Indexical Duality: A Fregean Theory

Tomis Kapitan

Abstract


Abstract: Frege’s remarks about the first-person pronoun in Der Gedanke have elicited numerous commentaries, but his insight has not been fully appreciated or developed. Commentators have overlooked Frege’s reasons for claiming that there are two distinct first-person senses, and failed to realize that his remarks easily generalize to all indexicals. I present a perspectival theory of indexicals inspired by Frege’s claim that all indexical types have a dual meaning which, in turn, leads to a duality of senses expressed by indexical tokens.

Keywords: Indexicals; First Person; Perspective; Senses

 

La doppia natura degli indessicali: una posizione fregeana

Riassunto: Le osservazioni di Frege sul pronome di prima persona contenute in Der Gedanke hanno sollevato numerosi commenti, ma le sue intuizioni non sono state pienamente comprese o sviluppate. I commentatori di Frege hanno trascurato le ragioni per le quali egli sosteneva che ci sono due distinti sensi della prima persona e non hanno colto come queste sue osservazioni possono essere facilmente estese a tutti gli indessicali. Intendo presentare qui una posizione prospettivista sugli indessicali, ispirata dall’affermazione di Frege per cui tutti i tipi di indessicali hanno un doppio significato che, a sua volta, porta a una doppia natura dei sensi espressi dalle occorrenze indessicali.

Parole chiave: Indessicali; Prima persona; Prospettiva; Sensi


Keyword


Indexicals; First Person; Perspective; Senses

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DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.4453/rifp.2016.0033

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