism – and emergentism – surprisingly smell of idealism, again, immer wieder. And they are not the only ones. To answer that some level of self is but a formal function of experience, or a necessary feature thereof, just sounds more consistent, though admittedly not unproblematic.

Secondly, it is generally recognized that there is a precursor subject of a fully naturalistic self. It is the (ancestral) immune system. It may go wrong exactly like the human self in schizophrenia, though the use of first-person sing. indexicals is not directly impaired. It distinguishes (genetic) friend from foe for defense purposes. Both aspects connect to Marraffa’s considerations on the self. On the other hand, as genetics comes into question, we are again pushed toward the spheres of language and/or mathematical computation, if we want to make sense of
some concepts, once metaphysical (Edelman’s “neural Darwinism” and the search for neural correlates ultimately derive from Edelman’s groundbreaking work on immunity and adaptive systems).

Mathematization is not consciousness or experience – but maybe just in the very end – so no swift conclusion is at hand, nor is any need to go (weakly) Anthropic. Yet one wonders whether “naturalizing” maths and logics makes any sense at all. Many will doubt it, at least if naturalization is taken in the above strict sense. One wonders then whether one can distinguish, at this level of analysis, (innate) linguistic faculties and (partly humanly constructed) mathematical faculties, or generally formal ones. If we rule we cannot, we have consequences for self-consciousness both surprising and not so clearly antinaturalistic, rather formally distinctive, deflationary ones. G. Bealer and others suggested that functionalism fails when confronted with self-consciousness, or shows severe limits – as both mental and logico-mathematical structures are not of “materialistic” nature, whatever people mean by this.

Materialism, functionalism, representational-computational theories of mind etc. agree that there is a subject to be explained away by making it “material”. This is rough, but right, if the subject is, were, what makes (real or thought) things conscious. But again, on formal grounds, it is not. A state one is conscious of being in poses, endlessly, the question about that “one”. So a conscious state is what constitutes a subject as such, and is not made such by an unexplained subject. A conscious state, consciousness, is “experience”. This is the line Nagel, with Jackson, took in 1974, without developing it (a caution to be approved).²

The problem is how “(real or thought) things” double as experience. Since before Kant, there is no term so dangerously idealistic as “experience”. Russell saw it clearly in 1918, before abandoning his project of a “Cartesian” epistemology. But a material subject meets no experiences.

Possibly Cartesianism and such are not the solution. At least two papers in this collection, Marchi & Romano’s and Delfitto & Fiorin’s (as indexicality is so close to experience in a minimal sense), wrestle with this problem, still so widespread and multifarious in the literature. Voltolini’s focuses on the real, linguistic, hallmark of the mental among other, more common or “material” functions. We are not drawing morals from these discussions. But this is the problem to tackle if Ned Block is right and the HOT approach is “defunct”.³ Marchi & Romano start from Jackendoff’s approach (see also the discussion of Jesse Prinz’ synthesis).³ Delfitto & Fiorin even resort to the philosophical and psychological notion of mini-selves.

The phenomenal, “what it is like” dimension opens a whole register of discourse not opposite, but orthogonal to thephysiclist one. Qualia are not another substance, even less the subject matter of alternative physics. This has little to do with the necessity, emphasized by Quentin Smith, of taking into account the developments of quantum physics. We may well take into account that, probably, quantum cognitive science will arrive; but cannot apply it in advance at every step. So no one is ready today to argue that a self, even if shown to be a sort of abstraction, even as purely phenomenal, is a necessary, unitary, certain assumption. Furthermore, there are plural levels, the orthogonality of discourse about consciousness being only one.

The self is encoded in language; but in which ways, and whether as an evolutionary basis or result, is not clear. I certainly do not claim that what has been suggested here (and/or in the following contributions, which are to be kept well distinct) solve the real, well-known problems. But some new roads are interesting to evaluate and for future theories to look at. We are not crazy. We believe in science, the one made now, not future science (though even physicists try to guess at it).
This includes believing that language and its logic, and mind, are to a large extent part not of culture, but nature – a nature thus inevitably deemed, to varied degrees, to be unfathomable by many, or to be very, very distant from deep-rooted, revered assumptions and models of analysis. But the corrections about Descartes (who was similarly minded) seem to me convincing. They make sense, needless to say, if we place them on the background of a Cartesian conception of language and argument etc. still not easy to regain and revise in full today.¹⁴

Notes


¹⁴ I am the sole responsible for the interpretations and theses sketched here. But I benefited from discussions with friends and colleagues. I thank them all, esp. Ermanno Bencivenga and Sandro Nannini.