Is This Self-Evident? The Phenomenological Method and the Psychopathology of Common Sense
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**Parole chiave:** Blankenburg; Husserl; Metodo; Psicopatologia fenomenologica; Evidenza naturale.

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**Abstract** This article seeks to highlight the methodological relevance of phenomenology for psychopathology. With this aim, it particularly focuses on the work of the German psychiatrist, Wolfgang Blankenburg. In developing his “psychopathology of common sense”, Blankenburg engages in a thoughtful dialogue with phenomenology. This allows him, on the one hand, to propose a phenomenologically grounded approach to psychopathology and, on the other hand, to redefine the epistemological status of psychopathology as a scientific discipline. The critical analysis of Blankenburg’s clinical works and theoretical positions, and notably the evaluation of his assessment of some central moments in Husserl’s phenomenology, will elucidate how the latter can contribute to research in psychopathology. Particularly, it will be shown how the two keystones of Husserl’s phenomenological method, namely the *epoché* and the eidetic description, can be fruitfully implemented in psychopathological research.

**Keywords:** Blankenburg; Husserl; Method; Phenomenological Psychopathology; Self-evidence.

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One of the central concerns in the first part of Husserl’s *Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft*,¹ is a critique of naturalistic and reductionist approaches to consciousness, which are based on the assumption that the experimental methods of the natural sciences provide a model for the investigation of subjective experience.

Husserl presents such an approach as being dominant in the psychology of his time. However, it is clear that developments in the cognitive sciences and the neurosciences have further increased the popularity of these, often unreflected, methodological and epistemological assumptions. As a response, in the just mentioned essay, Husserl advocates the necessity of taking the specificity of psychic phenomena seriously, and consistently elaborating a proper method of research, capable of addressing this specificity without misconceiving it or reducing it to other ontological regions.

Since it is precisely the phenomenological method which is expected to be able to achieve this task, the question Husserl raises eventually touches on the relationship between phenomenology and the other sciences concerned with the study of consciousness. Clearly, the science Husserl has here in mind is psychology. However, there is another science of psychic phenomena, which poses some radical questions for phenomenology and which may, at the same time, also deeply profit from the phenomenological method. This science is psychopathology.

On the one hand, the questions on which psychopathology confronts phenomenology are radical, since they concern the basic structural moments of experience and their alterations. Consistently, these questions compel phenomenology to further refine the conceptual and methodological tools adopted to describe the phenomena under consideration.

What is required is, in other words, a rigorous analysis of the dynamics of lived experience, which focuses not only on its ongoing consistency and *Einstimmigkeit*, but also on the meaning and the impact of the *Unstimmigkeiten*. The latter, as is well known, makes up the phenomenological core of anomalous experiences and, in radical cases, of pathological experiences.

On the other hand, psychopathology can also profit from a dialogue with phenomenology. Taking a descriptive stance, and focusing on the experience of patients in their interaction with psychiatrists, a phenomenologically grounded psychopathology contrasts those trends that end up reducing psychiatry to a branch of neuropathology. This is not meant to imply that psychiatry should only concentrate on the mind and leave the whole dimension of corporeality to the natural sciences, such as biology or neurophysiology.

On the contrary, the body, in its constitutive ambiguity (meanwhile as *Leib* and as *Körper*), is one of the main focuses of phenomenological psychopathology. Moreover, the latter also takes the biological dimensions of life into account² and is particularly open to those trends in biological research that emphasize the dynamics of interaction between the organism and its environment.³

Yet, since psychopathology is concerned with disturbances that affect the human being as a psycho-physical unity, and since the latter is not only an organism embedded in a surrounding world, but also a subject participating in an intersubjective context of meaning (the life-world), the range of inquiry clearly goes beyond that of biology. It includes, instead, all those moments that contribute to making meaningful experience.

Thus, pathological expressions that become manifest in behavioral structures cannot be intended as mere symptoms of disturbances at the sub-personal level. They should rather be primarily considered in terms of the meaning they convey to the experiencing subject, or the lack thereof.

The aim of this article is to discuss the relevance of Husserl’s phenomenology for phenomenological psychopathology. Even though the appeal to phenomenology in the very designation of the latter discipline may suggest that the problem is already solved from the beginning, such an appeal is still in need of a
more precise qualification. Indeed, adopting a phenomenological-descriptive method, such as Jaspers for instance does in his *Allgemeine Psychopathologie*, does not necessarily mean that this method fully coincides with the Husserlian one.

Moreover, several authors in phenomenological psychopathology distance themselves from Husserl’s transcendental approach and from his account of the *a priori*. This primarily because, in their view, both aspects of Husserl’s phenomenology would eventually neglect the facticity of experience. Accordingly, they appeal to other thinkers in the phenomenological tradition, such as Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty.

Given this situation, we shall ask: (1) whether the appeal to Husserlian phenomenology might still be of relevance for phenomenological psychopathology, and (2) what are the elements in Husserl’s philosophy that contribute most to the development of the discipline.

In this essay, I will argue for an affirmative answer to the first question and seek to bring to the fore the elements that allow us to answer the second. My suggestion is that the relevance of Husserl’s phenomenology for phenomenological psychopathology cannot be discarded on the basis of a critique of the subordination of the existential to the essential and transcendental order.

To support this claim, I particularly focus on the works of Blankenburg. In his writings, the appeal to Husserl’s phenomenology plays a pivotal role in the elaboration of a “psychopathology of common sense”. Confronting Blankenburg’s with Husserl’s positions, I expect to provide an answer to the second question and to highlight the aspects in Husserl’s philosophy that contribute most to research in psychopathology.

## The loss of natural self-evidence and the psychopathology of common sense

*The Loss of the Natural Self-Evidence* [Der Verlust der natürlichen Selbstverständlichkeit] is the title of Blankenburg’s habilitation treatise, published in 1971. This title is a quote from an interview with a young schizophrenic patient, whose case Blankenburg exposes to exemplify his approach to the so-called “psychopathology of common sense”.

The latter concept, which has experienced a revival in current phenomenological psychiatry, is intended to comprehend the disturbances of the most basic structural moments of lived experience. Notably, these disturbances concern: (a) the relationship between cognition and action; (b) the relationship between reflection and pre-reflective givenness; (c) the implicit presuppositions of experience; (d) the relationship with other subjects.

Blankenburg’s essay particularly emphasizes interweaving philosophical and clinical aspects in the definition of psychiatry and its tasks. Such an interweaving is already implicit in the forward, where Blankenburg exposes the two main tasks of his work. The first task is philosophical and consists in highlighting the essential embedding of the subject in the life-world. The second task is of a clinical nature and coincides with the reassessment of schizophrenia, particularly in its early stages, as a disturbance concerning this primary embedding.

What emerges as *Leitmotiv* in Blankenburg’s reports of his interviews with the patient is the experience of a profound perplexity concerning different aspects of everyday life. What the patient misses is “something small, so strange, something important, without which it is impossible to live”. Thus, quasi-paradoxically, the experience of lack concerns something that is at the same time small and extremely important, so important as to be absolutely necessary to continue living. As the patient herself says, the experience is that of lacking support: “I simply find that I still need support. In all the simplest things of everyday life I need support. What I miss is natural self-evidence”.

The diagnosis of schizophrenia, in the case under consideration, is motivated by profound emotional disturbances and episodes of dissociation and thought-disorders [*Denkstörungen*].
The latter, however, do not concern abstract thinking and reasoning, but rather touch more radically on the existential self- and other-relatedness of the patient. Indeed, while she tries to give more concreteness and to specify that “something small” she is missing, the patient refers to all those un-reflected certainties of every-day life, which everyone of us usually takes for granted.

Thus the experience of perplexity and the loss of natural self-evidence are connected to a lack of familiarity with the surrounding world and its meaningfulness. The world becomes profoundly alien, and this experience of alienness blocks common every-day actions and all initiative-taking. However, this should not be too simplistically understood as indicating that the lack of support and the collapse of the ground of un-reflected self-evidence imply an organically grounded, factual incapacity to perform actions and acquire new knowledge. In the case under consideration, these somatic prerequisites are still present.

Such a lack of support touches, instead, on the experiential level of meaningfulness and its structural pre-conditions, such as the implicit and pre-reflective awareness of being the source of spontaneous self-movements (the Husserlian “I can”), the meaningful structure of perception, the capacity of orientation in the intersubjective world, and notably auto- and hetero-affection. All these aspects are normally considered to be self-evident, selbstverständlich, since they should, so to say, “work by themselves”, without extra thematization or decision making.

They belong, in other words, to the sphere of pre-reflective awareness, which embraces all those pre-thematic subjective accomplishments that are the ground for explicit theoretical and practical activities. Accordingly, natural self-evidence is defined by virtue of its double character: both as pre-thematic and fundamental for the unfolding of experience. Its being commonly taken for granted may even make it appear rather jejunе. And nevertheless it remains something quite fundamental for the unfolding of our experience. Concretely, we can render the central moments making up natural self-evidence by resorting to what Straus calls the “axioms” of every-day life. These “axioms” are the undemonstrable truths that make experience possible at all levels beginning with the sensory ones.

In short, Straus’s axioms of every-day life concern: (1) the necessity of the correlation between subjectivity and the world; (2) the co-belonging of sensing [Empfinden] and moving; (3) the experience of the world as a unitary correlate of sensible experience, i.e. as intersensorially given; (4) the presence of inter-subjective relationships from the most basic domains of experience; (5) the assumption of implicit rules that define the ground of social interaction.

Like Straus’s axioms, what Blankenburg describes as natural self-evidence apparently shares some common features with Husserl’s account of the general thesis of natural attitude. In both cases, we are dealing with an implicit assumption or “positing” regarding the subsistence of certain fundamental truths and relations, which make up the general presuppositions of our being in the world.

Yet I consider it more appropriate to draw a parallel between the self-evidence Blankenburg and Straus are describing and what Husserl in his later texts calls Bodengewissheit. The latter notion, indeed, designates the pre-thematic and non-objectivating consciousness of the pre-givenness of the world, as the unitary correlate of subjective experience, and of other subjects, as co-experiencing the same world.

As Husserl again points out, we do not question such aspects of our experience of the life-world. They eventually make up the necessary and fundamental «soil of self-evidences, silent convictions» [Boden von Selbstverständlichkeiten, stillen Überzeugungen]. This soil of tacit familiarity and silent convictions gives us in every-day life precisely the support Blankenburg’s patient is lacking.
only if something in our experience of the life-world is not working properly any longer.\(^{17}\)

And it is the radicalization of this experience of Unstimmigkeit, its extension to different basic moments of lived experience, that defines, as Stanghellini puts it, the key vulnerability factor, or predisposition to schizophrenic diseases.\(^{18}\) Such an experience of instability and unfamiliarity often brings patients to compulsively reflect upon different aspects of their experience, to thematize them and call them into question.

This phenomenon has recently been conceptualized under the heading of the psychopathology of hyper-reflexivity.\(^{19}\) In short, this concept refers precisely to the compulsory need to reflect upon, and to explicate, those moments of experience that are normally taken for granted. This happens precisely because those moments are not experienced as tacitly familiar any longer, but rather as being profoundly alien.

If we consider that hyper-reflexivity is one of the fundamental phenomena used to describe and understand the experience of schizophrenic patients in the pre-psychotic phases, we can clearly see that at this stage the pathology does not properly entail a loss of self-consciousness, but rather a disturbance related to an exaggerated explicit self-consciousness, which eventually displaces implicit and pre-reflexive self-awareness.

Seeking to thematize and control the different moments of natural self-evidence, such a hyperbolic reflective attitude becomes itself a further source for the profound experience of alienness in the patient’s relationship with the world and other subjects. The experience of perplexity and the connected hyper-reflexivity touch on three main aspects, which, taken together, make up the experience of Bodengewissheit.\(^{20}\)

These aspects are: (1) the self-relatedness of the experiencing subject; (2) his/her world-relatedness, i.e. the openness to the world as the unitary correlate of experience; and (3) his/her relatedness to other subjects. Each of these dimensions has been thoughtfully considered in Blankenburg’s analyses. Moreover, all of them are still objects of inquiry in contemporary research.

The self-relatedness of the experiencing subject

With respect to the subject’s self-relatedness, Blankenburg highlights the deep connection between the existential need for support, characterizing the loss of the natural self-evidence, and the distinctive manifestations of self-consciousness in schizophrenic patients.

Talking about subjectivity disorders or Ichstörungen, in this case, neither means that patients are factually incapable of initiative taking, nor that they are not explicitly conscious of their actions. The disturbance rather concerns the foundation of subjective activity: the source of action and its motivation lose their implicit legitimation, and therefore need to be questioned as to their very principles.

Consistently, Blankenburg’s patient’s disappointment regarding her actions, together with the feeling of inadequateness in relation to the surrounding world, «does not concern a given event, which is expected in vain from the outside, nor does it concern exclusively the sustaining ground of natural self-evidence. It rather concerns her own self as the authority of all grounding [Begründungsinstanz]».\(^{21}\)

This approach has been recently developed through the characterization of schizophrenia as an ipseity-disease. In this respect, Parnas and Sass have shown how such a disease touches the most basic layers of subjectivity, arguing that this entails the two connected phenomena of diminished self-affection and hyper-reflexivity.\(^{22}\)

In agreement with them, Fuchs has further discussed how both phenomena interfere with implicit self-experience on different levels, involving corporeity, temporality, spatiality, and intersubjectivity.\(^{23}\) Accordingly, the disease does not imply any annihilation of the self, but rather its constantly and radically being called into question.\(^{24}\)

In this respect, too, Husserl’s phenomenology can offer important hermeneutical
tools. Indeed, he conceives of what we may call self-proximity as the main feature of pre-reflective self-awareness. And the Selbstverständlichkeit of such a primary self-experience is the ground of all further moments of experience.\(^{25}\)

The world-relatedness

Correlatively, the loss of natural self-evidence concerns the relationship between the subject and the world. As we have seen, Blankenburg’s patient explicitly connects her perplexity with lack of support and the crumbling of the unitary ground of familiarity, which is the pre-condition for all sort of expectations or projects.

Thus, what she misses is a direct and spontaneous relationship and openness to the world as the horizon of all events. In the most radical sense, thus, the disturbance concerns the experience of the world as soil and as the horizon of practical, emotive, and cognitive possibilities.\(^{26}\)

Being generated by such a loss of familiarity, hyper-reflexivity eventually aggravates this loss, so that the risk of a death spiral evidently manifests itself.\(^{27}\) Profoundly influencing even the experience of the world, such a disease implies a diminishment of responsivity. Accordingly, the disturbance of self-affection is parallel and correlative to a disturbance of hetero-affection.

The relatedness to other subjects

The very adoption of the notion of common sense to define the approach to psychopathology described here – think of Kant’s considerations regarding sensus communis as gemeinschaftliches Sinn and as correlative to a gesamte Menschenvernunft,\(^{28}\) to which Blankenburg explicitly appeals\(^{29}\) – hints at the intersubjective dimension of experience.

Blankenburg and several other authors in the current debate particularly insist on the structural connection between the loss of natural self-evidence and impairments in intersubjective experience.\(^{30}\) The loss of natural self-evidence, in other words, does not primarily concern the relationship between an isolated subject and a world made up of things, but rather the experience of Einstimmigkeit in intersubjective relationships.

Common sense, is thus shaped in accordance with the basic and mostly implicit game-rules that make possible our Mit-Sein, our mutual understanding, acting, and communicating. Again, this is best explicated by Blankenburg’s patient:

Everyone shall know how one behaves - has a path and a way of thinking. His acting, his humanity, his sociality, all the rules of the game he is accomplishing: I could not recognize them clearly thus far. I missed the basis. [...] I don’t know how to call it. [...] I don’t know, it’s not knowing, it is so...Even children know that! One gets it otherwise so obviously.\(^{31}\)

Having discussed the main features of the project of the psychopathology of common sense, we shall now return to the questions asked in the introduction, concerning the relationship between this project and Husserl’s phenomenology.

Some points which have already emerged from the previous analysis, concerning the contribution of Husserl’s philosophy to phenomenological psychopathology shall now be explicitly thematized. As I will argue in the next section, this contribution is primarily related to Husserl’s phenomenological method.

A question of method

In his meta-theoretical writings, Blankenburg is primarily concerned with the question of the proper method for psychopathological research. In particular, he seeks to highlight the relevance of the phenomenological method for psychopathology, showing how such a method impinges on both the analysis of single clinical cases, and on the redefinition of the epistemological status of psychopathology.
as a scientific discipline.

As a starting point for these methodological reflections, I consider it fruitful to address Blankenburg’s assessment of the distinction between Jaspers’s and Husserl’s understanding of phenomenology and the phenomenological method. In particular, Blankenburg investigates the consequences of a too drastic opposition between understanding [Verstehen] and explaining [Erklären], for psychiatric research.

Stemming from Dilthey, this methodological distinction is parallel to the one between spirit/mind and nature. Certainly, both distinctions cannot be simply abandoned. However, if psychopathological inquiries are focused on the human being as a psychophysical unity, the natural and the spiritual side cannot be simply opposed but should rather be considered in their reciprocal relationship. Accordingly, as suggested by Rinofner-Kreidl in her reading of Jaspers, a methodological pluralism is required in psychopathology.

The latter should in other words resort to both a descriptive method, aiming at comprehending psychiatric diseases as subjectivity-disorders, and an explicative method, which aims to shed light on the material-bodily conditions that underlie the emergence of the given pathology.

According to Blankenburg, Jaspers is not always perfectly clear in maintaining this methodological pluralism. Sometimes his arguments suggest a dichotomy between understanding and explaining, which Blankenburg is not ready to subscribe to. Assuming understanding and explaining as reciprocally exclusive, and observing that schizophrenic experience is not immediately understandable, Jaspers concludes that the only possibility for addressing the psychotic disorders characteristic of schizophrenia is some form of naturalistic explanation.

Blankenburg’s criticism is primarily directed toward such a conclusion: by resorting to a strict dichotomy between understanding and explaining, one would eventually deny the possibility of understanding pathologies such as schizophrenia. That is to say, one would neglect the core of sense that even patho logical experience has for the patient. As Blankenburg points out:

Jaspers [...] transformed Dilthey’s maxim, according to which “we explain nature, while we understand psychic life”, in such a way that it now has the following meaning: Insofar as we understand, we are dealing with non-psychotic life [nichtpsychotisches Seelenleben]. Where understanding ends, there begins nature - be that in the form of physiological (e.g. fatigue, sleep) or pathological processes (i.e. in the form of the illness that destroys life). In short: where understanding ends, there we need to explain.

Blankenburg’s criticism touches on two main points. First, assuming a dichotomy between understanding and explaining, Jaspers does not properly investigate what are the conditions for the possibility of understanding in general. This implies that the very assumption of the concept of understanding remains in need of legitimation. Second, Jaspers’s “descriptive phenomenology”, which is supposed to make understanding possible, is considered to be limited in many ways. In particular, by criticizing Husserl’s theory of Wesensschau as being too speculative, Jaspers eventually overlooks the potential impact of eidetic phenomenology on psychiatry, and considers the latter only as an empirical science.

The pars construens in Blankenburg’s methodological reflections can be read as a response, in many ways inspired by Husserl’s phenomenology, to these problems. On the one hand, indeed, Blankenburg questions the dichotomy of Verstehen and Erklären in favor of a more integrative approach to psychiatric diseases.

On the other hand, he restores the right of the eidetic moment of phenomenology. This allows him to characterize psychopathology as a science that integrates both the consideration of facts, and the retrieval of eidetic or structural moments. These methodological reflections set the basis for the proper descrip-
tion of pathological phenomena, including those of a psychotic nature.

From this perspective, instead of defining \textit{ex ante} the latter phenomena as something that withdraws from all understanding, one should seek to refine the conceptual tools, and thus the heuristic potentials, of psychiatry. For the latter is necessarily and constantly confronted with phenomena that challenge, or may challenge, its original conceptual framework.

Already on the basis of epistemological reflections, in accordance with the phenomenological method, we cannot however [...] be satisfied with exclusion [\textit{Ausgrenzung}]. Rather, with respect to the new or the different that impresses us in schizophrenic patients, a new task is set, namely that of being concerned with an enlargement of our categorial potentialities, in order not to exclude what is abnormal, and instead to be able to assume it within a larger essential comprehension.\textsuperscript{35}

In elaborating this method, Blankenburg explicitly appeals to Husserl’s phenomenology. Particularly, he focuses on two aspects: the \textit{epoché} and the eidetic description. In the following, I will develop my argument in a critical dialogue with Blankenburg’s considerations concerning these two aspects. I thereby intend to highlight the relevance of Husserl’s phenomenological method for psychopathology.

\section*{Epoché and psychopathology}

According to Blankenburg, the \textit{epoché} is a fundamental methodological tool for the psychopathology of common sense. It marks, in his view, the Archimedean point in order to scientifically phrase the question concerning natural self-evidence and its loss.\textsuperscript{36}

In order to assess the potentialities of this method for psychopathology, one should carefully consider its essential features and the conditions for its adoption. Blankenburg’s thesis can be summarized as follows. Assuming that, in general, there must be a shared moment between the subject and the object of knowledge, we shall ask what this moment consists of in the case of schizophrenic experience.

Jaspers, indeed, is right in claiming that such an experience, particularly in the most serious psychotic cases, withdraws from understanding. And this precisely because a shared context of exchange seems to be missing. According to Blankenburg, the \textit{epoché} may instead uncover just such a common soil. The argument for this claim is based upon the analogy between the loss of natural self-evidence and the \textit{epoché}.

What happens in schizophrenic patients can be described as a sort of “involuntary \textit{epoché}”, which corresponds to a pathological degeneration of the \textit{epoché} as it is intended in phenomenology. This amounts to saying that the loss of natural self-evidence is a compulsory and uncontrollable alteration of a natural attitude, in which the ground of familiarity that makes every-day experience possible gets lost. As Blankenburg writes:

The hypothesis made here is that in the loss of the natural self-evidence one has to do with something similar to an involuntary and “pathological” \textit{epoché} - which not only brackets the relationship with the life-world, but rather undermines it.\textsuperscript{37}

Even if Blankenburg is quite careful in distinguishing \textit{bracketing} from \textit{undermining} as resulting from, respectively, the \textit{epoché} and the loss of natural self-evidence, there is still something disturbing in this analogy.

Admittedly, on the one hand, we are concerned with a methodological tool adopted within a theoretical enterprise whereas, on the other hand, we are facing a pathological phenomenon that dramatically challenges the subject in existential terms. Considering that the difference appears to be so radical, one may wonder whether the analogy can be considered to be valid at all.

To understand the meaning of this analogy and thus to answer this question, it is fruitful to first thematize the differences between the
phenomenological epoché and the loss of natural self-evidence. Although something in this thematization may appear obvious and is certainly well-known to the phenomenological reader, it is important to clarify why, notwithstanding these radical differences, Blankenburg’s proposal is legitimate within his argument regarding the methodological foundation of phenomenological psychiatry.

Moreover, these remarks will allow me to show how these methodological reflections reverberate on the enlarging of the conceptual and categorial tools that Blankenburg appeals to in his response to Jaspers.

The first main difference between the epoché and the loss of natural self-evidence concerns the freedom of accomplishment. The phenomenological epoché is essentially characterized by Husserl as an act of freedom, which has both a theoretical and an ethical valence. Through the analysis of the field of conscious experience, which is uncovered by means of the epoché, i.e. by the bracketing of natural attitude, Husserl eventually raises the philosophical questions of truth and its foundation. The ethical ideal of a «radical renewal of the whole humanity» is connected to these questions.

The moment of freedom that characterizes the accomplishment of the epoché is clearly something that the experience of loss of natural self-evidence completely lacks. Obviously, this is quite clear for Blankenburg himself who correctly points out that

From the very beginning, the freedom of accomplishment [...] differentiates this [Husserlian M.S.] epoché from all other compulsory changes of attitude that seize the subject involuntarily and even more so from a change that is pathologically conditioned.

Far from resulting from an act of free will, and far from being motivated by theoretical and practical aims, the suspension of natural self-evidence in schizophrenic experience is instead compulsory, and induced by factors that cannot be controlled by the subject.

The second main difference is related to what we may call the elements of “resistance” to a change of attitude. Regarding the epoché, indeed, these elements of resistance make the shift between different attitudes possible. Even when we adopt a phenomenological stance, there is something of a natural attitude which is still implied in our experience, particularly in its practical concerns. Should we be endangered by a fire, we would not perform an epoché and suspend positing the existence of the fire, but simply escape.

Accordingly, accomplishing the universal epoché the phenomenologist certainly puts out of play the interests that belong to a natural attitude and acquires a new theoretically oriented attitude. This attitude, moreover, can (and does) itself become habitual and is constantly actualized, whenever the relevant scientific concerns are very deeply rooted and acquire an ethical character.

Nevertheless, those interests characterizing a natural attitude are never properly lost. And this not only according to the rather trivial example I just offered regarding our practical concerns, but also with respect to the specific mode of being of our interests.

The epoché «does put all other interests “out of play”, yet by no means gives up their mode of being as our mode of being (ours, as “interested”) as if we would give up these interests of doubt regarding their further subsistence».

Moreover, the epoché leaves our consciousness of the world as the horizontal correlate of experience and as soil [Weltboden].

In schizophrenia, instead, these “resistances” often fail, and the very mode of being of every-day life interests is called into question. Patients are overwhelmed by the questioning of the obviousness of experience in the different dimensions we have previously considered. And this process of calling into question does not meet any counter-movement that would re-establish familiarity with the pre-givenness of the world.

For this reason, as Blankenburg points out, a change of attitude for these patients does
not simply entail the bracketing, but rather the loss of natural self-evidence and of implicit trust in the soil of experience.

Given these fundamental differences, can we still consider the analogy proposed by Blankenburg as valid and legitimate? And is it really fruitful in epistemological terms? To answer these questions we shall now make explicit reference to the aspect under which the epoché and the loss of natural self-evidence are considered to be analogous.

This aspect coincides with the reflective detachment from the self-evidence of lived experience. In schizophrenia, such a detachment amounts to a self-alienation with respect to the most basic moments of experience, that is to say, it concerns the Bodengewissheit of the life-world, with its implicit game-rules that make both theoretical and practical experience possible.

Maintaining that such alienation is not simply reducible to the dialectics of the reflecting and reflected self, the moment of self-distancing can be considered as shared by the epoché and the loss of natural attitude. And it is precisely this shared moment that, in Blankenburg’s view, defines the common soil between the psychiatrist and the patient, that is to say, the place from which the psychiatrist must begin in order to establish a proper approach to what apparently withdraws from all understanding.

Resorting to the epoché, thus, Blankenburg faces the questions regarding the conditions of understanding, which, in his view, remained unanswered by Jaspers. Unlike the latter, in defining the proper approach to psychiatric diseases Blankenburg does not appeal to the presentification of the other’s experiences in the act of understanding.

With respect to this approach, which eventually seeks to absorb the other’s experience in one’s own and thus to fill the gap between the self and the other, Blankenburg somehow suggests counter movement, based upon the recognition of a moment of alienness in all self-experience, including that of the psychiatrist. To understand pathological experiences, indeed, he considers a «self-alienation of the psychiatric consciousness» to be necessary.

This amounts to saying that the bracketing of the psychiatrist’s own anchorage to the life world can establish a certain proximity to the patient’s experience. And on the basis of such proximity, it may be possible to share some aspects of the patient’s world.

The previous discussion shows that the appeal to the epoché as a methodological tool to phenomenologically re-found psychiatry as a science entails both potentialities and limits, connected with the analogy between the epoché and the loss of natural self-evidence. Indeed, Blankenburg’s considerations have two main implications, which shall be carefully distinguished and which may even be in conflict with each other.

On the one hand, the epoché is intended as the Haltung the psychiatrist will assume to approach the patient’s disease. Bracketing all presuppositions that make up his/her own anchorage to the world, the psychiatrist opens up the field for a possible encounter with the patient’s experience in its alienness.

This can be further developed in what Waldenfels has called a responsive therapy. Endorsing the dynamics of Frage und Antwort, responsive therapy may awaken the sense for what is alien and extra-ordinary, without subordinating it immediately to the proportion of what is normal and thus without seeking to contain it through normalization-processes. The accomplishment of the epoché, in this sense, makes possible an opening to the alienness of the other by precisely recognizing a moment of alienness in one’s own experience.

Such recognition is a condition for being touched by the alienness of the other and is necessary in order to come closer to the core-sense that still characterizes apparently incomprehensible experiences. On the basis of this approach, it will no longer be legitimate to address these experiences as an abstract symptomatology that lacks all contact with experience.

On the other hand, however, the analogy between the loss of natural self-evidence and the epoché risks being problematic in at least two senses.
First, strictly speaking, if we formally assume the analogical argument and its premise regarding the necessity of a shared soil presupposed by understanding, we could legitimate the adoption of the *epoché* only as a method suitable to address schizophrenia in its initial phases.

That is to say, it would be suitable to address a pathology characterized by the loss of natural self-evidence, but not other forms of psychiatric illness. Indeed, not all mental diseases are characterized by the loss of natural self-evidence. Yet, if the *epoché* and the characteristic self-distancing of psychiatric consciousness that it makes possible can play a role in providing a methodological ground for psychopathology in general, then the legitimacy of the assumption of the *epoché* cannot be based upon its analogy with one specific illness.

Second, and most important, the previously discussed differences between the *epoché* and the loss of natural self-evidence are so profound as to require a qualification of the very analogy. Voluntarily accomplishing the *epoché* (albeit such an accomplishment is itself motivated by a form of *pathos* that invites us to question immediacy) amounts to reflecting upon experience in order to uncover its immanent meaningfulness, its structures and dynamics.

The motivations for such a bracketing are both theoretical and practical in nature. Yet this is something completely different from the loss of primal familiarity with the world of experience, i.e. from the loss of the supporting soil of experience.

Although in Blankenburg’s argument these two points sometimes merge, I suggest that they should be carefully distinguished from one another. The first point, according to which the *epoché* makes it possible for the psychiatrist to assume a particular *Haltung* in the relationship with the patient is very promising, since it can indeed open up a “logic of correspondence” between the patient and the psychiatrist.\(^\text{46}\)

This “logic of correspondence” is particularly fruitful insofar as it is not based on the reduction of alienness and alterity, nor does it aim to “normalize” the other. It is rather grounded upon a form of self-distancing of the psychiatrist, which allows him/her to uncover a moment of alienness in his/her own experience. The second point, instead, which is centered on the analogy between the *epoché* and the loss of natural self-evidence, should not be overemphasized and generalized.

Besides the *epoché* Blankenburg’s methodological writings are concerned with the status of the descriptions provided by phenomenological psychiatry. Particularly, this impinges upon the qualification of the latter as a *Tatsachen-* or rather *Wesenswissenschaft*. The discussion of this further point will allow us to highlight another further relevant impact of Husserl’s phenomenology on psychiatric research.

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### Psychopathology between “Tatsachen-” and “Wesenswissenschaft”

Certainly inspired by Heidegger, authors in phenomenological psychopathology have notably stressed the indispensable facticity that characterizes the human being-in-the-world. Psychopathology cannot overlook this fundamental moment of facticity, but should rather consistently assume it as a central moment of its inquiries.\(^\text{47}\)

Endorsing such an assumption, Blankenburg does not for this reason dodge a confrontation with phenomenology as an eidetic science. For, if psychopathology certainly cannot overlook facticity, the preceding considerations have shown that it is also in search of the “essence”, i.e. of the immanent structures, characterizing specific pathologies.

Accordingly, Blankenburg seems to have accepted Husserl’s challenge regarding the methodological reform of empirical psychology, and has extended it to psychopathology. This challenge is best formulated in Husserl’s *Encyclopedia Britannica* article. In this text, transcendental phenomenology is presented as a new *a priori* science based upon a rigorous descriptive method.

As such, it is not only considered to be the *organon* of all rigorous philosophy, but also to
be able to promote a methodological reform of all other sciences. In Husserl’s view, such a methodological reform should primarily concern the science that comes closest to phenomenology, since it shares the same object of inquiry, namely psychology. And to endorse a methodological reform of psychology that is phenomenologically grounded means to re-found psychology itself on the basis of the eidetic-descriptive method.

Accordingly, psychology will not only be a factual science of conscious experiences as facts, but rather an eidetic science concerned with the immanent structure of these experiences and their reciprocal relationships. Such a descriptive psychology is called by Husserl pure psychology. It is supposed to have a two-fold function: a reforming function with respect to empirical psychology, and a preparatory function with respect to transcendental phenomenology.

Blankenburg subscribes to this demand for reform and extends it to psychopathology. That is to say, he believes it is possible to investigate not only the structures of the unitary and generally consistent unfolding of experience, but also the interruptions that undermine such a consistence.

One first ingredient of this methodological reform is, as we have seen, the epoché: its accomplishment opens up the field for psychiatric inquiry. A further aspect touches the status and the validity of psychopathological descriptions and analyses. In other words: Is it possible to retrace an “eidos”, distinctive of different pathologies, that is to say, a morphological core of sense? Or should they rather be considered as simple facts, maybe even deprived of an internally consistent structure?

Criticizing what he considers a too speculative reading of Husserl’s eidetic phenomenology, Blankenburg believes that precisely these eidetic concerns are fundamental for psychopathological research. Characterizing, for instance, the initial and pre-psychotic phases of schizophrenia as related to the loss of natural self-evidence, Blankenburg puts forward a thesis that evidently goes beyond empirical inquiry and rather addresses the eidos, that which structurally and essentially characterizes the pathology.

Such an essence, to indirectly quote Husserl again, is amorphological or vague and can be grasped by considering specific exemplers and confronting singular cases. Such a variation of “normal” and “pathological” examples sheds light on both the invariants and the specific alterations, and this is why it allows us to display the essential features of both normal and pathological experience.

In accordance with other representatives of phenomenological psychiatry, and eventually with Husserl himself, Blankenburg conceives of the a priori, i.e. of the eidetic character of description, as given in and through the description of concrete lived experience. Accordingly, focusing on the structural or eidetic moment does not mean denying the role of empirical reality and of facticity in a science like psychiatry.

On the contrary, the eidetic or structural description and the analysis of concrete clinical cases are connected in a double-bind relationship: the essence of a pathology, for instance schizophrenia, can only be given in and through the encounter with the singularity of each patient; conversely some hypotheses concerning that essence must be present from the very beginning, at least implicitly, in order to make a diagnosis possible. Such circularity, however, is not a vicious.

It rather hints at the dynamics of co-implication characterizing the relationship between eidos and factum, and at the unitary, although complex, character of a phenomenologically grounded science of experience.

In this respect, Blankenburg talks about “phenomenological experience”, and aims herewith to designate a constitutive moment of psychiatric science. Such an experience, as he suggests, is necessarily located on the threshold between facticity and the a priori:

We would like instead to talk about a “phenomenological experience” only where phenomenological explication of the
implications of sense of intentional life has an immediate impact upon the empirical dimension of the single sciences and transforms them from their basis, that is to say, where the objective-positivistic and the phenomenological-eidetic experiencing are connected in the unity of a regulation-circle [Regelkreis].

Based upon the recognition of the dynamic relationship between the eidetic-structural and the factual moment of pathological experience, phenomenological psychopathology aims at embracing and integrating them scientifically.

Thus, the phenomenological eidetic method is not merely in contrast with the empirical method. Its task is rather analogous to the one Husserl ascribes to pure phenomenological psychology, namely the task of reforming a discipline, the aim of which is still of a practical-clinical nature, based on solid theoretical grounds. And the solidity of these grounds is precisely due to their being deeply anchored in lived experience.

Conclusions

In this article, Blankenburg’s approach to the psychopathology of common sense has been considered in order to shed light on the impact of the phenomenological method for the redefinition of the epistemological status of phenomenological psychiatry.

My aim was particularly to highlight the specific contribution that Husserl’s phenomenology has to offer such an epistemological enterprise. Particularly, in this context (although the same could be said for every domain of phenomenological inquiry), the methodological considerations cannot be completely separated from the object of inquiry.

This is the reason why I started by considering Blankenburg’s example describing one of his patients and only subsequently moved on to the thematization of the methodological implications and presuppositions of these concrete descriptions.

In light of the previous discussion, we are now in the position to answer the two questions raised in the introduction to this article, namely: (1) Is Husserlian phenomenology of relevance for phenomenological psychopathology? and (2) What are the elements in Husserl’s philosophy that contribute most to the development of the discipline?

The discussion of Blankenburg’s approach to the psychopathology of common sense allows us to give a positive answer the first question. As to the second question, we have seen that the contribution of Husserl’s philosophy to psychopathology is of great importance insofar as methodology is concerned.

Particularly, we have seen how the two methodological pillars of Husserl’s philosophy, the epoché and the eidetic description, are fruitfully re-invested by Blankenburg in his psychopathological and methodological writings. Notably, the epoché plays an important role for the psychiatrist, insofar as, by suspending his/her familiarity with the world of every-day life, it allows him to address pathological disease in its characteristic alienness.

On the other hand, the eidetic-descriptive approach allows us to consider pathologies not only as factual deviations from established normality. This, indeed, would be extremely problematic, since the classification of something as normal or pathological would eventually depend upon an empirical, quasi-statistical, generalization, whereby, as Foucault has shown, the social element of power should also be taken into consideration.

The phenomenological criterion for characterizing normality is, as is well known, the experience Einstimmigkeit. And certainly psychiatric illnesses represent an interruption of such an einstimmig unfolding of experience. Nevertheless, this does not prevent us from recognizing that even these illnesses are characterized by an immanent structure, i.e. that they have a distinctive experiential core of sense.

Adopting the phenomenological method of description, this core of sense can be uncovered and described by inquiring into the interplay of Einstimmigkeit and Unstimmigkeit.
in lived experience, as well as the phenomena testifying to a dimension of alienness within self-experience.

**Notes**


3 Pioneers in this domain are authors like von Weiszecker, von Uexküll, Bilz. See, in this respect, E. BASSO, *L’apriori nella psichiatria “fenomenologica”*, cit. Basso particularly considers Binswanger’s position.


7 I will return to some aspects of the current debate later on.


10 Ivi, p. 42: «Was fehlt mir eigentlich? So etwas Kleines, so komisch, etwas Wichtiges, ohne das man aber nicht leben kann».

11 Ivi, p. 43: «Ich finde einfach, daß ich noch den Halt brauche. Bei den allereinfachsten alltäglichen Sachen brauche ich Halt. [...] Das ist wohl die natürliche Selbstverständlichkeit, die mir fehlt».


14 E. STRAUS, *Die Ästhesiologie und ihre Bedeutung für das Verständnis der Halluzinationen*, in: «Ar-


16 ibid., p. 252.

17 ibid., p. 251.


19 See T. FUCHS, The Psychopathology of Hyperre-flexivity, in: «The Journal of Speculative Philo-

20 Such an grouping somehow entails all of Straus’s axioms of everyday life. Although the second and the fifth axiom I listed above based on Straus’s text apparently disappear, this is eventually not the case. The second of Straus’s axioms, indeed, can be considered as transversal to the threefold categorization I propose. The fifth axiom can be apprehended under the larger category of inter-subjective experience.

21 W. BLANKENBURG, Der Verlust der natürlichen Selbstverständlichkeit, cit., pp. 101-102: «Diese Enttauschung betrifft nicht nur ein bestimmtes, von außen her vergeblich erwartetes Ereignis, sie betrifft auch nicht nur den tragenden Grund der natürlichen Selbstverständlichkeit, sondern das eigene Selbst als Begründungsinstanz».


26 See W. BLANKENBURG, Der Verlust der natürlichen Selbstverständlichkeit, cit., pp. 78-88.


28 I. KANT, Kritik der Urteilskraft, cit., p. 293.

29 W. BLANKENBURG, Der Verlust der natürlichen Selbstverständlichkeit, cit., pp. 113-114.

30 ibid., p. 105-121.


S. RINOFNER-KREIDL, Zur Idee des Methodenpartikularismus in Jaspers’ Psychopathologie, cit. The valence of phenomenology to address the possibility of explanation in psychopathology, particularly with respect to motivations, has been highlighted by L.A. SASS, Phänomenologie als Definition und als Erklärung: The Case of Schizophrenia, in: S. GALLAGHER, D. SCHMICKING (eds.), Handbook for Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, cit., pp. 635-654.


W. BLANKENBURG, Der Verlust der natürlichen Selbstverständlichkeit, cit., p. 63: «Bei einem phänomenologischen Vorgehen dürfen wir uns jedoch [...] schon aus rein wissenschaftstheoretischen Überlegungen heraus nicht mit einem Ausgrenzen begnügen. Es stellt sich vielmehr die Aufgabe, angesichts des Neu- oder Andersartigen, das uns bei Schizophrenen aufstößt, für eine Erweiterung unserer kategorialen Möglichkeiten Sorge zu tragen, um das Abnorme nicht ausgrenzen zu müssen, sondern in ein umfassenderes Wesensverständnis hineinnehmen zu können».

Ivi, pp. 63-64.


E. HUSserL, Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie, cit., p. 154.

W. BLANKENBURG, Phänomenologische Epoché und Psychopathologie, cit., p. 129: «Die Freiwilligkeit des Vollzugs [...] unterschiede diese Epoché von vornherein von jeder anderen, den Menschen unfreiwillig überkommenden, erzwungenen Einstellungsänderung, zumal einer pathologisch bedingten».

E. HUSserL, Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie, cit., p. 154: «Und wieder gilt [für die transzendentale Epoché M.S.] alles, was wir von der früheren Epoché, sie mit Berufseinstellungen vergleichend, gesagt haben: daß sie in der „Berufszeit“ zwar alle sonstigen Interessen „außer Spiel“ setzt, aber ihre Seinsweise als die unsere (bzw. unsere Seinsweise als solche der „Interessenten“) nicht etwa aufgibt, als ob wir sie preisgeben oder auch nur ihre weitere Aufrechterhaltung neu in Erwägung ziehen würden usw.».

Ivi, p. 155.


W. BLANKENBURG, Der Verlust der natürlichen Selbstverständlichkeit, cit. p. 64.


See E. BASSO, L’apriori nella psichiatria “fenomenologica”, cit.


51 Ivi, p. 16: «Wir möchten demgegenüber erst davon „phänomenologischer Erfahrung“ sprechen, wo die phänomenologische Explikation verborgener Sinnimplikationen des intentionalen Lebens unmittelbar Einfluss nimmt auf die einzelwissenschaftliche Empirie und diese von Grund auf wandelt, d.h. wo positivistisch-gegenständliches und phänomenologisch-eidetisches Erfahren sich zu der Einheit eines Regelkreises zusammenschließen».
52 W. BLANKENBURG, *Der Verlust der natürlichen Selbstverständlichkeit*, cit., p. V.