

STUDI

## Response to De Caro, Lavazza, Lemos, and Pereboom

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I HAVE PUT MY COMMENTARIES in alphabetical order, not because I think this is “fair and objective” but because, as it happens, this order strikes me as providing the most readily followed path for my responses to the many good ideas contained in these essays, with forward- and backward-facing allusions kept to the minimum.

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I want to thank Mario de Caro for his sympathetic framing of the predicament I face on free will, having to confront Giants of Science while being considered by them a dwarf, that is, a philosopher. It isn't quite as bad as all that, at least for me, and one of my most delicious pleasures (usually enjoyed in private, not public, discussion) is rubbing the noses of Giants in their philosophical naiveté.

De Caro sees this possibility, but, gentleman that he is, he barely follows through; he could have driven home his examples of scientists doing naïve philosophy. Since scientists tend to be self-confident when they venture into our precincts, we can expect them to dismiss charges of naiveté as just so much self-protective hermetically sealed “quality”

control by nit-picking philosophers – and, of course, sometimes it is. But not always, and not here.

In general I endorse de Caro's comments, and particularly his brief account of Harris's oversimple vision of free will. As he says:

So, Harris faces a problem here: if he's really criticizing the commonsense view of free will, he's reinventing the wheel.<sup>1</sup>

We philosophers have been making the points Harris makes against various libertarian versions of free will for decades if not centuries. The essays in this issue will show Harris and his fans that he has both underestimated the complexity of the issues and – much more importantly – underestimated the need for critics of free will to articulate what they plan to put in its place. Harris likes to dismiss my attempt to articulate varieties of free will worth wanting as an evasion, but in fact it is he who has largely ignored the obligation to say, in the wake of his self-styled demolition of the concept, just what adjustments we should make to our institutions of punishment and reward, and why.

The essays here both demonstrate the irrelevance of the oft-discussed neuroscientific

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experiments inspired by Libet's work, and point to more fruitful sources of empirical evidence we need to consider: social and political facts that are typically bracketed out of the thought-experimental forays. Instead of science-fictional accounts of logically possible manipulating neuroscientists, nearly identical twin deciders (Ann and Barbara), Plum and Mr. Puppet,<sup>2</sup> we should look more closely at how we are helped and hindered by our friends and acquaintances, and by the laws and policies that enable and constrain these interactions, to see what differences in our decision-making ought to matter when we are assaying responsibility.

I would also like to thank de Caro for his defense of my avuncularity. I would like to think that it is not just my advanced age that licenses my willingness to give friendly advice, but the fact that I have been using all those years to listen to my colleagues and learn from them, and I am still engaged in those tutorial sessions.

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I view Andrea Lavazza's essay as a series of friendly amendments to the view I have developed over the years, and I particularly applaud his concentration on what he calls "empirical free will" and I have called "practical free will".<sup>3</sup> We agree in distinguishing it from "metaphysical" free will, which is the fantasy Harris says it is. Human moral responsibility no more depends on metaphysical free will than it depends on the antique doctrine of immortal souls, bound for Heaven or Hell.

I also join Lavazza in endorsing Pearl's view of causation.<sup>4</sup> I am not sure I endorse Ismael's extension of Pearl's view, which I have not yet had occasion to study, but it is certainly along congenial lines. We have to rinse the standard but obsolete Laplacean billiard-balls model of causation out of our thinking.<sup>5</sup> Lavazza notes that the Libet-inspired experiments *suggest* what Caruso calls a "shrinking" of agency or the self, but they only suggest this to the unwary. In addi-

tion to the well-exposed difficulties with the experiments and their interpretation, of which Lavazza gives a good summary, there is the fact – obvious but seldom noted – that these experiments are attempts (good and bad) to *clamp* human subjects in states that expose the possible pathologies of machinery that normally churns out successful results – the counterparts of perceptual illusions in the investigation of vision and the other senses. We can be tweaked into revealing the less than perfect methods of our neural machinery, but this doesn't show that we don't, in general and in more normal circumstances, acquit ourselves competently. Lavazza cites Doris,<sup>6</sup> and I would add Doris's more recent book, *Talking to Our Selves: Reflection, Ignorance, and Agency*,<sup>7</sup> Doris adds valuable detail to the empirical perspective on the conditions of rational, responsible choice. All of this highlights what I meant by my parenthetical aphorism in *Elbow Room*: «If you make yourself really small, you can externalize virtually everything».<sup>8</sup>

Here is where my campaign to raze the Cartesian Theater of consciousness<sup>9</sup> pays dividends in the investigation of free will. Harris, in effect, is tilting at windmills while adopting a rather Cartesian perspective of his own, which might be succinctly summarized as "my brain made me do it!". Well of course it did, but it is not something external to *you*, but rather a part of you. Once we set aside the first-person perspective of the Self trapped in the Control Room of the Brain and unable to have access to the subpersonal events that are doing all the work, we can make sense of the idea of *practical* free will, with rational choices implemented by subpersonal agencies distributed in both time and space in the brain. We enlarge the self from Nagel's<sup>10</sup> dread "extensionless point"<sup>11</sup> to a more familiar and explicably capable seat of agency. Lavazza notes:

A rational choice seems to imply a conscious consideration of the reasons why one makes a choice. Of course it can be ar-

gued that there is no need for a thorough examination, minute after minute, choice after choice, for an action to be free. But it is undeniable that control over the action in its full unfolding cannot be separated from a period of time, however brief, in which the subject is aware of her decision and execution.<sup>12</sup>

Actually, it is undeniable only if we extend the temporal window indefinitely. Consider the case of the factory worker who foresightedly handcuffs herself to safety levers that will jerk her hands out of harm's way as she inserts new sheet metal blanks into the punch press. Then she doesn't have to devote any attention to the intentional task of keeping her hands out of the press. The conscious choice was made weeks ago, perhaps, and still is in force but never reconsidered. In a similar spirit the subject in a Libet-style experiment has made a conscious choice to obey the instructions as best she can, and so she delegates to some unknown brain tissue the task of jerking a left-right motor decision out of her at an appropriate time.

Does she do it intentionally? Yes, of course, by outsourcing the triggering to something brewing in her brain, something that she might be completely oblivious to, but that might well be as detectable to the right sort of high-tech probing as a book of random numbers locked in a desk drawer. As I have said, the only moral to draw from Soon and colleagues is:<sup>13</sup> Don't play rock/paper/scissors with Soon for high stakes if your head is in an fMRI scanner.

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John Lemos presents his critique so clearly and fairly that he almost convinces *himself* that my compatibilist view is right! In the end, he jumps off my bandwagon at the last possible moment, and at the end of my commentary I will try to show him how to climb back on. He gives a fair and accurate summary of my debates with Harris and

Waller, and approves of my response to Harris, but he thinks Waller shows up a flaw in my compatibilist/determinist account:

But, as Waller shows quite forcefully, with his examples of Ann and Barbara, once we accept a naturalistic deterministic perspective we should also believe *there are sufficient causal conditions which are beyond Ann's control which have led her to be the way she is and which explain why she could not have made the better choice which Barbara made*. Barbara and Ann meet Dennett's requirements for morally responsible agency, but once we accept a deterministic worldview we must also concede that Ann has come to be who she is through factors beyond her control and because of who she is she makes the poor choice she makes.<sup>14</sup>

The phrase I have italicized contains a mistake I have pointed out before, but not in just this context, so this is a useful moment. In my discussions of control and causation going back to *Elbow Room* and elaborated at length in the discussion in *Freedom Evolves* of the chess-playing computer programs competing against each other (see also the chapter, *A Computer Chess Marathon in Intuition Pumps*),<sup>15</sup> I have pointed out that *being in control* is never a matter of being able to counteract all prevailing conditions. Determinism is not only not an obstacle to being in control; it is much easier to control things in deterministic settings than when genuinely random interveners are apt to interfere with one's goals. This is as true of *self-control* as of the control of other things (drones, for instance). Think of yourself as a drone with onboard control, not remote control: *you* are "pulling the strings"; you are *autonomous* in the sense that *no other agent is controlling you*. Or as Truman might have put it, the buck stops with you.

The innards of control systems must frequently exploit "random" variables to handle conditional branching that must occur in the absence of sufficient information about the prospects of the two paths encountered – a Bu-

ridan's ass situation with no hint about which way to turn. It *does not matter*, metaphysically or morally or practically, whether the control system gets its random nudges from the amplification of an utterly indeterministic quantum event or from the emission of a pseudo-random digit (a coin flip, in effect) from a pseudo-random number generator.

Let's think about using a coin-flip. In a deterministic world, coin flips are not "really undetermined" but they may wisely be treated as random – as our very paradigm of randomness, in fact – because the "sufficient causal conditions" for heads or tails involve the location of every electron in the observable universe, something that is not possibly in any agent's control – except for an omniscient, omnipotent God! (It is for this reason that I eventually conceded to Bob Doyle's persistent search for some role – *any* role – for indeterminism in free will: I granted him that if I were playing rock/paper/scissors for high stakes with an omnipotent, omniscient god or demon, I would want indeterminism to be true. Only in that presumably unlikely situation would it be of any consequence to me, as a responsible, moral agent, to worry about determinism.)

In short, the control that Ann, in Waller's thought experiment, has of her choice is as real as control could be, even though her choices, like the choices of all non-miraculous non-divine agents, must be determined by the interaction between incompletely informed states of her brain and (possibly chaotic) elements that are not informed at all about relevant affairs. Let us look more closely, now, at Lemos's claim:

there are sufficient causal conditions which are beyond Ann's control which have led her to be the way she is and which explain why she could not have made the better choice which Barbara made.<sup>16</sup>

The first clause is true, but has no bite. A controller cannot control everything and hence cannot control all of its own controls.

Does that obvious fact entail that nothing ever controls anything? That is a dire consequence indeed, and amounts, in my view, to a threatened *reductio ad absurdum* of the libertarian position, since invoking indeterminism wouldn't make the problem go away. Control is a perfectly real phenomenon in the world, well investigated by mathematicians and engineers in control theory, and they can readily distinguish the systems that are autonomous self-controllers from those that are controlled by other agents, and so forth. Determinism does not threaten their discipline. The second clause hides an elision:

sufficient causal conditions [...] which explain why she could not have made the better choice which Barbara made.<sup>17</sup>

Here we have to look at the logic of "could have done otherwise". A deep enough analysis of Ann's inner workings *might* show that indeed Ann's reasoning and controlling prowess was not as powerful as Barbara's, or it *might* instead show that the better choice was as accessible to Ann as to Barbara, only a single bit-flip away in the ongoing processing. To illustrate the point by going to the limit, it could turn out that Ann and Barbara were information-processing twins, both running the same "program" (like a chess playing program playing against itself), and one of them, on the occasion, flips a bit "at random" and branches on 0 while the other, in almost exactly the same state, branches on 1. A flip of a coin is all that distinguishes them, *but they both had to flip a coin*.

Now are Waller and Lemos right that it would be *unfair* to hold Ann responsible and not Barbara? Why? Ann is not to be pitied for having a defective or morally incompetent brain, for her brain is just as good as Barbara's. There is nothing we would *repair* or *adjust* in Ann's brain to make it more like Barbara's. There is nothing for Ann to regret, aside from the fact that on this occasion one of her necessarily uninformed choices went sour in a way beyond her control.

In life you have to take your chances. Does this show that “it is a matter of constitutive luck that when faced with the same choices Ann makes a poor choice and Barbara makes a good choice”? I suppose in a way it does, but is this actually a serious objection? Is there – could there be – a coherent position that somehow ruled out the role of luck in life? We already have put in place many features of civilization intended to mitigate the role of luck, damping it down instead of amplifying it, and we are busy designing more and more. Many of the horrors and miseries of earlier ages have been, if not eradicated, greatly diminished, and an important aspect of the moral agency “game” we are invited by society to play is that it fosters a policy of habitually taking steps to minimize the role of bad luck in our own dealings, not just for our own sakes, but for the sake of others. Reckless driving is just one kind of reckless self-control we condemn, and I do mean *condemn*.

We are invited to *take* responsibility for our choices, and hence we attempt to obtain as much information as is practically possible to guide them (depending on their anticipatable seriousness). We don’t need any fantasies about “agent causation” or Ultimate Responsibility to ground this attitude. It is undoubtedly unfair to impose this daunting challenge and opportunity on the very young, the senile, and those of intermediate years who for one (unlucky) reason or another are *generally* unable to participate competently in the citizen role. But why is it unfair to oblige the rest to take responsibility, in return for granting them the freedom to act that is the particular blessing of a working society. The concept of “constitutive luck” sounds very impressive, but for the life of me, I cannot get it to make enough sense to worry about.

Lemos then turns to the Libet-inspired literature, and notes that Mele and others have offered serious objections both to the details of the experiments and their interpretation. Of course I concur; in fact, my cri-

tique of Libet’s work began with my review in 1979 of Popper and Eccles’ embarrassingly bad book, *The Self and its Brain*,<sup>18</sup> and has continued through the years. Let me just say that the missteps detectable in this literature would take a volume to expose, without thereby gaining much insight into the nature of morally relevant decision-making.<sup>19</sup>

So let’s turn to Lemos’s next topic, an exploration of libertarian alternative views, which he rightly says both Harris and I find unpromising at best. He devotes careful attention to my long, sympathetic analysis of Robert Kane’s position, and he gets it right, until he comes to his objection: «Dennett’s critique here focuses too much on randomness. On Kane’s view, free willed decisions are causally undetermined but they are not random».<sup>20</sup> Why not? Because «what she [Kane’s businesswoman, in his example] does will not be a random happening but a product of her effort either way».<sup>21</sup> No, it will be a product of her effort, *supplemented* (sent down one branch rather than another) by a quantum coin flip of one sort or another. Kane elaborates his position by proposing that the coin flip must be “responsive to the dynamics within the agent’s own will,” but this won’t do. If *which way* the coin flips is “responsive to the dynamics”, then it isn’t undetermined – and isn’t even pseudo-random, isn’t really a functional coin flip. If the *use at this time* of a genuinely undetermined coin flip is what Kane means by its being “responsive to the dynamics” then, once again, it doesn’t matter where or when the undetermined event that counts as the coin flip occurs.

As I once put it, it doesn’t matter whether the winning ticket in a fair lottery is chosen before the tickets are sold. In a deterministic world all your life’s lottery tickets, all the crucial items that are going to be “responsive to the dynamics of your will” throughout your life might as well be installed in your brain at birth. As long as no one can discover them in advance, you are as safe from exploitation as you would be with genuine contemporaneous random events.)

Lemos goes on to grant that I have some good objections to Kane's position, such as the awkward fact that on his view we can never know who is morally responsible and who is not, but he is still not ready to settle into compatibilism, falling back on Waller's example of Barbara and Ann, and the presumed problem of "constitutive luck." This leaves Lemos in a bind:

While there is not at this point sufficient empirical or metaphysical evidence of the existence of free will, there are still moral and pragmatic reasons for living and acting as if we do have free will.<sup>22</sup>

It seems then that if I can succeed in persuading Lemos that the problem of constitutive luck has been misplaced and inflated, he can join me, and the rest of the discussants, in a variety of free will worth wanting: moral competence and membership in a fair society (see my comments on Pereboom). We will be acting as if we do have free will because we really do have this variety of free will worth wanting.

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Derk Pereboom identifies Frank Jackson and me as sharing a version of compatibilism that has the following property: «virtually everyone would qualify as a compatibilist».<sup>23</sup> If Pereboom is right, Jackson and I have succeeded in articulating a version of a variety of *free will worth wanting* that nobody wants to discard; it provides the kind of "non-basic" desert (if that is not a misnomer) that sustains many of the features of civilized life: we deserve to have our promises and contracts honored, we deserve our political freedom of action and movement unless we have become dangers to society in one way or another, we deserve the penalties imposed on us by our societies when we knowingly violate the terms we have tacitly agreed to live by, etc. Since almost no one calls for the abolition of all promises and rules, returning us to some-

thing like a Hobbesian state of nature, virtually everyone could be this kind of compatibilist if it weren't for the deal-breaker: there is no room in this view for *basic desert*. Jackson and I both think that our non-basic desert is "sufficient for a moral life," as Pereboom puts it, so the question to be addressed is: why do our incompatibilist opponents insist on casting the free will issue in terms of basic desert? We can ask libertarians: what is it about basic desert that makes non-basic desert a cheap and unworthy substitute? We can ask incompatibilists like Harris and Pereboom: what follows from your denial of "basic" free will that makes a moral difference? Pereboom says:

I deny that causal determination is compatible with the control in action required for moral responsibility in the desert sense, and in the basic desert sense in particular. I believe that this is no small matter, since relinquishing desert would stand to significantly alter our practice of holding responsible and our ways of dealing with criminal behavior.<sup>24</sup>

I agree with Pereboom about the need for major reforms in our policies and justifications regarding responsibility and punishment, but I don't think "causal determination" has any role to play in obliging this salutary revision of common wisdom. I have never seen a libertarian account of desert that is coherent, so the incompatibility he sees is negligible. It is not as if we were unlucky to be situated in a deterministic universe that denies us the basic free will of which we can clearly conceive but to which, alas, we cannot aspire. An indeterministic universe could no more meet the imagined requirements for "basic desert" than a deterministic universe. *Determinism is simply beside the point*. Pereboom sees his manipulation argument as raising a problem for me. I am not sure I see why.

«The manipulation argument against compatibilism brings this disagreement to

the fore», he says.<sup>25</sup> This is a series of thought experiments in which manipulation by other agents is first introduced and then gradually reduced, leading eventually to cases «in which the action is causally determined in a natural way».<sup>26</sup> The challenge to me is to identify and defend a “principled difference” between two roughly adjacent cases on this near-continuum, so that I can identify those agents who are *not* responsible for their manipulated decisions/choices/actions, while the rest *are* responsible (and deserve – in the *basic* sense – their reward or punishment, the blame or acclaim). I am obliged to draw and defend this principled distinction, Pereboom proposes, because although these blameworthy or praiseworthy choices are as determined by prior conditions as anything else in nature, the decisions are in some morally important sense *up to* the deciders. Can I point to an essential feature of some cases where *the buck stops*?

Notice at the outset that this way of putting the challenge apparently presupposes a kind of bright line essentialism that is, in general, not to be found in the natural world, and not to be missed. There is no “principled difference” between mother and offspring in the gradual lineage from reptiles to mammals, and yet reptiles are very definitely not mammals and mammals are not reptiles. This does not demonstrate that there is something illicit or incoherent or indefensible about the concept of mammals, and I submit that nobody has shown that we need a concept of basic desert (or free will in some special sense) that doesn’t admit of degrees. After all, we normally assume that small children are not fully responsible, and that they mature into responsibility gradually, with only arbitrary (not “principled”) demarcations such as minimal driving age, voting age, etc.

In this regard, I think it is notable that Pereboom acknowledges that even with his Case 1, there are philosophers who disagree with his verdict, which is appropriately hedged: «Does Plum deserve to be blamed or punished for what he’s done? I don’t think so, and many others surveyed agree».<sup>27</sup>

So with the proviso that I simply reject

the goal of finding a bright line between Pereboom’s various cases, I am happy to say what matters and why, the same way a biologist can list and defend the “wild type” features of a species while acknowledging vagueness at the boundaries. To be eligible for blame, punishment, praise and reward is to be eligible for membership in what I call the Moral Agents Club (stressing that this is a socially constructed category). Such a morally competent agent

- (1) is well informed
- (2) has roughly well-ordered desires
- (3) is moved by reasons
- (4) is not being controlled by another agent
- (5) is punishable
- (6) “could have done otherwise”

All these features admit of degree, and this isn’t a bug, it’s a feature. A brief word of explanation: (5) refers to the vulnerability we human beings have and robots wouldn’t have unless steps were taken by their creators to give them memories and minds that could not be backed up, bodies that could not be repaired indefinitely piecemeal. Superman, absent kryptonite, would similarly not be eligible for membership in the Moral Agents Club. (6) is to be understood in the sense – the only coherent sense, I claim – of the phrase that is, as I have shown,<sup>28</sup> compatible with strict determinism: having the relevant *degrees of freedom* (in the engineer’s sense) presupposed by (1-4). See my comments on Lemos for more on this. Pereboom acknowledges this sense:

Another question one might pose is: could Plum have done otherwise given that the compatibilist conditions are met? We can all agree that he has the general sort of ability to do otherwise that Dennett spells out. He indeed does have the general ability to kill and to refrain from killing.<sup>29</sup>

Pereboom goes on:

But we can ask: could he have exer-

cised his general ability to refrain from killing *on this particular occasion*?<sup>30</sup>

We can ask, but we shouldn't, since the answer about whether or not Plum could have done otherwise, *were every atom and particle in the universe in exactly the same state as in the actual occasion* tells us absolutely nothing of importance about Plum's competence or character, and so could shed no light whatever on whether Plum met or failed to meet some requirement for desert in any sense worth our attention. We can indeed ask a more reasonable question, about whether Plum's self-control was impaired or overwhelmed on the occasion, but this is independent of any issue of determinism.

All this attention focused on the ultimate causal intricacies of decision-making doesn't just entice us into metaphysical fantasy; it distracts us from the truly important questions we should raise about the political and economic conditions that might undercut the presumptive justification of our societal system of blame and punishment. Pereboom's sequence of examples actually illustrate the conditions that matter (without highlighting why they matter) and his proposals on this score are very much to the point. I agree with him that this goes well beyond "just positive and negative incentives". The moral legitimacy – not mere effectiveness of control – of a system of laws and punishment can be jeopardized by empirical facts about *particular kinds* of causal backgrounds (poverty, abuse, lack of basic security and other hardships), which should have a bearing on our decisions about blameworthiness.

Everybody's decisions are caused by an almost unimaginable commingling of factors both distal and proximal, both chaotic and regular, but sometimes there are identifiable features of that background that justify mitigation or excuse, beyond the obvious features already listed in my six eligibility requirements for membership in the Moral Agents Club. These requirements are balanced by the requirements for being a Moral Agents

Club *worth joining*. This is brought out clearly in new work by my colleague Erin Kelly, who has substantially clarified and extended my own thinking.

Social injustice presents a dilemma for the prospects of criminal justice. We are torn between protecting some people's basic rights by incapacitating dangerous offenders and refusing unfairly to deprive offenders of their liberty when they have already suffered serious injustice. This dilemma for criminal justice cannot be solved in an unjust society.<sup>31</sup>

A society with serious inequalities is a society in which respect for law enforcement, for example, is eroded, which impacts the effectiveness of enforcement, which brings in its train harshness and opportunities for abuse of power, in a self-perpetuating spiral that can plunge into a failed state. (Notice that this observation *presupposes* the underlying moral competence of those on both sides of the social inequalities: it is just as *rational* for the severely disadvantaged to lower their respect for laws that unjustly penalize them for conditions imposed on them by inequality as it is for everyone to disrespect laws that oblige them to act in ignorance of the laws.) What should an *imperfectly* just society (like ours) do, then? Excuse everybody? No. That would abandon the whole point of the Club, which is to preserve the security of those who choose to make the obligatory adjustments and contributions of membership.

If we opt for collective self-defense, even though it cannot be fully justified, incarcerated offenders are due compensation for the burdens we impose on them. This might take the form of delivering to them some of the social goods they have been denied, including education, health care, and job opportunities. By including elements of distributive justice in our criminal justice system, we acknowledge the rights, welfare, and humanity of people we lock up. We

owe this to people whom we, as a society, have failed, and whom we are now asking to bear the brunt of our criminal justice efforts to protect other people's rights.<sup>32</sup>

This, in my opinion, is the best way to fill the gap left by the abandonment of such indefensible notions as "basic desert" and libertarian free will. It provides a framework for Pereboom's call for greater leniency in the law while maintaining something like the traditional idea of responsibility, shorn of metaphysical excesses but recognizable in its appeal to a defensible rendering of the requirement of "could have done otherwise".

I see what seems to be a clear path to consensus looming: we can all be compatibilists who jettison retributivist notions of blame, while keeping a defensible justification for a much more humane institution of punishment. The specter of a return to an amoral and chaotic state of nature is not the only alternative to the panicky metaphysics of libertarianism and retributivism.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> M. DE CARO, *In Defense of Avuncularity. Dennett and Harris on the Relation Between Philosophy and Science*, in: «Rivista internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia», vol. VIII, n. 3, 2017, pp. , here p. .

<sup>2</sup> See J. GREEN, J. COHEN, *For the Law, Neuroscience Changes Everything and Nothing*, in: «Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society», vol. CCCLIX, n. 1451, 2004, pp. 1775-1785.

<sup>3</sup> See A. LAVAZZA, *A Pragmatic and Empirical Approach to Free Will*, in: «Rivista internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia», vol. VIII, n. 3, 2017, pp. 247-257.

<sup>4</sup> See, for instance, the discussion in D.C. DENNETT, *Freedom Evolves*, Viking, New York 2003, pp. 85-87.

<sup>5</sup> See my discussion in C. TAYLOR, D.C. DENNETT, *Who's Afraid of Determinism? Rethinking Causes and Possibilities*, in: R. KANE (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Free Will*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2005, pp. 257-277 and in D.C. DENNETT, *Freedom Evolves*, cit., chap. 3. See also my remarks here about coin flips as paradigms of random events – events without a cause in a possibly

deterministic universe (*infra*, pp. 277-278).

<sup>6</sup> See J.M. DORIS, *Lack of Character: Personality and Moral Behavior*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2002.

<sup>7</sup> See J.M. DORIS, *Talking to Our Selves*, Oxford University Press, New York 2015; on this topic see also E. LAMBERT, D.C. DENNETT, *Getting by with a Little Help from our Friends*, in: «Behavioral and Brain Sciences», forthcoming.

<sup>8</sup> D.C. DENNETT, *Elbow Room. The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting*, MIT Press, Cambridge (MA) 1984, p. 143.

<sup>9</sup> See D.C. DENNETT, *Consciousness Explained*, Little Brown, New York 1991.

<sup>10</sup> See T. NAGEL, *Moral Luck* (1976), in: T. NAGEL, *Mortal Questions*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1979, pp. 24-38.

<sup>11</sup> See D.C. DENNETT, *Elbow Room*, cit., p. 75.

<sup>12</sup> A. LAVAZZA, *A Pragmatic and Empirical Approach to Free Will*, cit., p. 249.

<sup>13</sup> See C.S. SOON, M. BRASS, H.-J. HEINZE, J.-D. HEYNES, *Unconscious Determinants of Free Decision in the Human Brain*, in: «Nature Neuroscience», vol. XI, 2008, pp. 543-545.

<sup>14</sup> J. LEMOS, *A Libertarian Response to Dennett and Harris on Free Will*, in: «Rivista internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia», vol. VIII, n. 3, 2017, pp. 231-246, here p. 236 – my italics.

<sup>15</sup> See also D.C. DENNETT, *Intuition Pumps and Other Tools for Thinking*, Norton & Co., New York/London 2013, chap. 3.

<sup>16</sup> J. LEMOS, *A Libertarian Response to Dennett and Harris on Free Will*, cit., p. 246,

<sup>17</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>18</sup> See D.C. DENNETT, *Review of Karl Popper and John Eccles, "The Self and its Brain"*, in: «The Journal of Philosophy», vol. LXXVI, n. 2, 1979, pp. 91-97.

<sup>19</sup> For my latest on this, see my comments on Lavazza (*supra*, pp. 275-276), and my recent talks available on YouTube.

<sup>20</sup> J. LEMOS, *A Libertarian Response to Dennett and Harris on Free Will*, cit., p. 242.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>22</sup> *Ivi*, p. 244.

<sup>23</sup> D. PEREBOOM, *Response to Dennett on Free Will Skepticism*, in: «Rivista internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia», vol. VIII, n. 3, 2017, pp. 259-265, here p. 260.

<sup>24</sup> *Ivi*, p. 264.

<sup>25</sup> *Ivi*, p. 260.

<sup>26</sup> *Ivi*, p. 261.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>28</sup> See D.C. DENNETT, *Freedom Evolves*, cit.

<sup>29</sup> D. PEREBOOM, *Response to Dennett on Free Will Skepticism*, cit., p. 261.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibidem* - my italics. See also R. CLARKE, *Dispositions, Abilities to Act, and Free Will: The New*

*Dispositionalism*, in: «Mind», vol. CXVIII, n. 470, 2009, pp. 323-351.

<sup>31</sup> E. KELLY, *Limits of Blame: Rethinking Punishment and Responsibility*, forthcoming, manuscript p. 183.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibidem*.