A Libertarian Response to Dennett and Harris on Free Will

John Lemos

Abstract


Abstract: This article critically examines central arguments made in Sam Harris’ Free Will as well as key aspects of Daniel Dennett’s compatibilist conception of free will. I argue that while Dennett makes thoughtful replies to Harris’ critique of compatibilism, his compatibilism continues to be plagued by critical points raised by Bruce Waller. Additionally, I argue that Harris’ rejection of the libertarian view of free will is ill-informed and I explain the basics of Robert Kane’s libertarian view, arguing that it can be defended against points raised by both Dennett and Harris.

Keywords: Free Will; Libertarianism; Compatibilism; Daniel Dennett; Sam Harris

 

Una replica libertaria Dennett e Harris sul libero arbitrio

Riassunto: Questo articolo prende criticamente in esame gli argomenti principali presentati nel volume di Sam Harris “Free Will” e gli aspetti principali della concezione compatibili sta proposta da Daniel Dennett sul libero arbitrio. Intendo sostenere che Dennett, pur rispondendo accuratamente alla critica del compatibilismo proposta da Harris, sostiene un compatibilismo che resta sotto il giogo delle critiche sollevate da Bruce Waller. Inoltre, cercherò di sostenere che il rifiuto della prospettiva libertarian proposto da Harris è una posizione male informata ed esporrò I principi di base della prospettiva libertarian di Robert Kane, affermando che lo si può difendere dale critiche sollevate sia da Dennett che da Harris.

Parole chiave: Libero arbitrio; Libertarianismo; Compatibilismo; Daniel Dennett; Sam Harris


Keyword


Free Will; Libertarianism; Compatibilism; Daniel Dennett; Sam Harris

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Riferimenti bibliografici


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DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.4453/rifp.2017.0019

Copyright (c) 2017 John Lemos

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