From Minimal Self to Self as Hyper-generalized Sign: Notes for an Integrated Model of Subjectivity
Abstract
Dal sé minimo al sé come segno iper-generalizzato. Note per un modello integrato della soggettività
Riassunto: Il presente articolo propone una prospettiva teorica di tipo fenomenologico e intende mostrare che l’intersoggettività e le sue dinamiche di costituzione di senso sono coerenti con una vision emergentista del sé personale. In particolare, questo studio propone un modello semiotico di mente e una concezione correlata del sé come “segno iper-generalizzato”. Il punto di partenza di questa analisi poggia sui modelli proposti dalla ricerca fenomenologica, cognitiva e da quella ispirata dalla teoria dell’enazione che distinguono tra una coscienza pre-reflessiva e un sé non concettuale proprio del corpo vissuto. Il presente studio mira a proporre un singolo costrutto non-ipostatizzato di tipo psicologico e psicodinamico capace di ricomprendere e integrare tutte quelle proprietà intersoggettive della cognizione che sono oggi oggetto d’indagine della ricerca fenomenologica sulle varie tipologie di sé (sé minimo; sé pre-riflessivo; sé non-concettuale; sé ecologico; sé esteso), le quali vengono anche indagate nelle scienze cognitive da coloro che seguono l’approccio incarnato e situato.
Parole chiave: Sé minimo; Sé pre-riflessivo; Sé non-concettuale; Sé ecologico; Sé esteso.
Abstract: This paper proposes a phenomenologically oriented theoretical perspective and it aims at showing that intersubjectivity and its dynamics of sense-making are consistent with an emergentist view of the personal Self. In particular, this paper proposes a semiotic model of mind and a correlated conception of the self as a “hyper-generalized sign”. The starting point for this analysis is based on models emerging from phenomenological, cognitive and enactive research which differentiate between pre-reflective consciousness and a non-conceptual self of the living body. The paper will try to develop a single non-hypostatised construct of a psychological and psychodynamic kind that includes and integrates all those intersubjective features of cognition addressed by phenomenological research on the various forms of the self (the minimal Self; the pre-reflective Self; the non-conceptual Self; the ecological Self; the extended Self) which are also an object of study for embodied and situated approaches in the cognitive sciences.
Keywords: Minimal Self; Pre-reflective Self; Non-conceptual Self; Ecological Self; Extended Self.
Parole chiave
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.4453/rifp.2013.0002
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